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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral. 
(Kranzberg' s first law of technology)1 
 
 
This work has developed within the on-going scientific and socio-political debate on the 
issue of the relationship between technology and society. In common understanding, and 
also in scientific practice, these are very often viewed as two distinct and quite separate 
entities. Against that, this study presents a theoretical exploration aimed at showing that 
there are significant margins within which to maneuver in order to recuperate and valorize 
human and social action in the sphere of technological development. The principle of 
interwovenness between technology and society has been an important contribution of the 
sociology of science and technology. It has enabled what in sociological terms is usually 
referred to as the debate on the ‘social construction of technology’. This issue, therefore, is 
not new or original, but rather a major and ongoing debate that has characterized social 
studies of science and technology (STS studies) for some forty years on. Thus, the 
‘interwovenness’ principle seems to be broadly accepted nowadays in humanities and 
social sciences. Nevertheless, if one looks at the way in which technology is developed by 
engineers and technicians and applied in policy (sometimes also by sociologists and 
philosophers) – that is the practice science and technology development -of it seems that 
this principle may indeed formally recognized within one field but substantially denied or 
misunderstood in another.  
 
It is important to emphasize that although STS studies have been able to express this 
interwovenness, the politico-economic (differentiating) aspects of technology development 
have tended to be neglected. They have been deeply elaborated, but in a rather essentialist 
and determinist way (as I will discuss in Chapter 2). For this reason, I think, a critical 
                                                            
1 Kranzberg, 1986. 
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reflection on the issue of the interwovenness remains important; in particular, it is 
necessary to explore the margins of human and social action in the technology of today. 
One objective of this thesis, therefore, is to make a contribution to the actual 
interwovenness debate, indicating that a new cultural horizon is needed to reflect critically 
on technology-society interaction, especially on the relationship between human 
experiences and technology design.     
 
This new cultural horizon is explored by analysis of the  role human experience plays in 
technical action. This focusing on human experience is directly inspired by Andrew 
Feenberg’s teachings on technology. In supporting his thesis of the possibility of a 
democratic rationalization of technology, Feenberg aims to develop Marcuse’s argument of 
the need to reconcile the rationality implied by science and technology with experience of 
the lifeworld.2 For Feenberg, science and technology should also be constrained by values 
and human needs recognized in experience and validated in political debate. In this, 
Feenberg seems to be recovering the phenomenological approach of Gadamer and Merlau-
Ponty who, while not wanting to endorse an impossible and regressive re-enchantment of 
nature, did want to defend the role of experience against the naturalistic reductionism of 
science and technology in modern society (Feenberg, 2010: 208-10). It is clear that 
demonstrating the possibility of reconciling experience and technology means opening 
significant margins within which to maneuver in order to recuperate and valorize human 
and social action within the sphere of technological development, democratic participation 
and potentialities included (as considered in Chapter 2).  
 
Thus, the main area of critical reflection in this thesis is on ‘human experience and 
technology’. The reflection is guided by the following key issue: Have technology and 
human experience really become two mutually exclusive entities?  This theoretical 
question will be discussed from various perspectives, developing a socio-anthropological 
and socio-epistemological research that proceeds from a specific social unit of observation, 
that of skills.  
  
                                                            
2 Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) represents a condition in which the world is experienced and lived. It may be 
conceived as a universe of what is self-evident or given, a world that subjects may experience together. 
Sociologically, it introduces the socio-cultural context wherein what seems immutable (for example, 
tradition, common sense, social practices) is, in reality, historically mutable. For Husserl, the lifeworld is the 
fundamental of all epistemological enquiries. 
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1.1 The concept of experience and research methodology  
 
1.1.2 Skills, lifeworld and the sociality of technical action 
 
In taking skills as the specific unit of observation of this work, I am obliged to underline 
that the main object of this thesis is not skills. I do not want to develop a research model or 
paradigm for skills. Rather, I will ‘use’ this category in an ‘instrumental’ way, employing 
skills as the main indicator of a more general dimension of investigation: experience in 
technical action. In order to explain the reason for this choice of instrument, I use a 
classical conceptual distinction made within the methodology of social research.  
 
In quantitative and qualitative social research, there is a difference between the unit of 
observation and the unit of analysis. The former is described by the data one analyses, 
whereas the latter is the major entity that is being analyzed, the ‘what’ is being studied. 
The two should not be confused. A study might, for example, work with a unit of 
observation that is situated at an individual level but have as the unit of analysis something 
at a neighbourhood level, and thence drawing conclusions on neighbourhood 
characteristics from data collected from individuals. In the case of the present work, since 
it is focused on delivering theoretical insights, the focus is not on collecting empirical or 
statistical data. Nevertheless, I will collect conceptual data produced by the unit of 
observation of skills, with the aim of drawing more general theoretical conclusions on the 
unit of analysis (experience in technical action).      
 
But why skills? In the epistemological point of view of ancient Greek culture, experience 
was expressed with the word ‘ἐμπειρία’ which coupled the terms ‘ἐν’/ ‘ἦν’ (inside) with 
‘πεῖρα’ (practice). This meant that with experience, according to ancient Greeks, man was 
able to essay or practice reality from within. This etymological meaning expressed a vision 
of knowledge open to personal and social (and also contingent) experience.3 The scientific 
revolution of modernity split these two formerly interwoven domains (rationality and 
experience). Today, in the hegemonic mainstream meanings, ends, practices, traditions, 
that is sociality, are considered as subjective, non-rational, non-scientific, against which 
there is nature, means, abstraction. No mediation is accepted.   
                                                            
3 Interestingly, in this ancient philosophical thought, the idea of essence prevailed as the rational form of the 
teleological structure of everyday life.  
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This thesis, on the contrary, refers to an idea of experience linked to the concept of 
lifeworld. For this reason, I discuss the sociality of technical action and interwovenness of 
these two domains (rationality and experience). In order to do this, from the 
methodological point of view, a sort of operationalization4 process of the concept of 
‘experience in technical action’ is developed (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Operationalization process of the concept of ‘experience in technical action’ 
 
This diagrammatic representation expresses the semantic operationalization of the concept 
of experience (as referring to technical action). The different rings express the different 
level of abstraction: the more external the ring, the more general the concept considered. 
The generality of the concept of the first (outer) ring (experience in technical action) is 
reduced in the second ring, where what discussion is specified in more concrete terms as 
social quality (of technical action). Specifying that social quality of technical action 
suggests analysis in more concrete terms as the classical concept of habitus (or hexis).5 
                                                            
4 In research design, ‘operationalization’ is a process defining the measurement of phenomenon that is not 
directly measureable but whose existence is indicated by other phenomena.  
5 ‘Habitus’ is the Latin version of the Greek ‘hexis’, an important term in the philosophy of Aristotle, and 
meaning a set of dispositions that generate practices and perceptions. Roughly, habitus is the way we see the 
world in which we live, through our own personal experiences acting as our eyes. According to Mauss and 
Experience
(in technical 
action)
Sociality (of 
technical 
action)
habitus (hexis)
Skill
(Savoir‐faire)
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This conclude in more operational terms with the analysis of the concept of skill in the 
final ring, a concept endowed of concrete, visible and measureable social characters.     
 
This operationalization process and the final choice of adopting skills as the main unit of 
observation is deeply influenced played by the work of the French anthropologist Marcel 
Mauss. Mauss indicated the existence of an inseparable link between man and technique, 
affirming that it is the human body that is the first technical means we have at our disposal, 
and that it is this which we must learn to master in order to survive: 
 
I made, and went on making for several years, the fundamental mistake of thinking that there 
is technique only when there is an instrument. I had to go back to ancient notions, to the 
Platonic position on technique, for Plato spoke of a technique of music and in particular of a 
technique of dance, and extended these notions.6 
 
For Mauss, technique is a traditional (social) and efficient (productive) action perceived by 
the actor as an action of a mechanical, physical or physical-chemical order. The body is the 
first instrument of man, his first technical object. The primary form of technique is 
therefore that of the body. Skills are guided by a habitus, Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual 
development from Aristotle’s hexis indicating an ensemble of culturally transmitted, 
enduring dispositions, anchored to the human body (Bourdieu, 1980).7 More recently, 
François Sigaut (2007) has confirmed this principle of fundamental association between 
technique and the body, reminding us that the etymological root of the term organ (of the 
body) is the Greek word ‘ὄργανον’, meaning ‘tool’.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Bourdieu, it is fundamentally a bodily dimension, since hexis, a basic dimension of the sense of social 
orientation, is a practical way of experiencing and expressing one’s own sense of social value. 
6Nous avons fait, et j'ai fait pendant plusieurs années l'erreur fondamentale de ne considérer qu'il y a 
technique que quand il y a instrument. Il fallait revenir à des notions anciennes, aux données platoniciennes 
sur la technique, comme Platon parlait d'une technique de la musique et en particulier de la danse, et étendre 
cette notion (Mauss, 1936 : 9). The English translation of this paragraph is taken from Crary & Kwinter, 
1992 (p. 461). 
7 In his Logic of practices (1990), Pierre Bourdieu defined habitus as a ‘system of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes 
without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order 
to attain them. Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being in any way the product of obedience to 
rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor’ 
(p. 93). 
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Here, technique is understood as that which employs tools other than (additional to) the 
body. It is assumed that it develops from this fundamental relationship, known by terms 
like ‘skill’, ‘ability’ and savoir-faire8, and that it is linked to qualities such as perception, 
action, intentionality, corporeity and context. These elements will thus reappear frequently 
during this reflection: analyzing technique, as I see it, means starting off from 
these. Highlighting the relationship between these phenomena and technique in itself 
involves a demonstration that technique and society are not separate entities. Indeed, 
technical skills are not the property of any single body, but are qualities arising from the 
entire system of relationships that constitutes the presence of an agent in an extensive and 
structured physical and social environment. 
 
1.1.2 Transdisciplinarity, the encyclopaedic approach and semiosis 
 
But if the interwovenness of technique and society can be easily understood on the basis of 
these very common and (in sociology) shared evidences, why another work on this issue? 
As emphasized above, although in sociology the principle of the ‘interwovenness of 
technology and society’ is accepted, this principle seems to be somewhat confined to and 
within that discipline. Moreover, STS studies, which were born as a field of interest with a 
strong interdisciplinary orientation, nowadays seem having acquired a new disciplinary 
configuration, with its own exclusive borders and gate-keepers (schools, masters, 
literatures, etc.), with a closed jargon  and with a rather poor critical gaze.  
 
There is still a huge lack in interdisciplinary research with the philosophical and 
sociological debate on this issue apparently remaining within the narrow limits of single 
disciplines and even research areas (humanities, social sciences).  At the same time, 
interdisciplinary research is itself not always able to overcome the limits of mutual 
understanding and communication. Interdisciplinarity may easily be – often is, or at least 
seems to be - a communication between deaf people.  The communication is generally 
simulated for satisfying ministerial requests of bureaucrats and the desire for the display of 
innovative medals. However, everybody knows that really careers, power and professional 
                                                            
8Savoir-faire is a form of material understanding applied to tools and enabling the achievement of real tasks. 
It cannot be abstractly and formally reproduced, since it is incorporated in the bodies of those who possess it. 
Directly and materially applied to the task and transmitted only through imitation and practice, it is thus 
different to other modes of knowledge, such as scientific knowledge. 
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satisfactions are still assured within the reassuring (single) disciplinary borders 
(publications, journals, committees, appointments, etc.) and suchlike.  
 
It is clear that a new cultural horizon is needed. With this work, I try to suggest that a 
possible way forward is represented by the idea of trans-disciplinary research. Actually, 
trans-disciplinary research means that individual researchers should themselves make an 
effort to overcome disciplinary isolation through their own border crossings in order to 
emphasize the principle of the unity in diversity of human knowledge. This requires a huge 
effort, however, a passage across inhospitable lands that is certainly difficult and  may 
seem dangerous. Despite these risks which are several - including accusations of and 
resistance to presumed field invasions, ambitious pretentions, jealousies, criticisms of 
inevitable oversimplifications, difficulties in managing unknown concepts and terms, 
reduced margins for empirical research, etc. - trans-disciplinary research is nevertheless a 
risk worth taking.  
 
From the epistemological perspective, trans-disciplinary research should be based on a 
particular ‘picture’ of knowledge. Particularly, trans-disciplinary research assumes 
knowledge to be a semantic network of meaning that can be hardly organized in a well-
structured hierarchy of linear matches. Rather, knowledge is based on an unsteady, 
precarious and always contextually reconstructable network of semantic associations. This 
implies a different methodology of inquiry – as provided, for example, by the so-called 
encyclopaedic approach which has been widely represented and described by Umberto 
Eco (1984) in terms of an opposition to the so-called dictionary-like approach.   
 
The dictionary informs and defines a particular metaphorical representation of knowledge 
based on the figure of the so-called Porphyrian tree (Arbor Porphyriana), a conceptual 
device intended to illustrate the ‘scale of being’ (scala predicamentalis) elaborated by the 
Greek logician and philosopher Porphyry (Figures 2 and 3). 
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Figure 2: Porphyrian tree (Arbor Porphyriana) 
 
 
Porphyry elaborated this ‘device’ for presenting the Aristotelian classification system 
through a tree-like diagram based on dichotomous semantic oppositions. This device is 
considered the main model of the so-called ‘dictionary-like semantics’, a classification 
system implying a ‘fall’ from ‘genus to species’, based on a formal, linear and hierarchical 
system of linkages between categories. This model usually informs the hegemonic 
methodology of (disciplinary) scientific research.   
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Figure 3: Porphyrian tree 
 
In opposition to this epistemological and semiological model, Umberto Eco presented a 
new model broadly inspired by Peirce’s Theory of Signs (semiotics). Eco speaks of a 
dynamic object, the object itself, which we cannot never fully ‘grasp’ because we never 
have a complete, comprehensive and total vision of reality. We can only ever see reality 
from a certain point of view. This way in which we see things, ‘caged’ within our cultural 
system, is the so-called immediate object. But anything can be a sign as long as someone 
interprets it as ‘signifying’ something, and signs can and must be interpreted. This 
interpretative process is termed semiosis and in Peirce’s theory it is considered to be 
unlimited. Actually, when we meet a ‘signifier’9 – a ‘representamen’ in Peircean terms - a 
process  is initiated that leads to our interpretation of the representamen through another 
sign (Peirce calls this new sign: the ‘interpretant’). This last is another cultural unity useful 
to interpret, but one that will, in turn, call another interpretant, leading to a series of 
successive interpretants (potentially) ad infinitum.  
 
For this reason, according to Peirce, the meaning of a representation cannot be anything 
but a representation. Any initial interpretation can be re-interpreted and so semiosis is not 
considered a structure but a process. In this idea of semiosis neither universal semantics 
nor metalinguistic entities are allowed. Here, the system is based on an indefinite series of 
                                                            
9 A signifier is the form, not necessarily material, which the sign takes. 
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content units that are mutually defined and with a different nature but without being 
hierarchically ordered. These units cannot be classified as essential or ancillary. Eco 
defines this system an ‘encyclopedia’. Indeed, operationally and occasionally, within this 
system, local trees of meaning can be isolated.  But the system has the complex structure of 
a rhizome, that is a network in which all the points are, more or less, directly connected to 
each other. 
  
1.1.3 Rhizome semantics 
 
The rhizome is a special kind of root (a subterranean stem of a plant usually found 
underground) that can penetrate soil due to a horizontal extended movement. In botany, 
this root is considered as opposite to the usual taproot growing downward vertically and in-
depth. It became an important metaphor in philosophy as a result of the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari (1980). Referring to human knowledge, they opposed it to an arborescent 
conception of knowledge, which works with dualist categories and binary choices.  A 
rhizome works with planar and trans-species connections, while an arborescent model 
works with vertical and linear connections (Fig. 4 and 5).  
 
 
Figure 4: Rhizome 
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Figure 5: Taproot 
 
The rhizomatic method is particularly interesting. It opposes the idea that knowledge must 
grow in a tree-like structure from previously accepted ideas. New thinking need not to 
follow established patterns. It is interesting to notice that, as is clear from Figure 3, the 
horizontal extension of the root not exclude the possibility of in-depth vertical movement. 
Using a process of analogical and semantic associations, a rhizomatic method of 
knowledge can help in creating an intellectual and semantic map whose originality consists 
just in the coupling of concepts usually kept separate. This is what is attempted in this 
thesis coupling, for example, epigenetics (bio-anthropological dimension) with technicity 
(socio-anthropological dimension) and open source (socio-political dimension).   
  
This semantic model is usually rejected because it challenges the myth of expertise of a 
defined and complete set of technical knowledge about a specific issue, idea which is 
directly linked to the tree-like structure of knowledge.10 The rhizomatic model of 
knowledge requires a set of different research techniques reciprocally intertwined. The first 
technique is to use a language that is both logical and analogical through the use of so-
called nomadic concepts.11 For the purpose of this study, the concept thus employed is that 
of epigenetics, which has been already used very fruitfully in robotics.12 The second 
technique is anchored to a process of comparing different literatures of different domains. 
Here, what is original is not the object of analysis in itself, but the process of comparing 
                                                            
10 What is really bizarre is that this belief is gaining more and more ground also within humanities. 
11 Darwin stands as the best example of the potential value of this method with his use of concepts from 
horticulture for a theory of evolution. Another fruitful example is that of the concept of ‘entropy’. 
12Epigenetic robotics is a scientific field studying the developmental architectures allowing open-ended 
learning of new skills and knowledge in embodied machines. In this approach, robotic ‘learning’ is 
cumulative, as in humans, and results from the robot’s exploration of the world in combination with social 
interaction. 
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issues, concepts and literatures. In this thesis we tried to follow this methods and the three 
main chapters mirror this methodological effort.  
 
 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
 
While this work deals with the problem of the relationship between technology and 
society, it does so by developing research firmly grounded in the theme of the role of 
human experience in technical action. Moreover, it starts from the position that the root 
problem for any analysis of the so-called technology-society relationship concerns the 
definition of a specific perspective from which to examine such a relationship. For this 
reason, the primary objective is to develop this very perspective. Essentially, the aim is to 
combine a rhizomatic and associative working methodology in a novel fashion, together 
with a certain theoretical sensibility (outlook) which may be called ‘critical-pragmatic’ 
(Chapter 2). 
 
My hope is that this combination may enable a conceptual map to emerge from three 
selected access points - bio-anthropological, socio-anthropological, socio-political - which 
can then highlight and endorse the need to reassess the importance of human praxis in 
technical action. 
 
The originality of this thesis consists, then, precisely in the associative combination of the 
elements in the making of this conceptual map, since it is with just this combination, I 
suggest, that we may express the specific perspective referred to. 
 
In the light of this outline, the key problem of the research is to develop a theoretical 
perspective by which human experience can be reintegrated in technical action. The core 
problem is thus to contribute to the development of a new outlook (perspective) in which 
the role of human experience, praxis and skills in technical action can be re-evaluated, 
leading to a process of bottom-up democratization of modern technologies. 
 
The main problem defining this focus is the possibility of understanding the ways and 
degree to which technology and experience (in the socio-anthropological and operating 
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terms defined up to this point) have become two mutually exclusive entities. In order to do 
this, I will investigate how the primary relationship between body, society and technique 
has been transformed by the advent of modern technology and what kind of challenges this 
change implies. 
 
This provides the overarching theme for reflection developed in the next chapters which 
are guided by the following three ‘study questions’: 
 
1. What is the bio-anthropological explanation and justification for the importance 
of experience in human culture? And is there an epistemological paradigm able 
to represent such link in life sciences today? 
2. What kind of socio-anthropological data can help us understand whether and to 
what extent the relationship between corporeal experience and material reality is 
still relevant in defining the idea of technicity? 
3. Which practices of technological development are in a position to concretely 
recuperate human skills in the processes of technical innovation? And how can 
such practices be the advocates for a greater democratization of technology? 
 
Together, these research questions provide a tool with wich to critically investigate the 
main focus of the work from three different but complementary perspectives of analysis: 
the bio-anthropological, the socio-anthropological and the socio-political.   
 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background of this thesis. The main aim is to show that 
this background has been characterized by the existence of an ‘essentialist paradigm’, one 
that traditionally influenced the philosophy and sociology of technique. This, I argue, 
shaped a dystopian distortion of sociological interpretation of technical action (Section 1) 
affecting progressive currents of study (Section 3). The second section describes the 
philosophy of praxis as an antidote to the determinism of the essentialist paradigm outlined 
in the first. Section 4 presents Andrew Feenberg’s thinking as a philosophical vision that is 
able to rehabilitate Marx’s concept of praxis. In addition, this chapter tries to make explicit 
 18 
 
the ‘perspective angle’ of this thesis, that is the theoretical gaze and sensibility that 
influenced him in selecting theories and authors (critical pragmatism).   
 
Addressing the first study question – concerned with a bio-anthropological link for the 
importance of experience in human culture  – Chapter 3 seeks to show that skills are an 
ineliminable anthropological given since they are bound to the very biological status of 
humans. In particular, I aim to demonstrate that although scientific culture and public 
opinion have become dominated by theories with roots in a genocentric cultural paradigm 
ruled by a determinist “informational” mythology13. Against this mythology, a corpus of 
advanced analyses has developed demonstrating that the human organism is characterized 
by extraordinary malleability. This corpus may be characterized as constituting an 
approach that employs what is dubbed the ‘epigenetic paradigm’. This paradigm re-
evaluates the mutual interchange between organism and environment, rediscovering the 
active role of the organism in this relationship - and responding to the first study question.  
 
The suggestion developed is that the idea that epigenetics has of the organism scientifically 
supports a socio-anthropological conception of man as a real being-in-the-world, namely 
an intentional body that lives out a relationship of reciprocity with the surrounding 
(physical and social) environment. This, therefore, refers to a being ontologically grounded 
in experience. Indeed, the epigenetic interpretation of man dismantles the informational 
model and suggests, analogously and a fortiori, that in the cultural dimension too, the 
human being must not be considered an organism with an informative code encapsulated in 
his ‘mind’. The reasoning followed thus uses the epigenetic paradigm in order to challenge 
informational determinism, both on the biological as well as social level. Essentially, an 
epigenetic analysis offers scientific support for a socio-anthropological idea of man as a 
real being-in-the-world, a being that, facing processes of growth, development and also 
decay, incorporates in his very anatomy (muscles, neurology, etc.) particular skills and 
habits that lend him a plasticity in respect to the surrounding physical and social 
conditions.  
 
With chapter 4, I attempt to illustrate that modern technical action (technology) has limited 
but not eliminated the anthropological and social features at the roots of technique, such as 
                                                            
13 Conditioned by Cartesian dualism (body/mind, form/substance) this paradigm considers the genetic code 
(the genome) a set of discrete units of information that govern the human body and behaviour. 
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perception, action, intentionality, corporeity and contextuality. In attempting to answer the 
second study question – on socio-anthropological data supporting the relationship between 
corporeal experience and material reality as still relevant in defining an idea of technicity – 
I  show that in the context of the scientific literature, various (techo)pessimistic readings 
uphold the principle by which the advent of technology in modern society has provoked a 
deterioration of the relationship between perception and action and the separation between 
corporeal experience and material reality. In particular, many assert that the introduction of 
electronic and digital technologies has caused the loss of skills in exploring the world and 
the solipsistic closure of the body in a virtual world artificially generated by machines. 
This chapter criticizes such a reading, presenting an interpretation of an idea of technicity 
based on the intimate and indissoluble interweaving that exists between organism (body) 
and environment. In order to do so, technical action is defined in the framework of a 
model, known as SPIDER (Skilled Practice Involves Developmentally Embodied 
Responsiveness), based on Tim Ingold’s ecological perspective, presenting some points of 
friction with the ANT (Actor-Network Theory) model of Bruno Latour and colleagues.  
 
Chapter 5 seeks to shed light on the existence of important theoretical and practical 
margins for a recovery and valorization of social skills in modern technical action that may 
achieve a greater democratization of technology. The third study question guiding this – 
related to which practices of technological development may be able to recover human 
skills during technical innovation and how such practices can support a greater 
democratization of technology – is addressed through the argument  that the valorisation of 
the role of experience and corporeal skills in the relationship with modern technology does 
indeed raise the Feenbergian theme related to the possibility of conceiving of a 
democratization of technology.  
 
In particular, the possibility is explored of considering open source - basically, universal 
access to and (re)distribution of information, particularly design – as a new, free or non-
licensing (commons) model for shared technological development will be explored. 
Clearly, the demands of critical theory are met here insofar as this is a quintessentially 
democratic development, and pragmatic in that it is thus open to social practices. In other 
words, the work open source is asked to do here is to define the institution of a 
participative method. Through this method, the hegemonic technical code of which 
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Feenberg speaks – ‘the realization of an interest or ideology in a technically coherent 
solution to a problem’ (Feenberg, 2005: 52) -  is rendered an open entity – a public interest 
in a socially oriented solution - in which processes can be achieved that constitute and lead 
not only to novel development but also to a creative appropriation aimed at literally re-
inventing technologies. In such penultimate chapter, such principles will be conceptually 
applied to the controversial and emblematic case of biotechnologies.  
 
The burden of Chapter 6 is to bring together the analyses of the main chapters, setting out 
the key issues, objectives and concepts discussed in the essay and presenting the main 
conceptual results in response to the various research questions motivating this work. A 
semantic map is provided. Finally, the main aim is to develop a general discussion to 
sketches some of the new questions representing other possible proposals for future lines 
of research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical background. 
On technology: essence, praxis, experience14 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the theoretical background of the 
philosophical and sociological debate behind this research.  Firstly, I show that the 
philosophy and sociology of technique have been conditioned and undermined by an 
essentialist paradigm of analysis. I also show that this paradigm has been fiercely 
counteracted by two opposed approaches, critical theory and pragmatism, usually 
considered mutually incompatible. Secondly, I suggest that in order to overcome the limits 
of these approaches, it is possible to adopt a theoretical gaze able to contemplate their 
mutual contamination. This contamination is provided by a ‘new’ philosophical current, 
‘critical pragmatism’, which can inform a renewed idea of the philosophy of praxis in order 
to instigate a constructive lecture of technology. In this work, I do not try to develop this 
new philosophy of praxis, but rather indicate how this theoretical gaze has strongly 
influenced me in selecting theories and authors. In this chapter the reader will find five 
paragraphs.  
 
The first subsection (2.1.1) introduces the determinist and apocalyptic hegemonic 
paradigm operative within the domain of the philosophy of technique, a paradigm that has 
directed our understanding of how the passage from technique to technology (from ancient 
to modern society) brought about the end of the role of experience and human action 
(hence of perception, action, intentionality and praxis). According to this essentialist 
paradigm, the advent of modern technology has disembedded technique from the socio-
                                                            
14 This chapter is based on the content of the article: G. Nicolosi (2013), Essenza, esperienza, prassi, 
conflitto. Un pragmatismo critico per la filosofia (e sociologia) della tecnica? in G. Mari, F. Minazzi, M. 
Negro, F. Vinti (eds.), Epistemologia e soggettività. Oltre il relativismo, Firenze University Press. 
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cultural fabric that had safeguarded it for centuries and rendered it an autonomous corpus 
directed only by internally defined parameters of efficiency, functionality and rationality. 
 
The following subsection (2.1.2) outlines the philosophy of praxis, showing that it may be 
a real antidote to the determinism of the essentialist paradigm. It is suggested, however, 
that it was precisely the overshadowing of the concept of praxis, which Marx’s thinking 
had set center stage in critical analysis on technique, that prompted the affirmation of a 
logical paradox in the history of Western thought that continues to heavily condition 
philosophy even today: technique, the essence of man, expands beyond all proportion in 
modernity, ultimately to negate man in his essence. 
 
The next subsection (2.1.3) explores how this paradox has transversally conditioned not 
only conservative currents of thought but also progressive ones. In particular, I will explain 
how the essentialist matrix of the philosophy of technique has exercised a considerable 
influence even on the Frankfurt School, a current that has itself much influenced the social 
critical thinking of the Left. This influence has ended up by undermining the potentially 
revolutionary outcome of the philosophy of praxis that the Frankfurt School, at least as a 
neo-Marxist tendency, should have developed and diffused.  
 
Subsection 2.1.4 discusses how Andrew Feenberg’s thinking has brought a philosophical 
vision to the field of the analysis of technique that is able to rehabilitate Marx’s concept of 
praxis. Feenberg introduced a possible way out of the blind alley of having to choose 
between two unsatisfactory visions: the determinism of the philosophy of essentialist 
technique versus the insufficient critical potential of constructivism. Carefully combining 
the anti-essentialism of constructivism with the analyses of socio-political dynamics linked 
to power relationships and class conflict produced by the Frankfurt School, Feenberg has 
managed to re-evaluate the role of experience and praxis in technical action. This is a 
revaluation, moreover, oriented to support of the possibility of changing technological 
development in the direction of a democratic rationalization of technology and a greater 
participation from below (i.e., through ‘bottom up’ approaches). 
 
Lastly, in Subsection 2.2, I will shortly introduce the new theoretical perspective of critical 
pragmatism aimed at stimulating a new materialist philosophical orientation that emerges 
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from a fecund (albeit difficult) encounter between the anti-essentialist current of critical 
theory and pragmatist philosophy. In exploring this critical pragmatism, I will refer 
particularly to a renewed philosophy of praxis that may creatively recuperate the critical 
thinking of Marx, Gramsci, Marcuse and Feenberg on one hand and the pragmatist 
thinking of writers like Peirce, Dewey, Mead, Garfinkel and Sennett, on the other. In 
particular, I suggest that the traditional conflict between these two schools is rather more 
ideological than scientific. 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical background 
 
2.1.1 Technique and technology: the advent of modernity and the end of experience? 
 
Human action, including the technical, increasingly seem to be the terms of an impossible 
binomial, or perhaps even by now, to refer to a mythical and forgotten past. The increasing 
pace of relentless techno-scientific development witnessed over the last century or so in 
particular has, in the opinion of many, substantially uprooted technique from the social and 
cultural fabric in which it had been embedded for centuries in order to create an 
autonomous corpus, namely, a neutral and independent ensemble, bound to ‘inner’ logics 
and dynamics and responding exclusively to linear principles of efficiency, effectiveness, 
functionality and rationality.  
 
According to a widespread hegemonic interpretation within the field of the philosophy of 
technique today, this process has been consolidated in relatively recent times with the 
advent of modernity. The thinking of Umberto Galimberti, in Italy, expresses this 
philosophical prejudice emblematically. Starting from a deeply rooted proposition in 
classic philosophical thought that can be traced from Plato through Aquinas and then Kant, 
Herder and Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, Bergson and Gehlen, Galimberti (2007: 34) asserts 
that technique (understood both as a universe of resources as well as rationality) should be 
understood as the essence of man, in that it arises as a ‘remedy’ to the biological 
incompleteness of the human being, to the deficiency, that is, of his genetic and instinctual 
endowment. In this vision, the unsuccessful stabilization of the world that characterizes 
animal experience is overcome by the development of cultural procedures of technical 
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stabilization based on: anticipation, invention, planning, prediction, freedom of action and 
of movement. 
 
For Galimberti, precisely because it is the ‘essence of man’, technique should not be 
considered a simple ‘tool’ in the hands of a ‘subject’ (man). This ‘instrumental’ condition, 
claims Galimberti and with him a large part of traditional philosophical thought, 
characterized pre-modern societies, in which technique was practiced inside the city walls, 
the residual enclave with respect to nature that continued to govern, with its laws, most of 
the remaining life of man. But, according to Galimberti’s thesis, modernity radically 
modified the relationship between subject and tool: 
 
Today it is the city that extends to the edges of the earth, and nature is reduced to its 
enclave, to a fenced-in remnant within the city walls. And so technique, from a tool in the 
hands of man in order to dominate nature, becomes the environment of man, which 
surrounds and constitutes him following the rules of a rationale that, measuring and 
gauging itself on criteria of functionality and efficiency, does not hesitate in subordinating 
the very needs of man to the requirements of the technical apparatus.  (Galimberti, 2007: 
36, emphasis original)15 
 
In the traditional reading of the philosophy of technique it is important to emphasize that 
this overturning is not the fruit of a socio-historical transformation, but is already in some 
way inscribed in re. We thus find ourselves facing a substantially universalistic and 
determinist interpretation, one that many authors, as we shall see, recognize explicitly, and 
others implicitly. Again Galimberti exemplifies this: 
 
Technique, as a matter of fact, is wholly inscribed in the constellation of domination, from 
which it arose and within which it has been able to develop only through rigorous 
procedures of control that, in order to genuinely be such, cannot avoid being worldwide. 
This rapid sequence was already clearly glimpsed and announced by modern science at its 
outset when, without delay and with clear foresight, F. Bacon removed any ambiguity and 
proclaimed: ‘scientia est potentia’.  (Galimberti, 2007: 36) 
 
                                                            
15 Translations by the author. 
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Technique in its essence, therefore, would have inscribed a code oriented towards 
dominion over nature and man. As long as this code remained hidden due to the limited 
pervasiveness of technique, man would have had the illusion of being able to 
instrumentally use the technical instrumentation as a means to achieve subjectively set 
ends. With the passing of time, however, the quantitative increase in the technical arsenal 
has caused an upset of the means/ends relationship.  
 
The difference between technique and technology, between the one as ancient and the 
other as modern is founded here on what Hegel in Logic defines as ‘the transformation of 
quantity in quality’. When  the technical means at man’s disposal became sufficient to 
achieve the ends set by men, the significance of the means was absorbed and hidden by the 
goal. However since the quantitative increase of technique with modernity renders every 
end dependent on the necessary means for its attainment, the qualitative condition of the 
situation is radically transformed. Technique becomes a goal in itself, not because it 
expresses a precise objective - Severino (1972) would speak here about ‘nihilism' - but 
because the attainment of all objectives always depends on the intermediation of 
technique16. 
 
This vision, with its roots in a fundamental philosophical tradition of Western thought, has 
profoundly permeated the philosophical and sociological production on technique (and 
techniques). What such an interpretation of technique ultimately challenges is precisely the 
relationship of man with experience. It is asserted that in the past the reiterated human (and 
therefore social) experience controlled, defined and characterized technical procedure, 
while in modernity it is technique that becomes the horizon from which man makes 
experience in every possible field. In this sense, the human is no longer man, but a 
functionary; and technique is no longer a tool, but the owner of nature.  
 
In dystopian vein, the clearest example of the abstractness and absolutism of such an 
interpretation is given by the essentialism of Martin Heidegger, probably the most 
representative and influential of the philosophers of technique. Here, technology is seen as 
an impediment to Being, in so far as its substantive nature is essentially destructive of 
experience. Again, Heidegger (1927) proposes the classic contrast between technique in 
                                                            
16 Justifiably, Galimberti sees a fundamental analogy in this process with what Marx had already described in 
his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 with reference to money. 
 26 
 
the ancient world (a way of ‘revealing' through which the world takes shape) and technique 
in the modern world. This is the imposition (Gestell) of the being (Dasein), namely the 
reduction of being to the shadow of itself. For Heidegger, modern technology destroys 
sense because of its ontology. If the experienced craftsman was able to connect up matter, 
form and the ends in order to reveal the truth of the world, then technology ‘un-worlds’ its 
materials and transforms them into functions lacking sense. In this perspective, man 
becomes an object among objects, a function among functions. Heidegger makes no 
distinction between technologies, which he sees as all driven by a devastating inner logic. 
Technology, that is, expresses an independent and arbitrary will destined to subjugate both 
man and nature.  
 
However impossible it is to render the complexity and depth of Heidegger’s thinking in a 
few lines, it is easy enough to convey the sense that he was not focused on evaluating 
differences and contexts. Neither does he hypothesize that ends, objectives, uses, 
interpretations and so on, may in some way have an influence on the ultimate essence of a 
monster that is both unstoppable and uprooted from the world. And it is precisely because 
of this central limitation that we take determinism to task today, namely, its excess of 
abstractness. It decontextualizes, reduces and, consequently, forcibly removes the role that 
individual and social subjectivity can play in modifying the sense and ‘destiny’ of 
processes. 
 
2.1.2 The philosophy of praxis  
 
An antidote to this determinism is offered by the philosophy of praxis. Indeed, the 
apocalyptic essentialist interpretation, asserting the end of man’s experience, decrees the 
substantial conclusion of humanism, the elimination of significant margins of human 
acting and, consequently, the technical subordination of all the existential fields of man: 
reason, truth, politics, ethics, ideology, religion, nature and history itself17. We hence find 
ourselves faced with a vision that goes even further with respect to the very Marxian 
concept of alienation.  
 
                                                            
17 History disappears because the nihilistic nature (its profound lack of purpose) of technique eliminates any 
sense by which man transforms ‘time’ into ‘history’ (through narration). 
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Indeed, Marx, who had perfectly understood the risks of the transformations introduced by 
what he defined the new ‘civilization of machines’, ascribed alienation exclusively to a 
technical development rooted in capitalist means of production. For this reason, he 
advocated the advent of a communist society that, overcoming the internal contradictions 
of capitalism and the iniquitous division of society into classes, would have alienation done 
away with. For those subscribing to the notion of the end of experience, however, Marx 
presented a romantic kind of utopian illusion. For them, both capitalism and communism 
remained ‘pre-technological’ humanistic categories that presupposed a vision founded on 
the possibility of controlling the technical instrument by the human subject. The 
philosophical tradition no longer envisaged such a possibility with the advent of 
modernity. On this, Galimberti had this to say: 
 
At this point, also the Marxian concept of ‘alienation’ appears insufficient, because one can 
only speak of alienation in a humanistic scenario when there is an anthropology that wishes 
to be retrieved from its estrangement in production and in a context characterized by the 
conflict of two wills, of two subjects that still believe themselves to be the owners of their 
actions, not when there is a single subject, namely the technical apparatus, with respect to 
which individual subjects are simply its predicates. (Galimberti, 2007: 42) 
 
 
In effect, Marx (although unfortunately, as we shall see, not all his interpreters, even the 
most brilliant) was substantially immune from determinist interpretations of this kind, 
since he based his entire thinking on what in Italy became known as the philosophy of 
praxis. It was the socialist thinker Antonio Labriola (1899) who, introducing Marxism into 
Italy in the second half of the 19th century, characterized it with this expression, which was 
oriented toward highlighting the specific interpretation that Labriola gave of Marxism. 
This was a less rigid interpretation than that put forward by other thinkers (such as Karl 
Kautsky) and which was to have a great influence on Antonio Gramsci.18 Thus was 
                                                            
18 Gramsci saw Marxism not as an ideological and autonomous outlining of history, but rather as a self-
sufficient philosophy aimed at understanding the economic structure of society and consequent human 
relations. It was necessary, he thought, to introduce the social reality of one’s own historical period if 
Marxism were to consider the true complexity of social processes and specific variety of forces at work in 
history. Marxism had to be understood as a “critical” theory, that is one that did not claim eternal and 
immutable truths but was ready to interpret the social contradictions according to different historical stages, 
having at the heart of its analysis labour and the conditions of workers and therefore concrete and material 
human praxes. 
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inaugurated a philosophical tradition that was to have an immense impact on political-
social thinking and action all over the world. 
 
Basically the term ‘praxis’ refers to the process by which a theory or a skill is put into 
practice, realized or embodied.19 The expression and concept of ‘philosophy of praxis’ 
derive from Labriola’s conviction that praxis, understood as individual and social action, is 
the key essence of all Marxist thought. For Labriola, the idea of ‘human praxis’ comprises 
not only work, but also all the activities that become objectified in social relationships, 
institutions, needs, science, art and suchlike, and runs throughout the entire thinking of 
Marx and constitutes its fundamental principle. 
 
This conviction stems from the critical analysis that the philosopher of Treviri made, in his 
Theses on Feuerbach, on idealism and so-called ‘contemplative’ materialism (of 
Feuerbach, to be precise). In order to better understand the ‘practical tension’ of Marx’s 
thinking, it should be noted that in the first of the eleven theses written in Brussels, in the 
spring of 1845, Marx asserted: 
 
The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism — that of Feuerbach included — is 
that the Object [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form 
of the object [Objekts], or of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human sensuous 
activity, practice [Praxis], not subjectively. […]».20  
 
For the purposes discussed here, of special importance is the affirmation (Eighth Thesis) 
according to which ‘all social life is essentially practical’, and, above all, that (Fourth 
Thesis): 
 
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, 
therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, 
forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be 
                                                            
19 In ancient Greek culture, it referred to the activities performed by free men and in Aristotelian philosophy 
it indicated practical knowledge, whose end purpose was action (as distinct from theoretical knowledge, 
whose goal was the truth and poietic knowledge whose goal was production). 
20 In the Second Thesis, he clarified this thus : The question whether objective truth can be attributed to 
human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the 
reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality 
or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question». 
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educated. […] The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or 
self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as 
revolutionary practice 
 
For Marx, therefore, just as society produces man, so too is it  produced by him. For this 
reason, his claim that ‘philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it’ (Eleventh Thesis), is particularly pertinent. In other words, 
Marx’s materialism, unlike other forms of materialism that had been previously produced, 
established that the validity of philosophy consists in its ability to shape action. 
  
The philosophy of praxis, on which Gramsci would then base the more original part of his 
work, is therefore not a linguistic expedient, but a conception that postulates an 
indissoluble unity between theory and practice21. The unity of theory and practice would 
serve Gramsci in order to delineate a series of scientific concepts that enabled him to 
interpret his contemporary world (hegemony, historical block, common sense, mass 
conformity in its connection with new forms of individual and collective freedom, passive 
revolution, etc). Here, I limit myself to noting in general terms that for Gramsci neither the 
philosophy of praxis itself, nor any science connected to it allows us to make predictions of 
a determinist nature. There is only one possible way to predict, which is the way that 
makes it a practical action implying the formation and organization of a collective will22.  
 
For Gramsci, therefore, precisely because man is a process, he is a series of active 
relationships, that have a rapport with nature due to the mediation of work and technique, 
along with the synthesis and outcome of all the existing relationships and the history of 
these relationships. Nonetheless, change is always possible, because the individual, 
associating himself with all those seeking the same change (if this change is rational), can 
also induce a radical transformation of the existing status quo. For this reason, everything 
is political for Gramsci, philosophy included. The philosophy of praxis must be realized in 
a dialectic unity of politics and philosophy that is intrinsic to a social group; clearly, the 
social groups that Gramsci is referring to are the subordinate classes seeking their 
                                                            
21 Gramsci (1975) would write that such unity cannot be interpreted as a gesture repudiating every kind of 
philosophy, but rather the affirmation of a unity between theory and practice, and that for the philosophy of 
praxis, the being cannot be separated from thought, man from nature, activity from matter, the subject from 
the object; if this separation is made, one falls into the many forms of religion and meaningless abstraction. 
22 This same theory of prediction raises doubts on the determinist conceptions typical of the scientism of the 
Second International, with it, too, considered a source of passivity. 
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hegemony. And it is precisely the concept of hegemony, due to the philosophy of praxis 
and the work of Gramsci, that can become central in an analysis of technique that is neither 
determinist nor essentialist23. 
 
In The Phaedrus, Plato singled out a region beyond the sky where, in his view, immutable 
and perfect ideas would reside, attainable only by the intellect and intangible by terrestrial 
and corruptible beings: the hyperuranium. This was by definition a metaphysical, spiritual 
dimension, beyond space and time. One of the great merits of Karl Marx, therefore, was to 
lead philosophical thought back into the real world and to abandon the Platonic world of 
pure ideas, forcing it to deal with the social process of life. Not all his imitators, however, 
have been able to interpret this mission in an equally complete fashion. Indeed, many have 
distanced themselves radically, reproducing an abstract thinking detached from the real 
world of human praxis. This has been particularly true in the specific field of the 
philosophy (and sociology) of technique. 
 
Here, as indicated (above), the influence of that pessimistic vision of modernity, the idea of 
technique as the chief culprit of the crisis of culture, society and man heavily conditioned a 
major part of socio-political thought in the 20th century24.  This is not to imply that the 
century just passed only produced techno-pessimism; on the contrary, it was then also that 
an opposite tendency of techno-optimism also developed, directed towards eulogising 
technique as the unquestionable source of positive transformation.25 Thus the ‘apocalyptic’ 
and the ‘integrated’ (Eco, 1964) have widely and fiercely challenged each other, and 
                                                            
23 The concept of “cultural hegemony” was a theoretical contribution of Antonio Gramsci, the chief effects of 
which have been in the political and scientific field. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci meant to explain by 
this concept why the communist revolutions had not materialized in capitalist societies against the predictions 
and expectations of Marxist theory. For Gramsci, it was because the bourgeoisie was able to impose on other 
social groups “through daily practices and shared beliefs their own viewpoints, until their internalization, 
creating the foundations for a complex system of control”. Hence, the occurrence of revolutions required 
above all a cultural change. The subordinate classes needed to be in a position to replace the cultural 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie with a new anti-capitalist hegemony. The role of intellectuals was fundamental 
in this. Thus, the classical Marxian model, is overturned. In order to change economic structures, it is 
necessary to modify cultural and political superstructures. No transformation can be expected 
deterministically, but rather demands concrete action aimed at changing social and political reality; and, 
above all, the revolution does not require violent action, because in  the long term a power system is not 
founded on force but on hegemony. In this view, the principle of the philosophy of praxis is materialized: 
structure and superstructure, theory and praxis are not separate (rather, their separation creates ideology).  
24 Weber’s work is perhaps the most indicative of this tendency, but really represents only the tip of the 
iceberg. Heidegger has already been mentioned, but the work of Jacques Ellul has also acquired considerable 
prominence. 
25 One may mention, for example, the so-called ‘theory of modernization' (Martinelli, 1998), that of ‘cultural 
lag’ (Ogburn, 1922), or the so-called ‘School of Toronto’ (McLuhan, Innis, Ong, etc.). 
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Marxists also, in spite of Marx’s teaching, have been widely represented on both fronts. 
What needs highlighting here is that the opposing factions have both been locked into the 
hegemonic paradigm, implicitly and explicitly assuming the determinist interpretation of 
technique and society. Indeed, just how strong a role determinism and essentialism has 
played within the context of the philosophy of technique, is revealed by an analysis of the 
thinking produced by a current that derived its main source of inspiration from Marxism 
(hence from the philosophy of praxis): the Frankfurt School, known also as Critical 
Theory.   
 
2.1.3 The crisis of the philosophy of praxis: the essentialism of the “left” 
 
The Frankfurt School was a philosophical and sociological current constituted by a group 
of scholars originally united (in the 1920s) around the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Frankfurt am Main in Germany, under the guidance of the Marxist historian 
Karl Grünberg.26 With Adorno, Horkeimer, Benjamin, Marcuse, Habermas and Fromm 
among its most well-known representatives, essentially this group sought to widen the 
scope of the Marxist approach of the day with interdisciplinary considerations.  
 
The author who seems to have best critically analyzed the influence that essentialism and 
determinism have themselves had on the thinking produced by the Frankfurt School is 
Andrew Feenberg. Located in the main stream of Critical Theory, Feenberg’s reflection 
has nevertheless, had the merit of recognizing the limits and contradictions of the 
dystopian vision that over time had come to contaminate neo-Marxist thinking.27 Thus, 
referring also to Foucault on power, especially in the period of Discipline and Punish: 
 
Marcuse and Foucault stand out in this period as the most powerful critics of the role of 
scientific ideologies and technological determinism in the formation of modern hegemonies 
                                                            
26 Many of its exponents were of Jewish origin, for which reason they left the Germany with the advent of 
Nazism and moved to Geneva, Paris and the United States.  
27 This transformation began to materialize in the 1960s, when the legitimate critique of the movements 
against ‘technocracy’ mutated into a repulsion to technique per se, as it became considered the rapacious and 
insatiable source of environmental threat as well as social injustice. This dystopian perception then bonded 
with a broader critique of modernity emanating from a humanist culture with elitist leaning, giving rise to a 
form of left-wing essentialism. After 1968, this was itself challenged from within the new left, re-interpreting 
socialist ideas with an anti-Soviet perspective, and culminating with advocacy of self-management and direct 
democracy as the key to interpreting social processes, including those linked to techno-scientific 
development. A philosophical reflection was here developed (by Winner, Borgmann, Ihde, etc.) which aimed 
at a democratic framework for the substantivist interpretations (Achterhuis, 2001). 
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(Marcuse, 1963; Foucault, 1977). They rejected the idea that there is a single path of 
progress based on technical rationality, and opened a space for philosophical reflection on 
social control of technological development. At the same time, they argued, apparently 
inconsistently, that modern forms of domination are essentially technical. […] (Feenberg, 
1999: 6-7)  
 
The contradiction pointed out by Feenberg is evident. The ‘dystopians of the left’ 
recognize the ideological (not neutral) nature of technique.  28 At the same time, they 
oppose essentialism, hoping for and supporting a radical change of modernity, thereby 
assuming the possibility that technology may be steered towards alternative ends. They 
thus refute the liberal progressive faith in technique as governed by man but politically 
neutral (not charged with values and ideologies), but reject also the substantivism that 
matches an ideological baggage of immutable values to the autonomy of technique. 
Critical Theory, therefore, shares the idea that technology does not have a determinist 
nature (since it is controlled by man) with liberal instrumentalism, and shares the principle 
that it is loaded with values with substantivism. Such a standpoint can only hypothesize 
change through the substitution of the means-ends (ideology) model that shapes technique. 
 
In fact, however, Feenberg argues,  Critical Theorists tended to privilege only one of the 
two poles between which they built their reasoning, namely : the essentialist 
(substantivist). This, for instance, is the case of Adorno and Horkheimer who, finding in 
Heidegger a source of important inspiration, considered instrumentality in itself as a form 
of domination in which the nature of the objects subjected to control is violated and that of 
the dominant subject deformed. Albeit representing a valid antidote to the naïve 
progressive faith of classical liberal thinking, these authors leave no room for reform or 
‘reconstructive’ approaches. But it is also the case that Habermas, whose philosophy of 
technique can be assimilated to Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy, would tend to become 
frozen ‘in the concept of destiny’ (2002: 18). 
 
More complex and articulated is the work of Marcuse. While strongly branding the 
presumed neutrality of technique an ideological construction, he does not seem to deny the 
possibility of a neutral formulation of technical principles with equal vehemence. He does 
                                                            
28 Marcuse considers technique ideological in so far as it imposes a domination system and ends on nature 
and Man that are contrary to their potential for development. 
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criticize this formulation as abstract, since these principles at the moment they enter into 
reality must take on a social content bound to the interests of the ‘historical subject’ 
applying them. But this interpretation is not understood as undermining technical 
rationality per se, namely its fundamental imperatives. It seems to aim more at the 
application of technique than at the nature of technique itself. It appears, that is, that 
Marcuse fails to go the whole course in his criticism of essentialism (perhaps because he 
was too closely tied to Heidegger). This would probably explain why his analysis 
fluctuates between an optimistic vision that foresees the possibility of changing and 
democratizing technology and an apocalyptic view in which few margins are left for 
human action to modify an apparently ineluctable destiny. 
 
2.1.4 Feenberg’s critical constructivism: the concept of Code and the return of the 
philosophy of praxis 
 
As recognized, the essentialist hegemony in the philosophy of technique was challenged 
and questioned by a theoretical and empirical production of the history and sociology of 
science and technique that was able to show how technical action is characterized by socio-
cultural complexity and diversity. For present purposes, this production, whose inner 
articulation is highly complex, can be defined in general terms as constructivism29. 
 
Refuting the principles of neutrality and autonomy, constructivism recognizes the 
fundamental role played by society in determining the very nature of technique. This is not  
so much one of the efficiency, effectiveness or functionality that explains the success (or 
failure) of artefacts, but rather the variety of the local and contextual circumstances of a 
social and cultural kind. Thus, like all social institutions, techno-scientific innovations also 
prove successful when they enjoy the support of the surrounding social environment (Pinch 
& Bijker, 1987). For constructivism, artefacts are the fruit of a social and cultural trial-and-
error procedure. Their final configuration does not derive from the mere application of 
technical logic. A great variety of social groups (and alliances between these) participate 
                                                            
29 Very briefly, the constructivism of the social studies in science and technology (STS) is based on and 
develops a fundamental postulate elaborated by the so-called ‘strong programme' of the sociology of 
knowledge (Bloor, 1976) at the University of Edinburgh: ‘the principle of symmetry'. Following this 
principle, both the false and true theories of scientific knowledge can be explained by means of social and 
cultural factors. For a highly valid and detailed analysis of this complex and articulated current, see Bucchi, 
2004. 
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and conflict in this experimental-type procedure. Technological production, which appears 
linear when analyzed ex post facto, is actually exposed to a remarkable open-endedness, 
ambiguity and, above all, to clear ‘interpretative flexibility’. The final artefact becomes a 
‘black box’, an artefact no longer questioned but taken for granted due to the removal of 
the social matrix that has led to its ‘closure’ (Pinch & Bijker, 1987). In reality, any single 
artefact may have not existed or might have been entirely different, according to the social 
circumstances informing its creation and development.  
 
Starting off from these general assumptions, constructivism has produced a remarkable 
number of schools of thought over the last thirty-odd years and a vast array of analyses 
with a marked empirical slant largely oriented towards socio-historical studies of 
technique. This latter aspect is a considerable merit but also a major limitation of Science, 
Technology and Society (STS) studies. Indeed, one has the impression of witnessing a 
specialist and academic breakage of the study object that ends up by putting the more 
general issues that the philosophy of technique has always raised into the shadow. What is 
especially missing in STS studies is any theoretical ability to comprehend and render 
visible the social conflict mediated by science, technology and technical expertise. More 
generally, behind social constructivism as applied to the study of science and technology, 
there seems to be a moral agenda that insists on the ‘contingency’ of the analyzed 
processes (Hacking, 1999). While this has opened a potential space for the social 
intervention that substantivist analysis had excluded, from the material historical point of 
view, it has failed to realise this. In fact, the ‘contingency’ of this empirical analysis has 
discouraged the formulation of a positive project of social reform of science and 
technology.  
 
For many years it appeared that the only dialectic possible was that between the 
determinism of the philosophy of essentialist technique and the limited critical potential of 
constructivism, yet this contrast had only created a blind alley from which escape seemed 
impossible. One of the great merits of Feenberg’s thinking has precisely been that of 
indicating a possible escape route from this asphyxiating cul-de-sac.  
 
A student of Marcuse, Feenberg is one of the last direct heirs of the fecund School of 
Frankfurt: his ideas also comprise the most important and authoritative proposal of a 
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critical constructivism applied to the social study of technology. By critical constructivism, 
I mean the attempt to elaborate a kind of third position between essentialism and 
constructivism. In this way, as we shall see, Feenberg has succeeded in the difficult task of 
enabling the philosophy of praxis to re-emerge from the oblivion to which the same 
Marxist thinkers seemed to have relegated it.  
 
Inspired by the Marcusian principle of the social nature of rational systems, Feenberg 
developed the optimistic côté of his master, using an interpretation that sets the critical 
perspective alongside the constructive elaborated in a number of steps of sociological 
research applied to science and technique. We cannot deny that the balance Feenberg seeks 
between critical analysis and constructivism is rather precarious, but due to their common 
roots there are meeting points between the two approaches. Even if often not explicitly 
recognised by his supporters, constructivism does originate precisely from Marx’s critique 
of ideology, filtered by both Mannheim and Lukács’ sociology of understanding. This 
affinity is visible in the common interest in epistemological questions, in the great attention 
accorded to ‘empirical philosophy’, in the criticism of the ‘reification’ of concepts and in 
the focus on social practices. However, there are many points of apparently irreconcilable 
divergence (the concept of totality, the role of dialectics, etc.). Many of these derive from 
the post-structuralist influence that has shaped constructivist thinking since the beginning, 
distancing it from orthodox Marxism. To escape these limits, Feenberg has turned to the 
political implications of constructivism in order to reveal the democratic and liberating 
potential it offers and that exponents of constructivism had given up on developing. Taking 
the name ‘critical constructivism’, his philosophical, sociological and political programme 
represents one of the most interesting contemporary experiments of the philosophy of 
praxis. His concept of Code being an emblematic example. 
 
Andrew Feenberg refutes the vision that supports the neutrality and autonomy of 
technique, and, on the contrary, esteeming Antonio Gramsci’s teachings of heterodox 
Marxism, recognizes all the hegemonic content that is encapsulated within technological 
objects: 
 
Technical design responds not only to the social meaning of broader assumptions about 
social values. The cultural horizon of technology therefore constitutes a second 
hermeneutic dimension. It is one of the foundations of modern forms of social hegemony. 
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As I will use the term, hegemony is domination so deeply rooted in social life that it seems 
natural to those it dominates. One might also define it as that aspect of the distribution of 
social power which has the force of culture behind it. (Feenberg, 1999: 86) 
 
Feenberg reminds us that technologies are as they are not because there is any absolute 
(technical or economic) law imposing them. On the contrary, there are different possible 
paths and outcomes of development of every technology. Among the several possible 
configurations, the one that is realized is that which is selected by predominant interests. 
Once introduced, ex post, every technology appears functional precisely because it offers a 
material support to a certain cultural horizon. For this reason, Feenberg introduces the 
concept of technical code of technology as a code that defines ‘the object in strictly 
technical terms in accordance with the social meaning that it has acquired’ (Feenberg, 
1999: 105).  
 
Codes prove ‘invisible’ because self-evident, but they express hegemonic interests and 
visions in a given socio-historical context. From the Birmingham School of Cultural 
Studies, and its Gramscian interpretation of the processes of production and usage of mass-
media communication, Feenberg learns that order to have a meaning, every hegemonic 
code must also be decoded and domesticated, over time, by its users. Similarly, referring 
also to the work of Foucault (1976), Latour (1993 [1991]) and de Certau (1980), Feenberg 
shows the possibility of resistance tactics (to use de Certau’s terms) that are aimed at re-
encoding the social order incorporated hegemonically in technological objects. 
 
This aspect of re-encoding is fundamental in unhinging determinist assumptions about 
technology, such as those characterized by the pessimism of dystopian visions. First, the 
code is a social product, hegemonic, but which can be re-interpreted and even redesigned 
and reconstructed. There are no natural and unchangeable conditions supporting its 
hegemony. This is (merely) the expression of a ‘historical bloc’30 and as such it can be 
                                                            
30 In Prison Notebooks, Gramsci’s very important theoretical concept of historical bloc refers to a 
unity between the structure and the superstructure: « ‘A historical bloc refers to an historical congruence 
between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces 
politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its 
constituent elements. Moreover, for a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in conscious 
planned struggle. Any new historical bloc must have not only power within the civil society and economy, it 
also needs persuasive ideas, arguments and initiatives that build on, catalyze and develop its political 
networks and organization – not political parties as such’ » (Gill, 2002: 58). 
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overcome by means of an action that is philosophical/practical, aimed at democratizing the 
same code. Second, the technocratic tendency of modern societies, thematized in the 
Frankfurt School’s concepts of ‘total administration’ (Adorno), ‘one-dimensionality’ 
(Marcuse), and  ‘technicizing the life-world’ (Habermas), is real, but not invincible. One 
may still conceive of political action starting with the actions of micro-politics, local 
politics based on local know-how and practices that seek to achieve results in the long-
term. 
   
Feenberg’s own philosophy of praxis is grounded in an attempt to recreate a real and living 
relationship between technique and human experience. Much of philosophy presents 
modernity as the locus where such a relationship seems irremediably lost. Instead, 
Feenberg’s critical constructivism postulates significant margins of manoeuver to recover 
this relationship. Undoubtedly, the hegemonic scientific and technological development in 
modernity has artificially separated the world in two mutually irreducible spheres: the 
sphere of nature in which rationality and the absence of meaning are in force and the 
sphere of the human in which reigns a wealth of meaning, but equally an absence of 
rationality. For Feenberg, technology lies right at the intersection of these two spheres, 
since it is the fruit of the application of principles of scientific rationality, but is also based 
on the human experience characterizing the interchange with the world (Feenberg, 2010: 
181). The auspice of Feenberg is that these two dimensions, rationality and experience, 
return to communicate with each other. 
 
As outlined (above), all dystopian philosophy has at its base a critique of technology 
informed by  the radical contrast between ‘pre-modern craft’ and modern technology.  The 
main difference between the two consists primarily in the role that the body plays in the 
process of constructing artefacts. In the first case, it is chiefly the hands31 that, through 
direct or mediated contact of tools with the object, enable the craftsman to take on, in his 
own atelier, a sensitive and sensory relationship with the evolving artefact. Consequently, 
it is through his own corporeal skills, that the craftsman expresses his own culture and 
directly encapsulates it in the created artefacts. Modern technology would instead be 
characterized by limiting (tendentially annulling) the role of the body in technical 
performance, by producing on a large scale and dramatically impacting on nature and 
                                                            
31 See Chapter 3. 
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society. Moreover, the increased pace of innovation renders technology destabilizing for 
the cultural institutions of social groups. In particular, the application of autonomous and 
rational scientific principles by technology, causes a social instability, uprooting and 
breaking local communal ties formed in the production process of the past, along with their 
ethical and aesthetic values. This transformation may be traced to the process of growing 
differentiation and specialization of which Max Weber had written concerning Western 
modernity throughout his entire work. With the advent of modernity, the meaning linked to 
the social qualities (honour, prestige, gender, symbology, etc.) of the producers (craftsmen) 
and bound to the practices of production and use of the technical objects would seem to 
have vanished, sucked out into a kind of black hole.  
 
But is this really the case? Feenberg recognizes that essentialist or substantive dystopian 
criticism (in particular Heideggerian) is of an ontological rather than sociological form. 
However, and notwithstanding the fact that the two levels should be tackled separately, 
Feenberg asserts the need for a sociological ‘translation’ of Heidegger’s ontology, since it 
appears too radically contrary to common sense and experience (Feenberg, 2010). For this 
reason, taking up the deeper meaning of the concept of Heidegger’s Dasein, Feenberg 
reminds us that our fundamental relationship with reality is based on perception, but 
counsels that this should not be read as a separate entity from experience, as scientific 
research (emphasizing cognitive psychology) would tend to have it. The human being does 
not encounter the world through a chance relationship between the senses and nature, but 
rather by means of the direct action oriented towards objects endowed with meaning.  And 
Dasein, therefore, crucially implies the human being intended as the locus of experience. 
The subject of action is the being in its entirety, not the mind, a function or a single part of 
the body.  
 
Heidegger, who we recall was a student of Husserl, emphasized that the Cartesian cogito 
ergo sum, in truth, inverted the logical and ontological relationship between being and 
thinking.32 From this perspective, our understanding of the world is that of the way in 
which we are. Moreover, for Heidegger, we encounter the world practically. For us, the 
world is a place in which we act, with our practical tasks, and it is due to this that we 
                                                            
32 It is necessary to be in order to think, and thought (consciousness) derives from being. The nature of being 
shapes the way in which the world is recognised and understood; studying intentionality as independent from 
the way in which we inhabit the world is thus erroneous. 
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attribute meanings to those tasks. For this reason, the idea of intentionality as an abstract 
entity disconnected from practical interaction with the world lacks value, a kind of modern 
re-working of the idea of the homunculus developed by the current of premorophism.33 
Consequently, for Heidegger, the being is a being-in the-world (Dasein), embodied, 
practically oriented, active and intentional. 
 
The philosophical premises of Husserl’s phenomenology and the development of this by 
Heidegger witnessed a fundamental accomplishment in the particular importance assigned 
to the body and perception in the work of Merlau-Ponty. Here, importance is assigned not 
only to the body in its ‘objective’ dimension (shape, legs, etc.), but also to the set of bodily 
and cultural skills and contextual responses that the embodied agent is able to supply as the 
outcome of his practical involvement with the world. The philosophical essence of the 
principle of embodiment is therefore clear: the being is embodied in a phenomenological 
presence that is the fruit of active involvement in a lived-in world. 
 
This move means that the human being is immersed in a world that enables him to act so as 
to attain certain ends. Taking my argument forward, in order to do act thus, the being uses 
tools : but tools do not exist as objects per se. They are always correlated to a given task 
and in relation to other tools. For Heidegger, tools can be ‘usable’ (zuhanden or ready-to-
hand) or ‘simple presence’ (vorhanden or present-at-hand). In the first case, the technical 
instrument disappears and becomes a corporeal extension (prosthesis). In the latter, the tool 
instead becomes a separate object, and we acquire the knowledge of its presence. This 
distinction is as applicable to a hammer as it is to a mouse or a robot. 
 
For Heidegger (and Marcuse), therefore, it seems evident that scientific knowledge of 
nature does not have a contemplative origin, but emerges from practical and artisan 
knowledge.34 Knowledge and technē existed together in the pre-modern world through 
experience; a house certainly performs the function of a shelter, but it is also the place of 
privacy and hospitality, family rituals and the expression of the owner’s identity. 
                                                            
33The 17th (and 18th) century doctrine of ‘preformism’ alleged that within the seed is the homunculus,a 
miniature but complete adult, ready essentially just to grow. The development of the embryo here was 
nothing but the manifestation of already formed structures. Leeuwenhoek claimed to have seen the 
homunculus under the microscope as it awaited growth. Preformism was opposed by epigenism, according to 
which new structures are formed during the growth of the embryo in a biological development that was 
gradual (see Chapter 2). 
34 This is strongly echoed in the pragmatist philosophical current. 
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Technology in modernity, Heidegger claims, would isolate the function and make it an 
ontological synecdoche (one part is everything). Craft technique reveals the essence of 
things, while modern technology reveals the functional connection between artefacts in a 
system of production and consumption.  
 
Feenberg tries to recuperate Heidegger’s phenomenological intuition by reaffirming that 
knowledge is intimately rooted in the enactment of meanings in everyday practical action. 
This is the fundamental intuition of contemporary social epistemology and the sociology 
and anthropology of a pragmatist leaning. According to these approaches, meanings is 
neither an  a priori nor permanently engraved in the mind like a conceptual map of a fixed 
world, but is bound to the development of experience (always evolving) rooted in practical 
action that is purpose-driven and endowed with meaning (see Chapter 4).  
 
While Marcuse expounded this grounding of knowledge in pragmatic action, the 
pessimism deriving from the thinking of Adorno and Heidegger himself (‘Only a God can 
save us’) led him to believe that technological functional rationality had destroyed the 
twofold dimensionality of the Greek world, so that the supreme world of essence collapse 
into that of existence, where the absence of every transcendence destroys the generative 
dialectic between what is and what might be. For example, democracy coincides with the 
technical institutions that ‘fence it in’ and it may be that no ideal tension will ever be able 
to improve it (the one-dimensional society). 
 
Feenberg’s idea is that Heidegger’s and Marcuse’s (dystopian) critique seem to concede an 
idealized representation of technology : namely, as autonomous, disenchanted, rational, 
neutral, functional, free from prejudice and mythology, indifferent to nature and human 
life. In a Marxian vein, however, we know that the human senses guiding experience are 
not passive (empiricist vision), but actively engaged with the objects of the world. The 
senses become theoretical by means of practical activity (philosophy of praxis). As 
Feenberg sees it, therefore, what is missing in Marcuse’s critical thinking is a stronger and 
more relevant grounding in the phenomenological notion of ‘lifeworld’ (lebenswelt ; 
monde de la vie) and, consequently, in the valorization of the ontological status of 
experience.  
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Feenberg understands very well that it is impossible to re-propose the Greek conception of 
technique with its reference to the essence of things to be revealed. Moreover, culture and 
tradition no longer hold the binding power they once did. Nevertheless, as the American 
philosopher maintains, it is appropriate to analyze the modern relationship with technology 
by defending the importance of human experience and completely abandoning reductionist 
naturalism. Our encounter with the world is always of a practical kind, and in our daily 
experience we work with materials that are endowed with meaning. Experience is thus 
always endowed with this ‘two dimensional’ ontology (Marcuse), since the senses are 
‘directly  theoreticians in their practice’ (Marx). 
 
For Feenberg, therefore, technology has a two-fold existence. On one hand, it exists as a 
rational and scientific mechanism in the world of functional causality; on the other, it 
exists as an object endowed with meaning, in so far as it is an object of the world of 
experience. This duality does not consist in the juxtaposition of two different viewpoints 
(one subjective and the other objective), however; rather, it is an inextricable interweaving 
that anchors the most intimate essence of technology, because the action endowed with 
meaning is the precondition of scientific knowledge itself.  
 
The twofold dimensionality of technology represents an optimistic opening with respect to 
the potential to effect change in the world, and thus comprises a theoretical passage of 
enormous political implications. Technology, says Feenberg, is not only not immutable or 
unchangeable, but can be democratized and rendered more human(e) (he speaks of a 
‘democratic rationality’). This offers a space, however difficult and complex the effort 
needed to fill it, for an intervention that recuperates human action and restrains the 
superpower of technocracy. 
 
 
2.2 A different perspective on praxis: an overview of ‘critical-pragmatism’ 
  
Of course, critical theory has not been the only philosophical movement to counteract 
essentialism ‘in the name of praxis’. Philosophical pragmatism had a different, but equally 
effective role. A philosophical movement that developed in the United States towards the 
end of the 19th century and later spread to Europe, pragmatism remains one of the most 
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innovative contributions of the United States in the philosophical field.35 The chief merit of 
pragmatism consists in having recovered and valorized the concept of praxis, too soon 
forgotten by philosophers and sociologists who have analyzed technical phenomena. As 
already suggested, this concept may be employed to demonstrate the role and importance 
that human experience has played and still plays, in the sense of practical ability, creativity 
and sociality, in technical and technological action (above, 2.1.2). Nonetheless, it is right to 
point out that pragmatism has also had the demerit of not always giving due importance to 
the turbulent political and social processes that technological development entails and that 
are grounded in the dynamics of power and class differences - which critical theory, on the 
other hand, has been able to do very well (2.1.3).  
 
Nonetheless, the philosophical landscape, over the last century, has also been characterized 
by several critical versions of pragmatism. These versions rediscover the radical political 
spirit of classical pragmatism, and make an effort to elaborate an updated progressive 
version able to criticize the shortcomings of liberal democracy and the globalized 
capitalism. Critical pragmatism has the potential to integrate just what pragmatism and 
critical theory has best been able to produce in the philosophical reflection applied to 
technology.  
 
Unfortunately, this minoritarian philosophical movement is often considered as heretical, 
as  many obstinately consider pragmatism as antithetical to Marxism. In my view, the 
differences - which undoubtedly do exist - have been overemphasized for ideological more 
than scientific reasons. It is true that American pragmatism, especially that linked to the 
work of John Dewey, has been dismissed by Marxist thinkers as the intellectual instrument 
of liberalism and utilitarianism or more generally, an epistemological model that functions 
in defence of the status quo. On the other hand, many scholars of pragmatist vocation have 
regarded Marxism as a philosophical system that has supported and justified the totalitarian 
                                                            
35It is hard to characterize pragmatism with a simple definition, since the movement is not in itself coherent 
and has multiple alternative directions. Simplifying crudely, with Charles Sanders Peirce pragmatism theory 
appears as the theory of meaning identifying the meaning of an expression with the whole of the practical 
consequences that derive from its acknowledgment; or, with William James and John Dewey, it is a theory of 
truth tending to identify truth with practical usefulness. In sociology, following the work of Schütz, Mead, 
Goffman and Garfinkel, the approaches of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology can be considered 
as a pragmatist derivation. 
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power and status quo of the Soviet Union. It is my deep conviction that both affirmations 
are substantially lacking insofar as they are reductive and ideologically conditioned.36  
 
From a philosophical viewpoint, there is an affinity between pragmatism and the 
philosophy of praxis that goes beyond the terminological. We may recall, for instance, that 
pragmatism (just like Marx’s philosophy of praxis) conceives of thinking not as the passive 
contemplation of a pre-established reality or mere reception of external sensory data, but as 
a process of active intervention on reality. Marxism and pragmatism both affirm the 
principle that in the relationship between knowledge and action there has always been a 
bias in favor of knowledge in traditional philosophy. Thus, in late 19th century America, 
the mediaeval ideal of the ‘theoretical’ life, namely, a life given over to meditation and the 
search for a-historical truths, was replaced with the ideal of the truth as doing, as action, as 
activity.37 One therefore witnesses with pragmatism, as with Marx, a reassessment of 
action in philosophy as in life. The traditional conception of truth as the conformity 
between thing and idea - adaequatio rei et intellectus - like a compliance between being 
and thinking, is refuted. On the grounds of reassessing action, truth is transformed from a 
mental state to corporeal and contextual activity, the concrete and embodied cognitive 
doing. Lastly, like Marxism, American pragmatism is also a philosophical doctrine 
oriented towards the future, from the moment that it considers the truth of an action as 
future effect of the same action. 
 
Marxism and pragmatism both refute the philosophical appeal to the impartial search for 
certainty and, consequently, they challenge Cartesianism and its tendency to divide 
experience into two clearly separate and opposing dimensions, the subjective and the 
                                                            
36 In effect, the main political differences between the two schools are attributable to the fact that pragmatism 
has had a radical progressive but reformist democratic orientation in the United States, whereas elsewhere 
Marxism has more widely influenced revolutionary movements. But it is also interesting to remember that, 
politically speaking, Dewey was oriented towards the movement of American labor and, albeit never 
formally joining socialist parties, exuded socialism. The American socialist reformer William English 
Walling - founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the 
Women' s Trade Union League (WTUL), and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) maintained that 
‘pragmatism is socialism’. Nonetheless, Dewey’s socialism was not a state socialism, but decentred, 
egalitarian, democratic and without classes, a socialism neither collectivist nor monopolist, but in which the 
value of individual freedom (and of the property of small producers) was decisive (Westbrook, 1991). 
37 It is worth recalling that Marx, influenced in this by Fichte, asserted in his anthropology that human beings 
must be fundamentally understood as active beings, that is with respect to their activity. This should not be 
confused with ‘work' (wage-earning) or Arbeit. Work is the human activity in the phase of capitalism and 
antithetical with regard to free human activity.  In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx was already asking: ‘For 
what is life if but activity?’ 
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objective. Both avoid falling into the trap of absolute subjectivism, recognizing in rational 
analysis a role that is necessary but insufficient to understand and experience an indefinite 
and constantly changing world. 
 
Rytina and Loomis (1970) have gone further in the analysis of the affinities. They have 
asserted that Marxist materialist epistemology (founded on dialectics), in refuting the 
metaphysical interpretation of the world, and pragmatic epistemology, as based on a 
valorization of the ‘experimental situation’ over external, formal systems of validation 
(like logic or mathematics), have a common vision founded on the unity between theory 
and practice and the principle that it is what man does that determines what may be 
considered ‘real’. For this reason, dialectical materialism and pragmatism imply an 
activistic criterion of truth hinging on a logical system depending on social action. 
 
Dewey’s thinking, with its (Darwinist) emphasis on the ability of men to adapt to the 
contextual conditions of the external world with their own intelligence, undoubtedly may 
have led some of his interpreters to minimize the question of the divisions of power in 
society and allot related issues to the space between man and nature (rather than between 
man and man, as does Marxism, insisting on the class struggle). To resolve social 
problems, Dewey counts entirely on the role that educational processes perform. If the 
world is unjust, it can be changed. All that is needed, he thinks perhaps naively, is a greater 
‘diffusion’ of intelligence. For this reason, his perspective is not revolutionary, but 
reformist and progressive, coherently with an epistemology that considers reality a 
processual phenomenon.  
 
A number of authors, for example White (1995: 314), claim that pragmatism, albeit in a 
position to usefully revitalize critical theory, cannot inherently be considered an authentic 
current of social criticism. This is because pragmatism, being a social philosophy based on 
contingency and multiplicity, represents an ethos that expresses a sensibility rather more 
than a tradition built solidly on a normative order. Such a sensibility is substantially 
‘problem-driven’ and therefore, White continues, incapable of being ‘suspicious’ with 
regard to power structures. And yet, thanks also to the interest shown by authors with a 
critical background, such as Jürgen Habermas, this dilemma (can pragmatism be a fecund 
critical theory?) can and must, in my view, now be subject to review.  
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Kadlec (2006) is one writer who, clearing the field of the unjustified accusations of 
positivism that various authors of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer in particular) have 
levelled at Dewey, clearly shows how it is possible to speak of the existence of a critical 
pragmatism, or at the very least, reduce the gap between the two traditions of research. 
According to Kadlec, the mutual incomprehension between the Frankfurt School and 
pragmatism may be ascribed to the interpretation that Antonio Gramsci made of the latter, 
declaring that pragmatists were incapable of seeing hegemonic structures at work in the 
creation of ‘common sense’,38 thereby undermining their critical reflectivity from the 
outset.39  
 
Gramsci, impetuously, believed that pragmatist intellectuals would certainly be able to 
improve the conditions of workers, through the constitution of unions – which, effectively, 
they did. Unions could only marginally improve conditions in the factory, however, while 
the movement of the Factory Councils (Consigli di Fabbrica) that he motivated was 
intended operate on a more profound scale, to recreate the factory as the nucleus for the 
future proletarian state. For Gramsci, pragmatists constitute unions, while the purpose of 
the philosophy of praxis was to foment the revolution.  
 
It is clear that Gramsci’s critique is based on a different conception of history. This 
diversity is also founded on the genuinely anti-foundationalist nature characterizing 
pragmatist philosophy and that rendered the universal laws of history that Marxist 
historicism promoted incomprehensible40. As Kadlec sees it, however, the deficiency of 
critical reflectivity denounced by Gramsci is unfounded. In particular, the two key 
categories of Dewey’s thinking, ‘reconstruction’ and ‘individual’, refute this.  
 
Regarding reconstruction, Dewey claims that science can contribute to a rebuilding of the 
lost relationship between reason and experience, freeing human beings from a static vision 
of the world and enabling a possible transformation of the status quo. In effect, this would 
                                                            
38 A concept that is very close to the notion of ‘habit’ elaborated by James. 
39 According to the Sardinian philosopher, pragmatism reeked of utilitarianism and though he thought the 
centrality that pragmatists gave to the political dimension of daily experience to be right, he considered this 
focus insufficiently backed by critical reflection.  For Gramsci, the great virtue of pragmatism resided 
precisely in its understanding of human acting as something social, founded on interaction. But the 
relationship between experience and organism postulated by pragmatic doctrine was, in his view, overly 
limited in its conception. 
40 Perhaps the more general problem needing discussion is whether it is possible that an anti-foundationalist 
theory can also be radically critical ; my answer would clearly be yes. 
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comprise the end of the founding dualism of the Greek thought – particularly the 
distinction between experience and reason postulated by Aristotle - which has severely and 
negatively conditioned the whole tradition of the Western thought and should be revealed 
and dismantled.  
 
Dewey (1920) explains the origin of this dualism in the need that Greek philosophers had 
to justify a conceptual system that might preserve traditional beliefs, in an (ultimately 
rather extreme) attempt to conserve the traditional forms of authority (theirs). In the 
establishment of a final and normative distinction between reason and experience, the 
former (Truth) was transformed into a locus of the highest and most definitive reality that 
subjugated and disciplined the latter. This classification came to condition all Western 
thought by enabling transcendental reflection to reveal reality solely through Reason 
(thought, philosophy). It was a false dualism, Dewey argued, handed down to us in the 
form of the decidedly anti-democrat propensity of failing to credit to experience as a 
complete critical faculty, that, in turn, justified the monopolization of power in the hands 
of a select few. Indeed, according to Dewey, the reason/experience duality has echoed 
through the various (leisure/labor, thinking/doing, etc.) dichotomies at the root of the 
failure of democracy in Western societies underwriting a power structure that monopolizes 
the benefits of intelligence and best methods for the profit of the privileged few.  
 
The question Dewey takes his analysis to raise is that of how it might be possible to realize 
the critical potential of daily experience and transform it into an active reservoir for social 
change. His answer lies in the role that science (and technology) can play.41 For Dewey, 
we are indebted to the scientific revolution, since its development has revealed that reason 
does not occupy a separate kingdom from experience and that intelligence is not something 
possessed (or not) once and for all.42 Here, the contrast between Dewey and Horkheimer is 
played out, in that for the German this view leads to support of the status quo, whereas for 
the American, it represents a revolutionary vision with respect to elitist conceptions that 
ultimately legitimize oligarchies.  
 
                                                            
41 For such faith in science, the Frankfurt School has accused him of naïve optimism. 
42Both reason and intelligence are aspects of a process in which experience plays a founding role. 
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This emphasis on experience given by pragmatist philosophy does not mean that its 
advocates (prominently Peirce and Mead, as well as Dewey) intended to diminish 
philosophy. On the contrary, they supported it, but a philosophy that worked in the 
direction of realizing the possibilities of experience as the dynamic social medium of 
critical reflection (Kadlec, 2006: 535). One might say, contrary to Horkheimer,  that 
Dewey’s position is much nearer Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis than Bentham’s 
utilitarianism. It was not by chance that the then young American Marxist philosopher 
Sidney Hook should have been converted to pragmatism on encountering Dewey’s work, 
defined as a brilliant application of the principles of historical materialism (Hook, 1987).  
 
Moreover, for Dewey, this social and liberating dimension of free cognitive enterprise 
must always be valued for its deeper societal implications. If these are forgotten, then 
indeed, there is a risk of falling into the utilitarianism that serves the interests of one class 
(social category) at the expense of others. It is this social purpose of philosophy that gives 
pragmatism its normative significance and moral force. The social and institutional order 
should not be considered a means to obtain ‘things’ to the advantage of individuals. Rather, 
it should be an  instrument for the ‘creation’ of individuals.43 
 
Authoritative confirmation of the existence of an affinity between critical theory and 
pragmatism is also given by Karl-Otto Apel, much of whose thinking developed through 
an on-going debate with authors such as Wittgenstein and Peirce. In a significant overview, 
Apel (1981: 1) asserts that in the world of industrial societies there are only three 
philosophies that ‘work’, in the sense that they manage to mediate between the theory and 
practice of life : Marxism, existentialism and pragmatism - three currents of thinking, that 
is, which offer a mediation between theory and praxis, representing the most important 
outcome of the philosophical response to the ‘disintegration’ (of this mediation) caused by 
Hegelian idealism (commonly known as absolute idealism). Moreover, Peirce’s 
pragmatism, with his theory of signs (semiotics) and of rationality44 represents for Apel 
                                                            
43In Dewey’s pragmatism (1930), individuality in itself and for itself would have no value. It should instead 
be considered closely interwoven with social life, since it is bound to the broadening of the individual’s 
ability to develop free research, social intelligence and critical reflection in conditions of equal opportunity 
within the community.  
44What Apel calls ‘meaning critical realism’ (see also Footnote 4). 
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one of the benchmarks of a critical theory of society45 (Strydom, 2011). This connection, 
one might add, has led some authors (e.g., Smith, 2009) to speak of the effective or 
potential existence of a ‘critical pragmatism’ and of a so-called third generation of the 
Frankfurt School. Larry A. Hickman (2001), for example, has explicitly asserted that some 
of the pieces of the Feenbergian philosophical puzzle seem in his view to clearly hinge on 
the current of pragmatism (Feenberg explicitly cites Dewey in Questioning Technology). 46  
 
The link between critical theory and pragmatism also emerges from other sources, 
including the explicit acknowledgement that Habermas, among the few European 
philosophers to do so, has publicly paid towards pragmatism and also from the important 
work of reconstructing the influences of American pragmatism on European thinking made 
by Hans Joas (2005).47 In an interesting article that recalls Habermas’ tribute, Shalin 
(1992) has sought to show that integrating the pragmatist perspective on experience and 
open-endedness can favor a corrective remedy to the emancipatory agenda supported by 
critical theorists. In particular, Shalin’s article highlights the gainful comparison between 
the disembodied Reason of Habermas and the embodied reasonableness of pragmatist 
thought.  A very strong link between pragmatist thinking and critical analysis of society, in 
a sociological frame, may also be understood as emerging from the sociological work and 
the social commitment of Pierre Bourdieu (Shusteman, 1999).  
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
Critical theory and pragmatism are not, as often claimed, incompatible. On the contrary, 
the encounter of these two traditions is here argued as extremely rewarding, not least 
because pragmatism may represent a valid antidote to the venom represented by the 
essentialist and determinist temptation and which is always potentially present within 
critical thinking. Likewise, critical thinking can provide pragmatism with the tools and an 
attitude to a social analysis that may enable its interpretation of the conflict and distribution 
                                                            
45 Apel recognizes and includes Peirce among the left-Hegelians (like Marx), that is, the classical foundations 
of Critical Theory. 
46 It should be remembered that Feenberg (2003), albeit acknowledging the importance of Dewey’s thought, 
has clearly rejected this interpretation. 
47 In Italy recently, Marsonet has retraced a line of affinity also between Dewey’s and Gramsci’s thinking 
(Marsonet, 2012). 
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of interests between groups and classes in a more systematic and dialectical fashion. In 
other words, the fundamentally organic attitude of pragmatism that tends to produce an 
excessive faith in the fact that all conflicts can, in some way, be reconciled in a social 
whole, may be favorably counterbalanced with a focus on the dynamics of dominion that 
power, prestige and wealth enact in a conflicting manner within a social context.  
 
However, critical pragmatism has the potential to integrate just what pragmatism and 
critical theory has best been able to produce in the philosophical reflection applied to 
technology. I suggest that this perspective might support a philosophical re-foundation of a 
new philosophy of praxis in order to instigate a constructive lecture of technology. With 
the work of some authors, such as Hans Joas, this perspective does seem to be gaining 
ground. At least, the philosophical nuance shown by critical pragmatism may help the 
philosophy and sociology of technology in supporting a theoretical anti-deterministic 
approach to technology based on the concept of praxis. This could be, I would say, the 
basis of a new materialism with a deeply pragmatist philosophical influence. It is precisely 
this theoretical gaze and sensibility that has guided investigation of the research questions 
presented. Actually, the conviction prompting my development of this thesis draws on the 
work of authors influenced by pragmatism, within the field of research termed ‘Critical 
Construction Technology’ (CTC). This stems from an awareness that it is possible and 
indeed useful to find convergences between these two apparently opposite currents in order 
to grasp the opportunities of a controlled and positive development of technology.  
 
I have used this gaze in formulating the research questions and also in selecting theories 
and authors to give an answer to these questions. It is important to emphasize (again) that 
this work is not on critical  pragmatism per se. Rather, the cultural matrix, sensibility and 
ambition of this perspective has guided the direction of  the research. Equally, as I will 
discuss in Chapters 5 and 6, the idea to develop a critical reconstruction of technology 
grounded in shared and participatory social practices (what I named re-skilling practices, 
tailor-made practices, etc.), as well as the choice to anchor these practices within the open 
source logic and action model are deeply informed by this critical pragmatic nuance, as 
elaborated in the following chapters.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The bio-anthropological roots of experience:  
an epigenetic insight48 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In human life ‘skills’ are an ineliminable anthropological condition since they are bound to 
the very biological status of man. With skills, through learned, intentional, and plastic 
body-rooted experience man enters creatively into relation with the surrounding 
environment. Man thereby changes and is changed by the environment in  a mutual 
exchange where it is not possible (if not in an abstract analytical way) separate the man 
from the world.  The problem is that hegemonic scientific culture and public opinion are 
not aligned with this. 
 
Mainstream science and  popular culture are grounded today in a genocentric cultural 
paradigm itself defined by a determinist ‘informational’ mythology where ‘skills’ and 
‘experience’ have a very marginal position as compared to the role played by formally 
defined inscribed instructions, both physical (genes) and mental (for example, Richard 
Dawkins’ memes). What is new today is that a corpus of advanced analyses has revealed 
some flaws in this mythology.  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to discuss the following (extended) research question: 
What is the bio-anthropological explanation and justification of the importance of 
experience in human culture? And is there an epistemological paradigm able to represent 
such a foundation in the life sciences today? The response presented here is to suggest that 
the idea that epigenetics has of the organism scientifically supports a socio-anthropological 
                                                            
48 This chapter is based on the content of the article: G. Nicolosi & G. Ruivenkamp (2012), The epigenetic 
turn. Some notes about the epistemological change of perspective in biosciences, Medicine, health care and 
philosophy, (15), 309-319. 
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idea of man as a real being-in-the-world, namely an intentional body that lives out a 
relationship of reciprocity with the surrounding environment (physical and social). 
 
An intensive debate in both science and the wider society on the development and impact 
of genetics and genomics has been taking place over the last three decades. This debate has 
important scientific, philosophical, economic and symbolic implications. The general 
assumption of this chapter is that in spite of the wide range of actors and institutions 
(scientists, politicians, churches, etc.) animating this discussion with a variety of different 
and often opposing voices, the debate in itself is situated within a hegemonic scientific and 
cultural paradigm which is built upon specific conceptual interpretations of life that 
demand the development of a critical reflection. This chapter reflects on the basic 
epistemological pillars of that hegemonic paradigm, particularly in the light of the 
emergence of a new scientific and epistemological development – an ‘epigenetic turn’ - 
which leaves the former in serious crisis. 
 
The hegemonic paradigm  assumed by both the opposed sides in this debate is built upon 
the assumption that life is fundamentally detached from the environment in which it 
develops. The assumption of detachment is anchored in a long Western philosophical 
tradition of dualism probably linked in turn to a platonic tradition based on the 
contraposition between body and soul and then, facilitated by Christianity, reproduced in 
every cultural domain (Galimberti, 1983; 1999). Modern genomics represents an example 
of this paradigm in that it conceives life as composed of two parts, the germplasm and 
somatoplasm, with the germplasm (actually defined as DNA) containing all the necessary 
information to shape (activate) the organism (somatoplasm) which, conversely, receives 
and reacts (passively) to the instructions inscribed in the germplasm.  
 
The active/passive dichotomy assumed in genomics of germplasm and somatoplasm (or 
genotype and phenotype), has hereditary information moving only from genes to body 
cells and never in the opposite direction. Germplasm and somatoplasm are bound to each 
other through this unidirectional, causal relationship (the so-called ‘Weismann barrier’). In 
this vision, great weight is given to the genetic design of life, the genetic programme that is 
incorporated into our cells as the result of the natural selection of random genetic 
mutations. Evidently this concept of life reduces biological organisms into compliant 
 52 
 
entities that are i) governed by internal mechanisms (the actual locus of ‘life’),  and ii) 
detached from the world around them (the given within which they operate).   
 
The epistemological frame of reference of an assumed detachment of life is, however, 
increasingly challenged. Through epigenetics, renewed interest has developed in the 
relevance of relationships between organisms and the external environment. In a line of 
investigation further outlined below, laboratory research has shown that environmental 
stimuli can be genetically assimilated and transmitted to subsequent generations, and even 
when the stimulus that generated them is no longer active (Waddington, 1953; 1959). This 
chapter thus refers to various bio-scientific studies that challenge the currently dominant 
gene-centric paradigm.  
 
The following first section presents some of the core scientific assumptions upon which the 
hegemony of a unidirectional and informational basis of life rests. It shows that the 
standard, dominant reading of DNA derives from a long historical and epistemological 
tradition. The second section presents bio-scientific arguments around which an alternative 
paradigm is constructed, considering the genome as an embedded and plastic entity. This 
section discusses various new routes that are being followed in reading the role of the 
genome in life processes, routes recognizing the creative role of the organism-within-an-
environment, and which thus have the effect of exploding the traditional nature/nurture 
dichotomy. Establishing the point of departure for the next chapter, the concluding section 
argues that such a new (or renewed) conception of life has important implications that can 
also inform the social sciences in a reorientation of their epistemological basis and lead 
them to a different approach to technology development.  
 
It will appear clear, indeed, that the picture of man to be sketched here is based on a being 
bio-ontologically grounded in experience. Indeed, the epigenetic interpretation of man 
dismantles the informational model and suggests that, analogously and a fortiori, in the 
cultural dimension also, the human being must be considered not as an organism controlled 
by an informative coding lodged in his mind, but importantly as interacting with its 
environment. Looking forward, this line of reasoning will thus employ the epigenetic 
paradigm so as to challenge informational determinism on the social as well as the 
biological level. Indeed, it will be argued, the epigenetic analysis does offer ‘hard’ 
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scientifically support for a socio-anthropological idea of man as a real being-in-the-world - 
a being, that is, which facing processes of growth, development and decay, incorporates in 
his very anatomy (muscles, neurology, etc.) particular skills and habits that render him 
plastically intertwined with the surrounding physical and social conditions.  
 
 
3.2 The gene-centric approach: the hegemonic paradigm 
 
Watson and Crick’s 1953 discovery of the structure of DNA led to the formulation of the 
protein synthesis – the equation of one gene, one protein. This was interpreted as the 
uncontroversial confirmation of the Modern Synthesis, or neo-Darwinism, presenting a 
picture of the human genome as an ordered and sequential ensemble of basic mechanisms, 
the genes, seen as informational bricks governing the ‘functioning’ of our body just as 
programming languages direct the operation of computers. David Le Breton has dubbed 
this interpretation ‘genetic fundamentalism’, or the informational myth (Le Breton, 2004). 
The reading and interpreting of biological processes are strongly influenced by this myth 
and the tacit rules of scientific communities as elaborated within the hegemonic social-
historical context (Kuhn, 1962). Essentially, the modern development  of science (biology) 
development has led to a disconnection of the DNA from the developmental processes of 
organism and to the perception of DNA as merely an informational mode, independent of 
its environment.   
 
3.2.1 DNA as a code: the informational metaphor 
 
Lily E. Kay (2000) has described the socio-historical process through which the DNA-
based protein synthesis was transformed into a very powerful informational metaphor, as 
the code (or the book of life). Metaphors are very powerful tools in determining 
‘knowledge dynamics’ (Maasen and Weingart, 2000) and like other successful 
representations used and assumed within scientific and wider public discourses (‘the big 
bang’, ‘black holes’, etc.), this informational metaphor has played a vital role in the 
imaginings of and about genomics. Coined in the field in 1950s, the code metaphor has 
heavily influenced the subsequent development of molecular biology, even though many 
scientists at the time of its development protested against this biasing analogy. Kay  
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showed that the idea of encoded information was strongly shaped by the development of 
communication techno-sciences at that time, which facilitated the embedding of 
‘information thinking’ in many scientific disciplines. This included the life sciences, where 
it determined a paradigm shift from proteins to DNA. Today, as Kay notes, it is difficult to 
think about protein synthesis without referring directly and immediately to information 
codes and writing technologies - previously, up until the 1940s biology had been 
characterized by the predominance of a very different metaphor, that of specificity49(Kay 
2000). 
 
The social affirmation of the informational representation of life as a code caused 
something of a ‘fetishizing’ of DNA, transforming every living form into an ‘organized 
sum of information’ (Le Breton, 2004: 1). In fact, one of the main benefits of the 
information  category has been precisely that of its neutral and universal characterization. 
Information has been widely used by scientists applied through and thereby defining a 
variety of conceptual domains without any reference to a specific ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘when’, 
etc. It is a sort of wonderful, universal Esperanto that can be used at any given moment to 
translate any living form into a series of instructions. This transformation, according to Le 
Breton, has gradually removed living material from the scientific horizon, because 
‘information effectively puts all levels of existence on the same plane and empties things 
of their substance, their value and their meaning in order to make them comparable’ (ibid). 
Life is information in its genetically encoded form. The analysis suggested here is that the 
success of the code metaphor within scientific thought lies in its capacity to meet a 
classical Western epistemological dualistic juxtaposition: form versus substance. 
 
3.2.2 The body as a machine: philosophical background of the form/substance dualism 
 
We can trace the foundational form/substance dualism back to Plato and Aristotle’s ancient 
speculations, but we find in Descartes its full modern expression. As Carlo Sini (1993: v-
xx) remarks, there are works marking the passage to a new era and Descartes’ Discourse 
on the Method is probably one of the highest and certainly one of the most emblematic 
example of these. Although Descartes developed ideas that we cannot consider original for 
                                                            
49In this respect, Kay shows that the role specificity played within biology the role, material cause played in 
Aristotelian thought (as the opposite of form). In terms of Platonic dualism, again, specificity is anchored to 
the body and its (specific) ever changing relationship with the environment - whereas, information is 
anchored to the idea of soul and its abstract, immutable and incorruptible condition (Galimberti, 1983).  
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the time – Copernicus, Bruno, Kepler and Galileo were probably, in fact, the outstanding 
protagonists of the modern, or ‘Western’, epistemological revolution – Descartes’ work is 
widely considered the foundation of modern thought because it was an organic 
systematization of a radically new cultural climate. It was a manifesto leading to a new 
mechanistic philosophy.  
 
The new ‘Cartesianism’ gave expression to the rise of a new scientia activa, oriented to 
man’s intervention in nature, coupling knowledge to action, wisdom to power. This new 
science contrasted the old scolastica scientia contemplativa, which was merely oriented to 
contemplate the grandeur of Nature created by God. The ‘machine’ became the 
paradigmatic figure of this new philosophy applied to nature (the external world), as well 
as to human body architecture (the internal world) through medicine. With the fallibility of 
perception leaving only the mental state of consciousness or awareness (the cogito) as 
unquestionably valid, which Descartes crucially blurred into thought, and thence to reason, 
so mathematics and geometry became considered the main sciences with which to 
understand the machine. Rigorous measurement combined with logical and formal 
abstraction, where the qualities required for and of this knowledge, enabling man to ‘steal’ 
the law governing the perfect mechanisms of the natural machine. Thus did Koyré (1948) 
characterize the new philosophy as the transition from the vague to the precise (‘du monde 
de l’à-peu-près à l’univers de la précision’). And thus did ‘the clock’ become the 
metaphor best suited to symbolize the precise (rational) structure of the machine, 
prototypically representative of the ‘logic of interdependence’, accuracy and efficient 
predictability (Mumford 1934). And, indeed,Descartes depicted the Universe and Nature as 
well as the Human Body like they were perfect machines. 
 
At the same time, Descartes introduced within the epistemological paradigm of modernity 
a new element: the mind/body dualism.50 And, separating the body (res extensa) from the 
mind (res cogitans), he recognised the superiority of the latter, because only the latter was 
capable of thinking (res extensa being but a ‘mirror reflection’ – Galimberti, 1983). It was 
the ego cogito that lived the world, not the human ‘I’ as a whole. For Descartes, in fact, 
‘mind would not cease to be what it is, even if the body was not’ (Galimberti, 1983). So, 
                                                            
50 Although, again, Descartes did not actually introduce this dualism, as it was already implicit within the 
ancient Platonic-Christian tradition. Rather, he explicitly separated the body from the soul (or mind) in a 
secular and scientific framework, extending the power of a rational systematization to this decoupling. 
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Cartesian thought   introduced the possibility of a disjunction between body and mind, and 
reduced the human being to the essentialism of pure spirit (or, disembodied consciousness) 
and this, in a nutshell, is the cultural background which made possible the hegemonic 
imaginary in modern society of the anatomic body.51 
 
The disjunction of body and mind enabled a focus on the body (and the material world), 
perceived as disconnected from the mind, thus facilitating the development of modern 
science (as an ‘objective’ methodology).  In fact, the traditional separation of matter from 
spirit became a separation of the body from the person (Le Breton, 1990). From then on, 
the person was associated with the verb ‘to be’ (I am, a form of solipsistic consciousness). 
The body, on the contrary, was associated with the verb ‘to have’ (classically, bundles of 
properties). So, ontologically, ‘I am’, but ‘I have a body’. Society had never been so far 
from the holistic dimension of the communitarian characterization of the pre-modern era. 
The body had become a residual entity, emptied of and detached from its spiritual 
environment. It became a corpse to dissect, a machine to operate (on), the human body as 
holistic entity in the pre-modern era now reduced and objectified by scientific investigation 
and experiment (Le Breton, 1990: 61). Descartes gave philosophical legitimacy to a new 
meta-structure aspiring to geometric precision. He did not create this new sensitivity, but 
he was successful in revealing it and this machine (body, nature) henceforth appear as 
formally organized, to be studied with formal tools like mathematics eponymously 
heralded just a half century after the Discourse by Newton’s Principia.   
 
3.2.3 The hegemony of the informational model of life 
 
Susan Oyama (1998) suggests that the ancient mind/body dualism is reproduced within the 
genocentric paradigm in biology. This paradigm opposes genotype to phenotype, ascribing 
to the former a deterministic influence on the latter. Here, again, the form (genotype) 
defines the substance (phenotype), the physical, embodied organism, only a material and 
                                                            
51In fact, Descartes gave cultural legitimacy to a pre-existing medical practice and an anatomical knowledge 
that had been emerging in Italy (Padua, Venice, Florence) since the fifteenth century, and had reached a 
turning point a century before, in 1543, with the astonishing De corporis humani fabrica by Vesalio (the 
Flemish Andreas van Wesel). In Padua, at that time the most important Gymnasium in Europe, Vesalio 
confuted the Galen’s anatomy, discovering a ‘new body’. In this sense, Vesalio was the main author of a 
revolution less well known but no less important than that of Copernicus (with his De revolutionibus orbium 
coelestium,1543). We may say that ‘the macrocosmic revolution of the ‘universe factory’ coincided with the 
microcosmic revolution of the ‘human body factory’’ (Cosmacini, 2003: 234, trans. the author). 
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contingent expression. In this view, it is only the form that is really important, for which 
we employ abstract tools (algorithms, information science, etc.) in order to capture the 
essential information and which cannot be tricked by changing appearances. The onto-
genetic development (the substance) is controlled by the genetic programme (form). In this 
sense, a sort of preformistic model emerges, according to which a fertilized egg contains 
the organism design and  all the information required to specify its development 
(Lewontin, 2002: 6). Metaphors such as ‘the genes as programmes’ and ‘DNA as 
information’, very common amongst biologists, represent a contemporary version of this 
modernistic retreat to the so-called ‘homunculus’. That is, the paradigm which orders the 
conceptualization of the genome as a ‘barrel’ containing discrete information units, linearly 
linked to a unique determination chain from genotype to phenotype, belongs to a 
hypothetical construction of reality which is increasingly in tension with actual observation 
in the laboratory. 
 
Lewontin (2002) argues that the particular attention paid to similarities and invariance 
between organisms and species has led developmental biology to emphasize the 
deterministic power of DNA. Ultimately, from this perspective, organism development is 
no more than the mere ‘unrolling’ of a pre-determined genetic programme –to the hard 
determinist extent wherein knowledge of the complete DNA sequence of a certain body 
entails the ability to develop that body. Lewontin also argues that the usage in science of 
concepts like ‘self-replicating DNA’ and phrases like ‘DNA fabricates proteins’ are likely 
to further the misleading instructionist paradigm. Very little or no weight is given to the 
internal or (worse) external environment; evolution is envisaged as a process producing 
(novel) genetic programmes (a sort of design, or informational software) that control 
ontogenetic development. A linear influence is assumed, and, rather than mutual 
interchange, an unbridgeable divide of ontogeny from phylogeny. 
 
Le Breton expresses this conception that every living being is an organized sum of genetic 
information in terms of a hegemonic paradigm of ‘genetic fundamentalism’. An interesting 
example of this genetic fundamentalism can be found in Gros (1990: 20) referring to the 
Human Genome Project. According to Gros, we can reduce vital mechanisms and therefore 
also human behavior to a ‘huge algorithm’ whose programme is determined by 
chromosomes. From this perspective, biology itself should be considered as an information 
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science and the human body as a kind of complex ‘Meccano’ whose components are just 
genetic information. Le Breton is right to warn about the risk of just such a reductionist 
approach leading to a scientific tendency to deny differences between organisms and 
species, as well as between the living and not living. 
 
One serious risk we run in following this framework is that of depriving living beings of 
their specificity. As Research Director at the National Centre for Scientific Research 
(Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS) world renowned geneticist Bertrand 
Jordan, someone who certainly cannot be accused of harboring an anti-science attitude, has 
complained that undisputed advances in biology led some scientists, the media and public 
opinion to overestimate the power of genetics (Jordan, 2002). He talks explicitly of a 
culture of ‘genetics mastery’, where imposers and fakers can thrive. Scientists contribute to 
this supposed mastery, he explains, sometimes from imprudence and sometimes for other 
interests, occasionally immoral. Inherently sensationalist, the media also contributes to 
laud genetics through oversimplification, which further distorts the distortion. 
Nevertheless, new routes leading to other visions and perspectives have been opened. 
 
 
3.3. The epigenetic turn 
 
The gene-centric reading of life has increasingly been challenged over recent years, within 
biology itself as well as by philosophers of science. Gradually, a new way of looking at the 
role of the genome in life processes, based on alternative assumptions, has appeared. These 
new assumptions have been tracing a two-step conceptual flow that challenges the genetic 
dogma. The first step moves from the idea of the isolated genome to the idea of its 
relationships with the living organism, the  second from the living organism to the 
interrelations of this with the external environment. What is crucial here is that this flow is 
not unidirectional, but circular, in the manner of a feedback loop. 
 
3.3.1 DNA as a plastic entity: the organism – environment mutual interchange 
 
Many scholars started to feel dissatisfied by the hegemonic gene-centric approach and 
started to take a different direction, over the last three decades, stimulated by the 
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pioneering work of Conrad Waddington. Waddington’s laboratory empirical research 
showed that some somatic non-inherited changes provoked on phenotypes by 
environmental stimuli can be genetically assimilated and transmitted to following 
generations even when the stimulus which generated them is no longer active52. The 
traditional epistemological divide between inside and outside was radically reconsidered 
by the implication of this work and perceived as a simplistic vision.  
 
In the traditional, the organism is read as the passive meeting point of independent external 
and internal forces, whereas, it appears, the relationship between living organism and 
environment is much more a process of mutual dependence and feedback, of co-
construction, in which the organism plays an active role. The environment, therefore, is a 
space importantly defined by the activities of the organism (Lewontin, 2004: 46). This 
implies: 
 
1) Organisms may search for or select micro-habitats or habitats with specific 
physical conditions; 
2) Organisms are active players in building the world they inhabit; 
3) Organisms can survive by altering their environment, consuming the resources 
they need for this; 
4) Organisms are highly sensitive to cyclical changes in their environments. 
 
It follows from this, therefore, that organic life is a process importantly based on the 
transformation of the environment, a transformation that is continuous and retroactive. The 
transformative change causes reactions in a round of continuous change, a perpetual, 
interdependent process of co-construction involving organism and environment (which, of 
course, includes other organisms). For this reason, Lewotin suggests that organic processes 
cannot be understood simply within universal explanations: they have historical 
contingency.  
 
                                                            
52Fundamental here is the fact that the genetic mutations are not random, but environment-oriented or pheno-
centered: that is, genes serve the organism within a specific environment. 
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Within this biological ‘new wave’ also appears another alternative way of understanding 
the process of selection. Many scholars share the idea that we live today in a post-genomic 
era, a period in which the central dogma of ‘one gene, one protein’ (the one-to-one model) 
is unquestionably in crisis. Adherents of this view emphasize that we need to talk about 
‘smart changes’ produced by cells and that we have much empirical evidence and a 
(revived) theoretical basis for depicting the genome as a plastic entity and an integrated 
complex system. They recognize a newly important and creative role for the organism-
within-an-environment, one that ultimately collapses the traditional nature-nurture 
dichotomy.  
 
3.3.2 Phenotypic plasticity, epigenetics and the emphasis on the development process 
  
Within the one-to-one model and gene-centric approach there has been an underestimation 
of various phenomena, including notably: 
 
1) Pleiotropy (one gene affecting several traits simultaneously); 
2) Epistatis: (genes affecting other genes, giving shape to complex genetic 
architectures affecting a trait); 
3) Redundancy (different triplets specifying the same amino acid). 
 
Rather than underestimating and even neglecting these phenomena in the reading of the 
genome, scientists over the last three decades have increasingly been emphasising the 
importance of phenotypic plasticity, the ‘property of a given genotype to produce different 
phenotypes in response to different environments’ (Pigliucci, 2001:1). Contrary to the 
linear geno-phenotype relationship, this suggests a dialectical relationship between genes 
and environment. But what is really revolutionary here is the combined effect of two 
concepts: phenotypic plasticity and epigenetics. As Massimo Pigliucci (2001) emphasizes, 
the epigenetic interpretation of phenotypic plasticity makes development process the 
crucial node in the genes/environment dialectic.  
 
A consequence of this new way of understanding the relationship between organism and 
environment is that geno-phenotype interactions are also differently conceived. For 
example, Mary Jane West-Eberhard (2003: 16) claims to ‘adopt a phenotypic definition of 
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selection’. West-Eberhard explicitly links species differences and new phenotype creation 
to the reorganization of ‘ancestral phenotypes’ (developmental recombination) and the 
consequent ‘genetic accommodation’ of change. In fact, she states, selection does not act 
directly on genotypes, but affects phenotypes first (West-Eberhard, 2005a). So, novel traits 
can originate through environmental induction as well as mutation (for example, as a side-
effect), and then undergo genetic accommodation and selection. Moreover:   
 
If the resultant phenotypic variation has a fitness effect, that is, it correlates with the survival 
or reproductive success of the affected individuals, then selection (differential reproduction 
of individuals or other reproducing entities with different phenotypes) occurs. If the 
phenotypic variation has a genetic component, selection leads to ‘genetic accommodation’, 
that is, adaptive evolution that involves gene-frequency change. Genetic accommodation of 
regulation adjusts the frequency, timing, and circumstances of the novel response (e.g., by 
adjusting the threshold for its expression), and genetic accommodation of form refines the 
characteristics and efficiency of the newly expressed trait. (West-Eberhard, 2005b: 6544) 
 
Insofar as phenotypic novelties arise in this approach from adaptive developmental 
plasticity, they cannot be considered as ‘random’. More precisely, according to West-
Eberhard’s research evidence, phenotypic accommodation is a specific adaptive 
adjustment, within which we cannot find genetic change. This adjustment follows new 
input during development and may start adaptive (Darwinian) evolution in a new direction. 
What is really important here to emphasize is that the argument that, contrary to common 
belief, environmentally initiated novelties may have greater evolutionary potential than 
mutationally induced ones. From this perspective, genes are seen ‘more as followers than 
leaders in evolutionary change’ (West-Eberhard, 2005b: 614). 
 
Another important contribution to the epigenetic approach to the genome has been made 
by Eva Jablonka and Marion J Lamb through their book ‘Evolution in Four Dimensions’, 
in which the gene-centered version of Darwinian theory makes way for an analysis of 
inheritance as determined by four dimensions (four systems): genetic, epigenetic (cellular 
transmission without DNA mutation), behavioral and symbolic (language and 
communication). Named the Epigenetic Inheritance System (EIS) – referring to the 
transmission of information from a cell or multicellular organism to its descendants 
without that information being encoded in the nucleotide sequence of the gene - this 
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certainly seems to represent a radical alternative to neo-Darwinism rather than just an 
extension of the Modern Synthesis53. Combining Darwinism, Lamarckism54 and 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory55, EIS drives genetic selection, it is suggested, producing 
mutational biases and moving towards systemic mutation. For Jablonka and Lamb, 
developmental and evolutionary adaptation are not always the expressions of opposite 
paths. 
 
While it is true that development implies instruction and evolution implies selection, 
certain inherited variations are clearly controlled by physiology and 
development.56Jablonka and Lamb suggest that, except for few cases, all specialized cells 
(liver, skin, kidney, etc.) are differentiated on the basis of epigenetic differences. Although 
they have the same genetic information, they work differently. It is the specific 
developmental history that determines which genes are active and how their products will 
interact (Jablonka & Lamb, 2007: 140). What is really important in the argument here is 
that several specialized cells are able to transmit their phenotype to their daughter cells 
without changing DNA sequences.  
 
Jablonka and Lamb describe four different types of EISs: self-sustaining loops57, structural 
inheritance58, the chromatin-marking system59 and RNA interference (or the ‘silencing’ of 
                                                            
53 It could be useful remember that what we consider today as Darwinism is a re-interpretation of his ideas in 
the light of population genetics and Mendelian inheritance, a new theory dubbed ‘neo-Darwimism’  or the 
‘Modern Synthesis’, the latter originating from the title of a 1942 book by Julian Huxley (grandson of 
Thomas Huxley) Evolution: The Modern Synthesis. Probably even Darwin himself would have not 
appreciated the radical marginalization of Lamarckism characterizing this interpretation.    
54 The principle according to which an organism can pass on characteristics that it acquired during its own 
lifetime, also known as heritability of acquired characteristics. It is named after the French biologist Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829). 
55 A theory which proposes that most species will exhibit little net evolutionary change for most of their 
geological history, remaining in an extended state of stasis, and that significant evolutionary change is 
generally restricted to rare and geologically rapid events of branching speciation named ‘cladogenesis’. 
56For example this is the case of the so-called alternative splicing. Here we have a process by which a single 
DNA sequence is able to produce different mRNA and, by consequence, multiple proteins. In the alternative 
splicing, the environment and the developmental conditions determine which polypeptide will be set. At the 
same time, several cells are able, with the help of specific enzymes, ‘to cut and paste’ RNA and DNA itself.  
57 A temporary stimulus induces a gene to be active, and its product induces the gene’s activity. This is a 
model in which A produces B and B produces A within a feedback system. Daughter cells inheriting the 
gene’s product reproduce the active state.  
58Here the existing structures of some cells can mould similar ones in daughter cells. It is the membrane 
organisation to be modified and transmitted. Some pathogen agents are, in fact, self-modelling, famously the 
prions in Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in human beings. 
59Such as the DNA methylation enabling gene activity or inactivity states which are then transmitted in cell 
lineages. 
 63 
 
the genes)60. Following the lead of many microbiologists, Jablonka and Lamb believe that 
the EISs presently known are only the ‘tip of a very large iceberg’ (Jablonka & Lamb, 
2007 : 172).  This claim may be overemphatic, but to support the idea they do present 
some very interesting cases of methylation61 able to cause inherited phenotype variations 
both in vegetal (Linaria vulgaris) cases and mammals (Whitelaw’s mutant mouse strain62). 
 
Epigenetic Inheritance Systems (EISs) are both onto-genetically and phylo-genetically 
relevant. They play a key role within development (ontogenesis) and within evolution. For 
this reason, it is possible to use the neologism ‘evo-devo’ to indicate processes they imply 
and to start thinking about a new way of reading and living life. 
 
 
3.4 Re-reading the genome as a place of potentialities, illustrating the creativity of 
living systems 
 
The philosopher of biology Susan Oyama appears to have excellently interpreted the new 
mood. Her 1998 work referred to present a radical re-interpretation of the concept of 
ontogenetic development as well as of biological evolution in general, adopting a view 
considering development as the intersection of many interconnected levels. Oyama 
proposes an exit from traditional oppositions implied by the nature-nurture binomial, 
defining each system as a ‘natural-cultural’ as well as ‘environmental-genetic 
developmental system’. In fact, following the experimental evidence collected even by the 
end of the 90s, she re-conceptualizes the genome, presenting it not as a barrel – full of 
discrete units of linearly interconnected information (genes) – but as an integrated system, 
a non-linear multilevel network related to cells and organisms. From this perspective, the 
genome is a ‘place’ of potentialities influencing the developmental process with different 
modalities in a context-dependent fashion. The genome is precisely the place where, 
contrary to common wisdom, living systems show their creativity. 
                                                            
60 Named ‘RNAi’, this is an EIS able to bringing about stable and inherited gene silencing: some abnormal 
RNA molecules are recognised and chopped by a special enzyme (dicer) and the resulting fragments (siRNA) 
are able to eliminate the mRNA abnormal copies through methylation or a protein mark (Jablonka & Lamb, 
2007: 166). 
61 In chemical sciences it is a form of alkylation (a methyl group in addition to a substrate). In biology it can 
be generated by enzymes.  
62 In this famous experiment on mice led by the Australian geneticist Emma Whitelaw, it was showed that 
phenotypic variations of fur occurring in genetically identical mice were transmitted to offspring, a process 
linked to methylation patterns passed on to the next generations through the eggs 
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Oyama supports her thesis referring to the Developmental Systems Theory (DST). In such 
a system, there is no room for the body/mind or nature/culture dualisms. These are not 
regarded as pairs of somehow ‘interacting’ entities because this interaction logically 
assumes a (prior) differentiation between these as distinct. Here, on the contrary, 
development is seen as an ‘interactive emergence’, wherein the system is self-organized, 
and the ‘self’ not a primum mobile but an entity-with-its-world.  
 
Fundamental to the DST approach is an emphasis on the need to shift the focus of analysis 
from processes of information transmission to the never-ending co-construction and co-
transformation processes. As pointed out by Kim Sterelny (2001), and in line with 
Lewontin (above), for DST, inheritance and learning are coupled concepts delineating 
interactive resources transforming entities and contexts throughout lifecycles. Furthermore, 
because the relationship between information and ontogeny is inverted within DST (and by 
Oyama), the (genetic) programme metaphor – ‘explicitly identified as the genome’, as 
Evelyn Fox Keller (2001: 303) noted – loses its misleading power.63 It is individual 
ontogeny that gives pertinence to information. Development is the primary datum.  This is 
a new paradigm, which implies a radical shift to a focus on individual process and 
contingency. Contingency does not mean unpredictability, however, as it here has an 
ontological sense: it is a special case of causal determination.64 In developmental systems, 
in fact, we register a very high degree of contingency amongst different levels of causal 
determination  –  which, paradoxically, produces predictable and repeatable but, yet at the 
same time, not necessary or ineluctable trajectories.65 
 
Development is thus reconceived asa game between internal constraints and external 
potentialities. This game makes life creative and flexible. This ambivalent quality of 
developmental systems makes life processes both reliable and unpredictable, at the same 
time. This is what Oyama (1998) means when she says the developmental systems are 
‘ordered’, but not ‘pre-ordered’. Oyama’s work – as well as that of Lewontin (1993) and 
                                                            
63 Like the metaphor of information (above 1.1) this also was borrowed from (early) computer science, 
according to Evelyn Fox Keller, introduced by Mayr (1961) and Monod and Jacob (1961). 
64 For example, the imaginal disc gives rise to an insect limb or wing largely through the growth and 
unfolding of a pre-patterned epithelial layer, but, during early development the disc is created by means of 
multiple, complex interactions. 
65Deconstructing the nature/nurture dichotomy, Oyama presents a view in which ontogenetic cycles employ a 
set of heritable developmental resources. Each generation reconstructs them activating a process very similar 
to what Maturana and Varela (1980) called ‘autopoiesis’.  
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Patrick Bateson (1988) – anticipated a very rich and influential avenue of research. From 
the socio-anthropological perspective, probably the most relevant track to emerge from 
this, is the so-called ‘ecological niche construction approach’, in which an ecological 
inheritance is emphasized alongside the genetic (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). This is highly 
pertinent here, since it displays an important parallelism between development paradigms 
both within biological and social processes (see below).   
 
3.4.1 The Ecological niche construction approach: re-discovering ecological inheritance 
 
Where Jablonka and Lamb proposed four distinct inheritance systems in evolution (above 
2.2), Odling-Smee et al. (2003) delivered a new momentum to Lewontin’s teaching, with 
their proposal of two general inheritance systems in evolution: genetic inheritance and 
ecological inheritance. Starting from Waddington’s fundamental assumption, according to 
which organisms are not passive agents obliged only to react to external local selective 
pressures, Odling-Smee and colleagues argue that organisms are active agents perturbing 
and selecting (with metabolisms, movements, behaviors, choices, etc.) their own habitat 
(niche). That is, plastic phenotypes are able to change the natural selection pressures of 
local environments simply because they have to use resources from their environments 
through non-random work in order to stay alive. These changes can ‘act back on the 
phenotypes, and on their offspring, and very likely, on other related organisms too, with 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ consequences for the genetic fitness of all these organisms’ (Odling-
Smee, 2002: 165).  
 
According to this view, ancestral organisms transmit to their descendants not only genes 
but also an ecological inheritance, that is, the inheritance of natural selection pressures 
modified by the localized environmental construction activities of organisms. This 
represents a mix of i) independent sources determining the generalized environment and 
acting on the organism (e.g. climate, the activities of other organisms), and ii) behavior by 
the organism acting on the environment that creates specific (favorable) conditions. The 
evolution of organisms, in other words, depends on a combination of natural selection and 
niche construction.  
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According to Paul Griffiths (2001), ecological inheritance is a phenomenon that goes 
beyond the so-called ‘Baldwin effect’.66 He argues that natural scientists continue to show 
a great interest in the Baldwin effect because they believe that without genetic traces, the 
epigenetic inheritance cannot leave a significant evolutionary contribution. Griffiths, 
however, counters that this belief is mistaken and that the Baldwinian heterodoxy of social 
heredity finds in ecological inheritance theory a very good ‘epigenetic’ continuity. There 
are at least four reasons for differentiating ecological from genetic inheritance (Odling-
Smee, 1988): it is transmitted by an external medium, the environment; it does not imply 
the transmission of discrete replicators; it involves several organisms (not only two 
parents) within and between generations; and it does not involve only genetic relatives, but 
all organisms sharing a specific ecosystem (with an ecological relationship). In the words 
of Luca Cavalli-Sforza, ecological inheritance may be ‘vertical, horizontal or oblique’ 
(Odling-Smee, 2002: 178) – which leaves him to propose a revised socio-biological 
approach based on a model of organism-environment co-evolution.  
 
Human culture is, of course, located within these niche construction processes. Here, the 
human modification of natural selection pressures are regarded as a part of a more general 
‘heredity’ of modified selection pressures caused by the niche modification action of 
constructing ancestors. Culture, from this perspective, influences genes in two ways. 
Firstly, it influences differential survival and reproduction, as already assumed by human 
behavioral ecologists or, in a richer version, the gene-culture coevolution theorists (e.g. 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981).  Secondly, it contributes to niche construction. From 
now on we thus have to include within the human ecological inheritance the culturally 
modified natural selection pressures, artefacts included.  
 
3.4.2 Exaptation and the organism as a “bricoleur” 
 
Within this alternative post-Darwinian framework we also find an important reassessment 
of the concept of exaptation. This concept has a long history dating back to 1872, when 
Charles Darwin responded to the zoologist George Mivart’s objections to the presumed 
                                                            
66 Theorized by the American psychologist James Mark Baldwin, this describes a character change (acquired 
or learnt behaviour or skill) occurring in an organismas a result of its interaction with its environment and 
becoming gradually assimilated into its developmental genetic repertoire. 
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inability of natural selection to account for the incipient stages of particularly complex 
biological structures. Darwin used the neologism ‘pre-adaptation’ and introduced the 
possibility of redundancy in nature within the relationship between organs and functions. 
Darwin envisaged this redundancy as allowing for traits developed for particular reasons to 
be co-opted or converted for new and independent functions – a functional co-option 
dubbed ‘exaptation’ by Gould and Vrba (1982), to indicate how organisms often 
opportunistically re-adapt available structures for new functions.   
 
It is interesting to notice that the concept of exaptation evidences an interesting analogy 
between organic and technical change. It shows, in fact, that new structures in nature do 
not appear from nowhere, are not designed for a specific aim ‘de novo’: ‘natural selection 
can only work on the stock of materials that are already available’ (Ingold, 1997 : 119). 
Changes within an ecological niche can lead the organism to co-opt one structure evolved 
for a specific aim to do a quite different job. In this view, therefore, the organism is 
considered as a sort of ‘plastic’ bricoleur which faces change by putting to the best use that 
of which it already has67. In this sense, flexibility is the main strategy available to the 
organism in order to guarantee its survival, and this is enabled by imperfection, multiplicity 
and redundancy (Pievani, 2004). 
 
Patrick Bateson (1988) goes further on this fundamental aspect. He shows that the 
traditional Darwinian image of selection leads to a concept of evolution downplaying the 
role of organisms within the evolutionary process. Indeed, Bateson considers the 
Darwinian metaphor of the ‘external hand’, as well as the Darwinian image of ‘selection’, 
as ‘encumbrances’. He describes four  characteristics that valorize organisms: 
 
a) Choice making that can influence the course of evolution; 
b) Actively alteration of their physical and social environment condition; 
c) Adaptability; 
d) Alteration in gene expression.68 
 
Bateson is very critical of evolutionary theory considered as  ‘the tendency to place so 
much emphasis on genes as the units of evolution and so little emphasis on how they are 
                                                            
67This principle of bricolage is, of course, valid also at the micro-level, as claimed by Jacques Monod (1977).   
68 See the ‘genetic assimilation’ (Waddington, 1953).  
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expressed’,  preferring instead ‘behaviorally induced evolutionary change’ (Bateson, 1998: 
192).He thus present a picture in  which developmental processes are not considered 
merely as constraints but also as evolutionary resources. 69 Patrick Bateson effectively calls 
for new metaphors able to replace the old Darwinian ones that emphasize the central role 
played by the relationship between the organism-as-a-whole and the environment in life 
processes. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The main aim of this chapter has been to consider the possibility of a bio-anthropological 
link that can explain and justify the importance of experience in human culture and an 
epistemological paradigm able to represent such link in the life sciences. 
 
Epigenetics appears to represent such a bio-anthropological and epistemological link, 
which is how it shows the organism as biologically founded on a radical openness to and 
interaction with the external world. There is no need, how it is often done, to refer to 
biological pre-defined instructions (genes) as the key-instruments for life development. 
Since this biological openness establishes all the dimensions of life (including the 
psychological and social life). Ultimately, there are no pre-defined informational codes 
determining human life.  
 
The philosopher of science Lenny Moss argues that paleoanthropology and comparative 
genomics show that the new passwords of biology are flexibility and plasticity: in fact, no 
organisms are limited to single-response patterns, albeit with varying degrees of freedom 
(Moss & Pavesich 2011: forthcoming). An organism’s activity is multi-contingent, which 
is to say that it can and must develop complex mediated relationships with its environment. 
Unfortunately, however, generations of young scientists have been educated in the dogma 
according to which the appearance of biological novelty is just assumed to be due to 
random and accidental genetic mutations, with no room for the creative or adaptive powers 
of individual organisms in specific settings.  
                                                            
69 The anthropologist Robert Foley, explicitly inspired by Bateson, used this very explanatory sentence: 
‘behavior, particularly the social one, which usually goes beyond the scope of paleo-biology, is essential to 
understand evolutionary events’ (Foley, 1999: 233). 
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The power of this dogma is revealed by the extensive resources employed for the 
development of the so-called Human Genome Project (HGP). We are probably now in a 
position to conclude that the high expectations generated by the HGP were dramatically 
betrayed. The scientific dream of associating individual genes with distinctive functions 
has long been forsaken: humans have no more of genes than other mammals, and fewer 
than some, and barely any more genes even than a microscopic rudimentary invertebrate 
like a flatworm. Clearly ‘the gradual emergence of behavioral complexity was not 
achieved by accumulating genes’, as Bateson (1988: 201) puts it.  
 
With a range of theories and evidence re-interpreting the role of the genome in life 
processes, the emergence of a new theoretical framework (a new paradigm) in the life 
sciences as presented here moves us from a rather deterministic, mechanical, and 
ultimately dualistically based evolutionary model towards an emphasis on active, 
reconstructing organisms and the organisms/environment interrelationship in development. 
This paradigm, presenting DNA as a rich plastic landscape and showing the biological 
capacity of the organism to react creatively to environmental changes (which are often 
ontogenetically self-produced) demonstrates that organisms do not have a specified design 
encoded in their genome or, at least, as Tim Ingold states, there are no means for ‘reading 
off’ this specification from DNA: 
 
There is only one reading of the genome, and that is the process of ontogeny in itself. Hence 
there can be no design for the organism other than its actual phenotypic form, as it emerges 
within particular developmental context. (Ingold, 2000: 233)     
 
This post-Darwinian interpretation of life supports a bottom up ecological model that is 
able to avoid both the limitation of genetic determinism. But what is important for us, as 
social scientists, is that this epistemological change in the life sciences has some important 
implications which can help social sciences also to renew their epistemological basis. 
 
Following Ingold, the currently hegemonic interpretation of man may be analyzed as based 
on the alliance of three complementary intellectual paradigms sharing the same 
informational fundamentalism and supporting one other : neo Darwinism in biology, 
cognitive science in psychology and cultural theory in social sciences. These approaches 
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clearly share the same epistemological basis, namely formal instructions (information) 
embedded within the body (genes), the mind (memes) or the society (norms).   
 
Human culture here is considered as a set of rules and representations available for 
transmissions across generations independently of their practical application (the so-called 
‘cultural models’ or ‘schemas’). In this conception, culture is supposed to be detached 
from experience, ‘just as [the] organism genotype is unaffected by the vagaries of its life 
history’ (Ingold, 1997: 239). Against this, still following Ingold we can refer to ecological 
psychology (Gibson, 1979) and the anthropology of practice (Bourdieu, 1972) to claim that 
knowledge, rather than being imported by the mind (as cultural design or programme), is 
itself generated within the contexts of experience during people’s involvement with the 
surrounding natural/social environment. Moreover, knowledge is associated with skills: a 
knowhow that we carry in our bodies with no formal instruction  but through a repetition of 
performed and embodied (read enfolded) tasks. From this perspective, skills and 
experience are basic interfaces between organism and world (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
 Life as informational 
design or programme  
Life as a process with no 
specified codes 
Biology Genetics Epigenetics 
Psychology Cognitivism Ecological psychology 
Anthropology/Sociology Culturalism Socio-anthropology of 
practices 
 
 
Similarly to what has been suggested for the genome in the epigenetic interpretation of life, 
the body can be considered as an organism with no specified cultural design encoded in the 
mind. Contrary to informational determinisms, we believe that the body, facing processes 
of growth and decay, enfolds in its anatomy (musculature, neurology, etc.) particular 
‘skills, habits, capacities and strengths, as well as debilities and weakness (Ingold, 2000: 
239). Then, it becomes really difficult to separate the cultural from the biological. Indeed, 
the epigenetic idea of the organism scientifically supports a bio-socio-anthropological idea 
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of man as a real being-in-the-world - the organism-person in Ingold’s terms.70 This is an 
intentional body living in reciprocal relationship with the surrounding environment.71 In 
this direction, Alvin Noë (2010: 25) claims that the best of science and philosophy in the 
future will lead us toward a vision of ourselves as beings endowed both with bodies and 
world; while Leila Craighero (2010), from the neurosciences, calls for an overturning of 
the Cartesian principle leading to the claim, ‘sum ergo cogito’. Our knowledge of the 
world is deeply linked to its translation in our experience in the first person, she says. It is 
precisely because we are acting beings that we are also thinking beings.  
 
Lenny Moss (2009) moves in a similar direction.  According to Moss we live within 
‘ecologies of compensation’, where the central role is played by the complex processes 
leading to the acquisition of skills.72 Indeed, the achievement of any constructed niche 
(nest, tunnel, culture, etc.) constitutes a resource for ‘compensatory stabilization’, where 
skills assume the relevant position of a field of analysis promising to be fertile and fruitful 
for interdisciplinary research (Sigaut, 1994). For all these reasons, Ingold, again, calls for a 
‘relational thinking’ in biology and the social sciences. This means: 
 
[…] treating the organism not as a discrete, prespecified entity but as a particular locus of 
growth and development within a continuous field of relationships. It is a field that unfolds 
in the life activities of organisms and that is enfolded (through the process of embodiment or 
enmindment) in their specific morphologies, powers of movement and capacities of 
awareness and response. (Ingold, 2000: 244)     
 
It is also interesting to notice that this vision is also supporting new lines of study in 
technology development. In the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Life (ALIFE), for 
example, the first wave of studies reproduced the dualistic and informational paradigm we 
                                                            
70The locus of intentional agency, in Ingold’s work is the person. ‘[E]very organism is an open system 
generated in a relational field that cuts across the interface with the environment. For the developing human 
organism, that field includes the nexus of relations with other humans. It is this nexus of social relations that 
constitutes him or her as a person. Thus the process of becoming a person is integral to the process of 
becoming an organism. […]The human being, then, is not two things but one’ (Ingold, 1989: 220). 
71 It is interesting to note that this is an uncommon case in which the hard sciences can help humanities to 
support a philosophical tradition, that of phenomenology. 
72These constructive phenomena have until now been incomprehensibly neglected, but today many ecologists 
and ethnologists are giving new relevance even to animal architectural skills, considered as a form of 
ecosystem engineering (Gould & Gould, 2007). 
 
 72 
 
criticized here, incorrectly assuming that an artificial production of mind would be enabled 
by a reproduction of the formal and ‘syntactic’ interpretation of intelligence. Today, new 
perspectives prefer to look at the relationship amongst the brain, the body generating that 
brain and the physical environment with which those organism interact. 
 
Epigenetic Robotics (DevRob) and Behavior-Based-Robotics (BBR), manage intelligent 
behavior excluding the meticulous planning and implementation of a coherent conception 
of the world through the formal description of the totality of objects and the possible 
environmental conditions. Here, the robot learns and (re)produces skills through 
experience, by doing, through trial and error repetitions and using information collected in 
the field to react to environmental challenges. The new buzzword of robotics are thus the 
same as those in the case of the ‘real’ biological organism: situatedness, embodiment, 
emergence (Vidal, 1997). Evidently, the focus of the attention is displaced from the 
machine in itself to the particular relationship that the machine has with its environment.  
 
And we find similar trends also in the field of agro-biotechnology. The top-down model, 
based on the imposition of ‘abstract’ seeds created in the labs by high-knowledge networks 
of research financed by big corporations and up-rooted from the environment in which 
seeds grow has led both to agronomic failures and dramatic social inequalities. Today, 
participatory strategies are being developed that lead to a bottom-up ecological 
involvement of (re)skilled local farmers (together with scientists and technicians) that 
involve the selection of seeds by crossing traditional knowledge with technological 
development in their local natural environments (Ruivenkamp, 2008; Ruivenkamp et al. 
2008). The general assumption is, again, that we can improve seed selection and socio-
economic relations by interacting with natural/social local environments. 
 
For all these reasons, the epigenetic interpretation of life is not only to be considered a 
‘matter’ for biologists, but also as a potential new paradigm able to support the humanities 
and social science. In the following chapters, I will try to develop this interpretation into 
social analysis, referring specifically to technique (and then technology). I choose 
technique as privileged point of view, because it is the most emblematic example of our 
interchange with the world in which skills and experience play a fundamental role and, at 
the same time, in which this role is neglected.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Symmetry and asymmetry between body and tool:  
from technique to technology73 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The opposition between utopia and dystopia (e.g. Galimberti, 1999; Feenberg, 2010; etc.) 
or ‘apocalyptic and integrated’ (Eco, 1964), has often characterized philosophical and 
anthropological debate on the issue of technological development (similar contrasts may 
also be found in current public debate).74 In the context of scientific literature, there are 
various (techno) pessimistic readings grounded in what we might define a ‘regressive’ 
interpretation of the Man-Technology relationship.75 One implicit, though sometimes 
explicit, assumption of such readings is the notion that the advent of technology in modern 
society has caused the deterioration of the relationship between perception and action. 
Particularly, within non-dualistic currents of philosophy, psychology, biology and 
anthropology looking at the body/mind relationship, there is a wide consensus that action 
and body perception are two sides of the same coin.76 
 
It has often been assumed that modern technology would radically mediated human action 
provoking a degradation of the direct body perception of reality. This process has been 
                                                            
73This chapter is based on the content of the article: G. Nicolosi (2012), Corpo, ambiente, tecnicità. Azione 
tecnica ed esperienza tra Ragni e Formiche, Tecnoscienza. Italian Journal of Science and Technology 
Studies,  3(1), pp. 73-93. 
74 Various investigations have shown the difficult and controversial relationship of Italians with technology. 
Often fluctuating between acritical enthusiasm and profound scorn. Similar contradictions have been found at 
a European level by the Eurobarometer surveys (Bucchi & Neresini, 2006; Nicolosi, 2006). 
75 Exemplary though very varied cases of techno-pessimism include the ideas of Heidegger, of authors of the 
Frankfurt School and, more recently, Postman (1993) and Nikolas Kompridis (2006). An extreme and violent 
version of such a formulation has recently generated a subversive and terrorist social and political 
phenomenon called ‘Neo-Luddism’, the most renowned exponent of which being Theodore J. Kaczynski 
(2010), the infamous “Unabomber”.  
76 Equally cognition is not to be considered as the ensemble of abstract encapsulated symbols in the mind but 
as the ontogenetic development of perceptuo-motor skills (Neumann & Prinz, 1990). These approaches have 
strongly influenced new perspectives in artificial intelligence (AI), such as epigenetic robotics (Morgavi, 
2011). 
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considered as the core issue of the so-called autonomy of technology from human and 
social skills, and has often been taken to the point of postulating an absolute separation of 
material reality from bodily experience with catastrophic psychological and social 
outcomes (e.g. Virilio, 1988; Baudrilliard, 2005). An important element of this 
interpretation may be traced back to the deeply rooted epistemological union between 
mind/body dualism  (Le Breton, 1990) and an ‘instrumentalist’ prejudice in defining 
modern Western thought, meaning by ‘instrumentalist’ prejudice the tendency to interpret 
technical action in the light of a presumed ‘dependency’ of the human player on the 
mechanical instrument.77 
 
Often spilling over into a genuine technological determinism, the dystopian dependency 
thesis has characterized the debate on technique ever since the advent of industrial society  
(Bourdon, 2001).78 It has contributed to reinforcing a substantial conceptual identification 
of ‘real’ work with manual labour alongside a generalized conception of mechanical work 
as alienating and expropriating. In this picture, the process of progressive mechanization of 
work has inevitably been interpreted as a dangerous erosion of the creative and 
constructive abilities of the human actor.79   
 
The advent of electronic and digital technologies has convinced many of the soundness of 
the pessimistic view. One often speaks of cyberspace today in order to regret the loss of the 
ability to explore the physical and the solipsistic closure of the body in the virtual world 
artificially generated by machines (Barcellona, 2005) - a regression that would deny the 
encounter between the material and man and the authentic possibility of a ‘handicraft’ 
experience of the world, severely reducing the margins of real, innovatory human labour. 
                                                            
77 The classic body/mind dualism is a two steps prejudice, withbody and mind firstseparated, and then the 
body made  mind-dependent (Le Breton, 1990).The instrumental prejudice follows the same schema with a 
separation between human player and mechanical instruments actor followed by human dependency on the 
mechanical. 
78 In the history of social thought, an emblematic case of instrumentalist prejudice is represented by the 
analysis of Karl Marx in his political writings such as the Manifesto. 
79 According to Ingold (1999), representing this in a specifically socio-anthropological context is André 
Leroi-Gourhan’s Le geste et la parole (1964), which lays out an evolutionary path tracing the origin of 
technicity to the ‘liberation’ of the hand in the process of the phylogenetic development of Homo sapiens. 
Leroi-Gourhan presents an interpretation of the relationship between hand and technique that, I would argue, 
anticipates a principle that was to directly and indirectly influence generations of scholars: the obsolescence 
of the body (Capucci, 1994; Maestrutti, 2011). An apparently paradoxical aspect of this –revealing, in fact, 
the profundity of the principle -  is that it is also shared by opposing ‘factions’ like the techno-pessimists and 
the post or trans-humanists (e.g. Stelarc, 1994; Moravec 2000; Warwick, 2004; Kurzweil, 2005; Hugo de 
Garis, 2005; Bostrom, 2002). 
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In contemporary society, human experience does indeed seem to be largely reduced to the 
consumption of goods by consumers who no longer participate in the technical production 
of reality.   
 
The objective of this chapter is to highlight how the pessimistic socio-anthropological 
analysis of technique could be the consequence of an erroneous standpoint and thence  to 
indicate a more articulated interpretation of the role of technology in the contemporary 
world. The main aim here is to answer the following research question: what kind of socio-
anthropological data can help us in understanding if the relationship between corporeal 
experience and material reality is still relevant in defining the idea of technicity80? Should 
we really consider the innovative and skilled handicraft experience of the world to be 
something relegated to a distant past?  
 
In trying to give an answer to these questions, an ecological and pragmatist view is 
assumed that defines technicity as an interweaving between organism (the body), tools and 
environment. Crucially,  at the very centre of this interweaving a key role is still played by 
the human experience, that is, by skills. This is explicate in following two sections. Against 
the dystopian dependency thesis, it is argued that this interweaving is not being - cannot be 
- broken by the advent of modern technology. The final two sections show why, or how, 
skills do not disappear in modern technology.     
 
The strategic aim of this chapter is to continue with the line of arguing established in the 
first chapter, by showing the relevance of human experience and skills in technical action. 
As stated (chapter 1), we decided to eviscerate this issue in a threefold analysis. Moving 
from the bio-anthropological ground-laying level of analysis of chapter 2, which brought 
us to the point of human culture, attention now moves squarely to the issue of man and his 
place in the world with a review of socio-anthropological considerations. 
 
Assuming, thus a socio-anthropological perspective, this chapter engages with the 
following key issues. First, I seek to define technicity with reference to the intimate and 
                                                            
80 The English neologism of technicity here is used to indicate that dimension of identity and experience 
linked to the subject’s relationship with technique/technology’. At the end of the chapter we will arrive to re-
define this experience as characterized by ‘the particular alignment (tuning) between corporeity, the 
situational context, the material and tools used’. 
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indissoluble interweaving between organism and environment. Then, I characterize 
technical action as defined by the frame of the ecological perspective of Tim Ingold, in the 
sense of an emergent property of the whole process, synergistically, that is, involving 
gestures, tools and material in a determined space and time of a real being-in-the world. 
The next section makes a theoretical digression aimed at showing how the ecological 
perspective adopted here may conflict with Actor-Network Theory. 
 
The penultimate section shows how the centrality assumed by the concept of skill in 
defining technical action as adopted may, in new forms, be combined validly with 
reference to advanced digital technologies. The chapter concludes this with a reflection on 
the responses to the research questions outlined, and indication of issues to be investigated 
further for the development of a socio-anthropological approach to technology 
development. 
 
4.2 Intentional acting as integral aspect of the relation between organism and 
environment 
 
At the outset of the study of perception, we find in language the notion of sensation, which 
seems immediate and obvious […].  It will, however, be seen that nothing could in fact be 
more confused, and that because they accepted it readily, traditional analyses missed the 
phenomenon of perception. 
 (Merlau-Ponty, 2002: 3) 
 
From an epistemological point of view, the last few decades we have witnessed an 
acceleration in the gradual erosion of the consent that for centuries had maintained 
Cartesian dualism as the dominant model of reality (chapter 2). For, by one of those 
strange paradoxes which the history of the ideas has by now accustomed us, it is precisely 
the development of new scientific paradigms (Kuhn, 1962) in life sciences (Jablonka and 
Lamb, 2007; West-Eberhard, 2003; Lewontin, 2002) and neurosciences (Rizzolatti and 
Sinigaglia, 2006; Damasio, 1994; Edelman, 1992) that has prompted a significant 
narrowing of the gap between the sciences of nature and human sciences in interpreting the 
relationship between organism (human or animal) and environment. In particular, many 
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scholars consider organism and environment to be inextricably connected by an 
ecological81 relationship hinging on two concepts: flexibility and plasticity.  
 
It is ever clearer that the human being appears as a being-in-the world, namely an 
intentional body that lives out a relationship of reciprocity with the surrounding 
environment. There is a very important tradition of externalist or sensorimotor 
philosophical studies that leads precisely in this direction (Clark, 2007; Noë, 2005; Jacob 
and Jeannerod 2003; Varela et al., 1991. In this picture of radical transformations, the 
socio-anthropological analysis of technique82 cannot be limited to set out, as so often 
happens, a museum-like cataloguing of the tools and techniques adopted throughout the 
several ages and cultures of the world. Rather, it demands the development of a new socio-
epistemological interpretative framework.  
 
The British anthropologist Tim Ingold has focused his attention in this direction. Going 
beyond the classic binomial opposition Nature/Nurture (Oyama, 1998), Ingold refutes the 
alliance and mutual support of the three complementary informational paradigms (the 
complementarity thesis) that have hegemonized the contemporary scientific panorama for 
decades: neo Darwinism in Biology, cognitive science in psychology and culturalist theory 
in anthropology (Ingold, 2000a). As indicated (chapter 2), for Ingold, man is not the mere 
juxtaposition of three informative packages: body (genetic information), mind (cognitive 
information) and culture (normative information). Rather, man is an entity that emerges 
from the bio-socio-anthropological relationship with the surrounding environment, in the 
form of an organism-person. Smoothing the sharp distinctions used to separate the domains 
of social and ecological relations and between the concepts of person and organism, Ingold 
seeks to demonstrate that intentional acting is found within the person, and that the 
development of this is integral to the development of the organism, since the organism83 is 
an open system generated in a relational field that transversally cuts across the interface 
with the environment.  
                                                            
81 Ecological science is a multidisciplinary approach toward studying living systems founded on the analysis 
of the reciprocal relationship that is established between these and their respective environments. 
Traditionally, ecological analysis places emphasis on the biological bases of the exchanges of energy 
between physical environments and animal organisms at various levels (cells, organisms, etc.). 
82 Technique is, par excellence, the anthropological ‘medium’ with which to ‘operate’ in the world (Arendt, 
1964). 
83 In Ingold’s work, the concept of organism coincides substantially with that of body. 
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Inspired by research into the biology of development, ecological psychology (Gibson 
1977)84, phenomenological philosophy (especially Merlau-Ponty) and by the anthropology 
of practice (particularly Bourdieu), Ingold identifies the crucial juncture of connection and 
continuity between the organic and the social in the concept of skill (Moss and Pavesich, 
2011). For Ingold, the body is an organism that is not bound by any specific cultural or 
biogenetic design. Rather, having to deal with processes of growth, development and 
decay, the body enfolds in its organization (anatomy, musculature, neurology, etc.) 
particular practices, habits and skills that  are at once both biological and social (Ingold, 
2000a: 239). 
 
Skills may be described as properties of living organisms that consist of posture and 
gestural expressiveness and which, through repeated exercise, are transformed into a 
stratified corporeal conformation (Connerton, 1989). This means a tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1979) that cannot be encoded linguistically or by formal rules and algorithmic 
procedures (savoir-faire). Starting off from this epistemological perspective, Ingold 
considers technicity85 a complex process linked to the ecological relationship86 that is 
established between the organism and the environment.87 
  
                                                            
84 Developed by James J. Gibson in order to more fully analyze the relationship between action and 
perception, ecological psychology had at its core a consideration of the concepts of ‘physical’ applied to the 
environment, and ‘biological’ or ‘psychological’ applied to the organism, as reciprocally and mutually 
dependent.   
85 Technicity does not necessarily envisage the presence of a tool. Speaking of technical action only in the 
presence of a tool is a modernist prejudice, following which the essence of technique would not reside in the 
skill of the user, as much as in the corpus of formal rules that are encapsulated in the technological object 
(Ingold, 2000b). Mauss (1936) understood this well but his techniques of the body was conceived in an 
excessively individualized manner: an ecological approach, on the other hand, invites us to consider these as 
the properties of a system of relations that is established between agent (human or non-human) and the 
surrounding environment (Ingold, 1997: 111). 
86 From this perspective, no clear-cut separation can be made between the technical and social and any such 
is misleading. Skills are sedimented and transmitted social practices, even if such transmission does not 
imply encoded representations, because skills are impervious to cultural encoding, just as the organism is 
impervious to genetic codings. 
87 Technical action is a skilled practice that emerges as a procedure in the course of the development of an 
attentional, intentional and perceptive involvement of the subject with the object in a defined context. In this 
process, imitation and innovation are two sides of the same coin (Lave and Wenger, 1991). 
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4.3 Technical action as a junction of body, tool and skill 
 
Demand for dexterity is not in the movements themselves but in the surrounding conditions. 
(Bernstein, 1996: 23) 
 
Beginning from this theoretical definition of the concept of technicity and in order to 
understand what ‘acting technically’ means in concrete terms, it is essential to define what 
a tool is. From an ecological viewpoint, an object cannot be considered a tool on the basis 
of its (presumed objective) attributes. On the contrary, following the so-called ‘affordance 
theory’ (Gibson, 1977),88 an object is only a tool in relationship to other objects within a 
field of activity in which a certain effect may be exercised. As Francois Sigaut states, 
criticizing the rather widespread practice among archaeologists and anthropologists to 
decontextualize the tools of the past without any reference to space-time adaptation 
processes, ‘isolated objects do not tell us anything’ (Sigaut, 1993: 383).89 This de-
contextualization is a tendency based on models of analogical reconstruction and, 
therefore, of teleologically projecting backwards current knowledge and usages. 
 
In the case of tools, the de-contextualization generally occurs because we are accustomed 
to defining a tool with reference to a presumed function that we tie to specific attributes 
that are considered objective. In reality, as Ingold points out (2006), the so-called functions 
are mere implicit stories or narrations that, describing the way in which the instruments are 
used, end up by normatively defining theirs ‘correct’ use. However, given that the meaning 
of every narration is neither ‘ready for use’ nor reinvented each time ex novo, the functions 
of tools must necessarily be recognized by means of a re-alignment (creative) of the 
meaning of the implicit narration to the actual circumstances that the user experiences. 
This is why, the expert users (the skilled) are like story-tellers whose stories are narrated 
by the practice of their technical actions. Tools thus have a procedure-like quality, similar 
to that of the activities that they make possible.  
 
                                                            
88 Gibson’s affordance theory asserts that human beings  perceive the world not only in terms of the form of 
objects and spatial relationships, but also in terms of ‘possibility of action’. 
89 According to Ingold, this is comparable to the biological processes of exaptation in the functional 
cooptation realized by organisms in order to  ‘opportunistically’ re-adapt the bio-anatomical structures they 
already have for new functions  (Gould & Vrba, 1982). We discussed this point in chapter 2. 
 80 
 
The central point of Ingold’s reasoning concerns not so much tools as the role of the body 
in the framework of technical action. Whether it is a mere ‘technique of the body’ (Mauss, 
1936) or an action mediated by a tool, in both cases the body (the hands, eyes, brain, etc.) 
is the main subject of the technical action. In this perspective, it is not we who ‘use’ our 
bodies as (simplistically) indicated in ordinary language; rather, it is we, hence our bodies, 
that use the tool or acts technically in the world following the memorized traces of the 
performances already realized and inscribed (literally) in our corporeal skills. This is 
central, even if too often overlooked. Indeed, performances are memorized by the body (by 
its gestural skill), but not by the tool and, therefore, there is a fundamental and irreducible 
asymmetry between the body and the tool (below, section 3.4).  
 
Moreover, as Leroi-Gourhan had observed, it is not only objects that become tools in 
relationship to the field of activity in which they are collocated; the body and its organs 
also undergo the same process with a similar outcome. A hand is not an objective ‘thing’ in 
itself (notwithstanding the fact that its bio-anatomical structure is a real and concrete fact); 
it too has a history of gestures and skills, one that influences, over time, the structure in a 
relationship of mutual and indispensable influence.  
 
As described, therefore, using a tool involves combining (not overlapping) stories 
contextualized by other objects and tools. This is why we never find ourselves dealing with 
simple tools, but rather we interact with synergistic processes engaging the bodies of  
practitioners, tools and materials. Nicholai Bernstein (1996) clearly demonstrated that the 
technical skills of the practitioner cannot merely be traced back to the gesture in itself, but 
rather to the ‘tuning’ that is established between gesture, task and the surrounding 
environmental conditions. It is this tuning that makes up the essence of skill. And this 
shows us that if intelligence does not reside in the brain, then neither does it reside in the 
hand. It lies precisely in the technicity, namely in a tuning, which cannot be traced back to 
an isolated individual (or part thereof). Technicity is, thus, an emerging property of the 
entire process that synergically involves gestures, tools and matter, in a determined space-
time (social), of concrete being-in the-world.    
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4.4 Ecological perspective vs. Actor-Network Theory   
 
As noted, Ingold clearly affirms the existence of a fundamental asymmetry between the 
body and the tool. In defining the role of the actor, thus, this principle reveals a delicate 
point of dissent with the main concern of the school of thought developed in the context of 
the New Sociology of Science: the Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Also known as ‘the 
sociology of translation’, ANT is a conceptual frame emerging in the mid-80s from the 
work of authors like Bruno Latour (1987; 2005), Michel Callon (1986) and John Law 
(1987). ANT has explored STS-related issues both refusing the naturalistic (realism) and 
culturalistic (constructivism) interpretations. It aims to show how science is a process of 
heterogeneous engineering in which the social, the technical, the conceptual and the textual 
are constantly interwoven and transformed (translated). 
 
In the ANT model the actor (‘actant’) is any individual or collective agent able to enter or 
leave reticular associations (networked) with other agents. In this appproach, it is precisely 
the networkink that defines substance, action, intention and subjectivity and attributes 
these to the actant, who in himself lacks any a priori essence or substance. Simplifying, 
one of the theoretical foundations characterizing ANT approach is based on the notion that 
the actors which can be either human or non-human (for example machines or any 
technical device) as well as singular or grouped, are interconnected and reciprocally 
defined in a network of relationships. Along such lines, Latour and colleagues emphasise 
the principle following which the so-called agency would prove symmetrically distributed 
in a network. Such an assumption, in STS contexts, is also known as the principle of 
generalized symmetry. 
 
This principle of generalized symmetry represents the chief separation between the 
approaches of ANT and Ingold - so much so that recently Tim Ingold (2008) has set out a 
‘counter-model’ incorporating the essential lines of the anthropological-ecological 
approach as outlined (above) and presented, somewhat ironically, with an acronym that 
also symbolically represents the contrast: hence, ANT was countered with SPIDER, 
standing for Skilled Practice Involves Developmentally Embodied Responsiveness.  
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4.4.1 Embodied Responsiveness 
 
In effect, there are two linked issues that decisively distinguish between SPIDER and 
ANT. The first concerns the idea of a network. For SPIDER, the ANT representation of an 
ubiquitous and extended agency through networks of material relations harks back to a 
‘weak’ epistemological interpretation of the relationship between the associated entities. 
Indeed, and more explicitly, one might argue that for Ingold the concept of network would 
be unable to conceptually express a true relationship between entities, and would be 
limited to, at most, their simple reciprocal connection. This is obviously no mere 
terminological dispute. The criticism is substantial and concerns the ability to represent a 
materiality of the world that is not entirely included (comprehended) in the connected 
entities (Ingold, 2008: 210). For SPIDER, the threads of its web are woven with the 
material discharge from its own body and are placed by its own physical movement. In 
other words, these lines are extensions of the being as it unfolds along the path of life 
weaving traces in the environment around it. These are the lines along which the being 
lives, perceives and acts in the world.90 Continuing with the metaphor, the spider’s web is 
not considered by the spider itself an entity, it is not regarded as an enclosed and distinct 
object that can be combined or juxtaposed to other objects in order to support a distributed 
agency. 
 
At the same time, this vision raises the (second) issue of the heuristic capacity of one of the 
most used concepts in ANT, that of hybrid. If, for example, an ant (ANT) were to define 
the spider-web conjunction as a hybrid entity, able to function as a trap only if supported 
by a network of other elements (twigs, bushes, grass etc.), a spider might consider all these 
elements as bundles of filaments that entangle in an intricate and inextricable way other 
bundles of filaments which are, in turn, the visible tips of unseen, underground and 
complex root systems. For this reason, Ingold has his imaginary spider say to the ant: 
 
It is as though my body were formed through knotting together threads of life that run out 
through my many legs into the web and thence to the wider environment. The world, for me, 
is not an assemblage of heterogeneous bits and pieces but a tangle of threads and pathways. 
(Ingold, 2008: 212) 
                                                            
90 Andy Clark (2008) speaks of ‘wideware’. 
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Hence, Ingold (2007) prefers the concept of meshwork to that of network. Borrowed from 
the French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1974), this does not refer to lines 
of connection between separate points, but rather to reticular paths traced by living beings. 
By moving their bodies in space, these interlace and weave an environment that, before 
being architectural, is above all ‘archi-textual’. It is interesting to note that the meshwork 
structure echoes patterns of development linked to biological processes of a cellular kind 
(Figure 1). 
 
A radical refection of the symmetry principle derives from this viewpoint. Indeed, only 
living organisms act perceptively (intentionally) and build lines of relationship. The 
entities with which Latour builds his hybrids are in effect unities of media in which living 
beings are immersed. Against this, for Ingold, the ‘blanket-category’ used by ANT to 
indicate non-humans generically (animals, plants, machines, etc.) has the epistemological 
limitation of removing the fact that it is the ability to realize attentive movements that 
qualify the very movement as action and the being doing it as the agent.91 
 
Figure 1. Cellular meshwork (process of differentiation of actin). 
 
The essence of action lies in the intimate interlacing that exists between the body and 
perception. For the spider, this means that the web is not an object with which to interact, 
and nor is it an agent in itself. Simply, it is the ‘terrain on which it is possible to build 
                                                            
91  Francois Sigaut (2007) also criticises the concept of negotiation between human and non-human players 
(short of wishing to interpret the term ‘negotiation’ to the point of drastically distorting its meaning). Indeed, 
the relationship with matter demands the ‘apprenticeship of necessity’ in which there precisely no margin for 
negotiation. This is an apprenticeship that is also laborious and hard, but able to account for the central 
dimension of technical action: invention. In this, I believe, Sigaut appears to be in line with the pragmatism 
of Peirce in his radical criticism of the theory of Cartesian doubt. For Peirce (the 1932-58), the genuine doubt 
is that generated by action in real life, in which it is the world that takes on the task of constantly crushing the 
certainties constituting it. Human action is thus caught in the tension between recursive and apparently non-
reflective practices, on the one hand, and creative action (skilful problem-solving) on the other. 
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every possibility of interaction and agency’ (Ingold, 2008: 213). Every action is thus 
always skilled to some extent, and the ability is not founded on intelligence, understood as 
the capacity to plan and foresee the consequences of the action, but rather on the ability to 
couple corporeal movements to perception (intention), an ability that is not encapsulated 
(e.g. in the DNA) and ready-to-use (c.f. the homunculus), but which is developed together 
with the organism in its interaction with its environment. 
 
4.5 Centrality of skill in technological action 
 
The analytical formulation described could be accused of anachronistically putting forward 
a romantic approach that is unable to grasp the most radical developments and potential of 
technological progress brought about by modernity. The processes of uprooting and the 
abstraction of work along with the technical action imposed by radical mechanization, and 
already widely described by classic socio-anthropological literature (Durkheim, Marx, 
Weber, etc.), seem to leave a very much reduced margin of manoeuver to the skill of man, 
to his body. The real responsibility of the movements of tools in technical action appears 
increasingly incorporated in technological design, in a serial and unalterable body of rules 
and algorithms, thus confirming the warning of Leroi-Gourhan about the incorporation of 
bodily gestures and instruments into the mechanical processes (see also above and note 9). 
 
Nevertheless, as Francois Sigaut has shown with his ‘law of the irreducibility of skills’, the 
apparently  inexorable separation of action from can never be fully achieved because ‘new 
abilities tend to constantly develop around the new machines (Sigaut, 1994: 446). This 
‘law’ has its roots in a fundamental anthropological relationship between the body and the 
tool Sigaut (2007).92 Traces of this relationship seem to go back to the same etymological 
root of the term ‘organ’ (of the body), the ancient Greek word ὄργανον, meaning ‘tool’. 
Important confirmations of this law come from various theoretical and empirical analyses. 
From the theoretical point of view, I would mention the highly relevant work by Jacques 
Perriault (1989). Into his definition of the ‘logique de l’usage’, Perriault has described the 
dimension of the technotopo: an ecological niche of the technological object that, bringing 
single, instrumental and socio-cultural components together, leads to original lines of 
                                                            
92 Sigaut speaks of technique as the foundation of human sociability. Indeed, in his view, the mutual 
relationship between reality, ego and other, which he calls the ‘triangle of sense’, is created precisely with 
technical and equipped action (outillée). At the root of this action is the sharing of experience, which renders 
technique the source of pleasure and is social in its essence. 
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thought in his novel interpretation. Regarding the empirical, Caroline Moricot (1997), for 
example, has masterfully demonstrated how pilots are still engaged in decisively ‘tackling’ 
machines with their own corporeal abilities, notwithstanding the high level of 
automatization of modern airplanes. 
 
There is also, as noted, an important philosophical and socio-anthropological production93 
along similar lines with its roots in the rich American pragmatist tradition (Peirce, Mead, 
Dewey, James, etc). Succinctly characterized by Hans Joas (2005) as a ‘theory of situated 
creativity’, and refuting the analytical theory of (rational) action and its several economic, 
sociological and psychological derivatives, this firmly refuses to consider the agent 
separated from his/her particular situational and biographical context. This is precisely 
what enables the understating of the corporeal dimension of action to trigger the 
perspectival distortion of the rational theory of action. In the pragmatist view, the body is 
not a simple instrument (of action or communication) always at the disposal of 
intentionality. It is this same ‘instrumentalist’ that constitutes the underlying 
epistemological error with which pragmatists also take major authors like Elias or Foucault 
to task (Giddens, 1984). On the contrary, bearing in mind the reflection on the body and on 
intercorporeity (Merlau-Ponty, 2002; Mead, 1934), pragmatism demonstrates how it is not 
that action is contingent on context but that the context (physical or social) constitutes the 
action (Joas, 2005: 160). 
 
In terms of the STS debate, it may suffice here to recall, by way of example, the masterful 
work of Lucy Suchman (2007). Criticizing a certain widespread tendency in the same STS 
literature to overestimate the rational dimension of the actor/designer and, above all, the 
ability of the latter to inscribe in the artefact the definition that it has of the user and the use 
(e.g. Akrich 1992, Woolgar, 1991). Suchman insists that, with respect to artefacts, we are 
‘embodied users’, conditioned more in our usage by the specific, effective and historical 
contexts than by the scripts codified and inscribed in the technological object.  
 
Finally, drawing on this tradition, the American sociologist Richard Sennett has recently 
shown that the foundations of handicraft technical creativity (mythologically represented 
as Hephaestus) can also be rediscovered (with risks and new opportunities) in the 
                                                            
93 The microsociological research of the Chicago School, of symbolic interactionism, of ethnomethodology 
and of the analysis of conversation. 
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relationship we establish with new technologies. In pursuing this line, Sennett has 
preferred to replace the term ‘skill’ with that of ‘craftsmanship’, a highly significant choice 
that clearly evokes the will of the author to go beyond the risk of a reductive usage of the 
concept of expert experience (skill). Indeed, craftsmanship is a quality of the relationship 
that the worker establishes with his task and his activity: tied to ‘an enduring, basic human 
impulse, the desire to do a job well for its own sake’ (Sennett, 2010: 18), it cannot be 
reduced to an exclusively manual activity. Besides, craftsmanship is a quality of work that 
depends more on the social conditions of the context surrounding the worker than the tools 
or machinery used – a sociological conclusion that originates in the intimately 
anthropological relationship (a substantial unity) between hand and head (material body 
and abstract reason).   
 
Sennett shows that intellectual work must likewise deal with the same practices 
characterizing manual labor: working with endurance and ambiguity, coordination and 
collaboration, ‘prehension’ and concentration, and so on. These, he argues, emerge 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically from the development of highly specialized manual 
abilities and, crucially, prove applicable also to the construction of social relations. Indeed, 
Sennett takes up the pragmatist principle that establishes a continuity between the organic 
and the social. In this view ‘the capacities our bodies have to shape physical things are the 
same capacities we draw on in social relations’ (Sennett, 2010: 290).  
 
In conclusion, in considering work done with the hands, with an embodied mind and in the 
context of a social relations, we are not dealing with unbridgeable paradigmatic 
differences. For Sennett, a carpenter, an orchestral director and a scientific laboratory 
technician are all craftsmen. The single necessary condition on which a comparison can 
effectively be made is that in exercising our crafts we learn not to artificially separate that 
unity between the head and hand that defines the craftsmanship of artisan work. Therefore, 
in Sennett’s thinking the advent of technology does not necessarily imply a marginalization 
of handicraft skills, as historically conceived. Strikingly, in fact, the advent of the most 
evolved digital technologies is currently making a recovery of such abilities possible.  
 
Skill can be defined as ‘a practical ability achieved with exercise’ (Sennett, 2010, 44), and 
the new information technologies render a dynamic feedback enabling the learning from 
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experience ever more possible. Thus, all the elements present in Plato’s hymn to 
Hephaestus, in particular the aspiration to quality, the control over processes, the 
participated and shared dimension, and the unity between individual ability and social 
community become present in the new forms of organization of work used to develop, for 
example, open source software (e.g. Linux) and, more generally, of all the forms of 
computer science development defined as ‘bazaar’ by Eric Raymond (2001). Obviously 
here, one is referring to a potential that is not yet fulfilled. By indicating the opportunities 
provided by the new digital technologies – such as the design of Computer Assisted Design 
(CAD) systems - Sennett emphasizes how they can also induce their ‘improper’ (repetitive, 
static, alienated) use, namely, that oriented toward a disconnection of reality from 
simulation. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reflected on the study question of what kind of socio-anthropological data 
can help us in understanding if the relationship between corporeal experience and material 
reality is still relevant in defining the idea of technicity. In a nutshell, if we must really 
consider the innovative and skilled handicraft experience of the world to be something 
relegated to a distant past.  
 
I have focussed here on two different theoretical contributions. First, the work of British 
anthropologist Tim Ingold has been used to highlight the ‘ecological’ principle following 
which, while the hand as a single organ may represent the privileged locus of technical 
skills, these are actually more generally nested within ‘technicity’, namely, in the particular 
alignment (tuning) between corporeity, the situational context, the material and tools used.  
 
Finally, with the support of theoretical contributions of a pragmatist and phenomenological 
inclination, I have sought to illustrate how the reduction of the manual dimension of work 
(in our view its demise is highly improbable) does not necessarily imply a regression of the 
innovative nature and the singularity of action preserved in human experience. For this 
reason, the development of mechanical and electronic technology and, more recently, of 
the digital has not brought about many of the pessimistic prophecies that over the years 
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have foretold the end of creative handicraft skills tied to the expert use of tools. I have 
sought to highlight that if it is not a single organ representing the privileged locus of the 
technical skills, these being linked to the tuning of our body with the surrounding 
environment, then the advent of modern technologies cannot do away with such locus in 
absolute terms, transferring it to technological design encapsulated in a set of rules and 
defined algorithms. Indeed, the user is still and will always be a body operating within a 
context.  
 
As indicated by the work of Sennett, the advent of new (digital) technologies is opening up 
interesting potential margins of recovering a dynamic feedback between operator, tool and 
environment (physical and social). Undoubtedly, this feedback is no longer prevalently 
centred on the manual and corporeal dimension of skill (which nonetheless does not 
vanish, and can indeed be re-valorized94); emphasis nowadays is on the intellectual and 
socio-relational dimension. The consequence of this argument which will be the theoretical 
starting point for the next chapter is that today there are (at least potentially) relevant 
theoretical and practical margins in which to stimulate a recovery of the value of 
experienced and skillful technical action. This clearly does not mean returning to the 
manual, but rather recreating the social and institutional conditions that render it possible.  
 
The appeal of Anthony Giddens (1991) to develop social practices of reappropriating 
technology (re-skilling practices) should, I would submit, precisely be interpreted in this 
light. This involves practices aimed at empowering individuals and communities due to the 
participatory and shared rehabilitation of technological production (ex-ante) and not only 
of its use (ex-post). It is to these experiences and practices of re-appropriation (Feenberg, 
1999) technology that the most interesting future developments of an innovative 
technological action are tied. Increasingly, the new digital technologies and the application 
of open source cooperative models make these experiences a less utopian goal. 
 
Thus, it can be argued that the advent of modern technology is not, in fact, a process fatally 
deteriorating the relationship between body experience and material reality. This relation is 
changed, but has not disappeared. Moreover, it is suggested, the innovative and skilled 
                                                            
94 One might consider the recovery of gestural and corporeal skills that digital technologies have made 
possible in the framework of the new generation of videogames complete with motion controller 
(Meneghelli, 2011). 
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handicraft experience of the world is not as something relegated to a distant past because: 
we still have   room for manoeuver to recover the apparently eroded skilled abilities in 
technical action, which will be elaborated further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The recovery of experience and social skills 
in modern technology development95 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Having i) discussed the bio-anthropological paradigm of epigenetics as explaining and 
justifying the importance of experience in human life and culture (Chapter 2), and ii) 
shifted to a socio-anthropological field of analysis with an ecological and pragmatist view 
defining ‘technicity’ as an interweaving between organism (the body), tools and 
environment (Chapter 3), the final move in this theoretical exploration aiming to 
understand if there is a place or at least room for manoeuver for the introduction of human 
and social experience and action in technological development involves an investigation 
into some empirical cases that appear to demonstrate this it is to this end, therefore, that the 
present chapter addresses the (third) study question, regarding practices of technological 
development that are in a position to concretely recover human skills within technical 
innovation processes, and, moreover, give voice to advocates for a greater democratization 
of technology.  
 
Attempting to answer (the first part of) this question on recovering skills will help to begin 
the process of sketching a modern version of the philosophy of praxis applied to new 
technologies. This chapter will concentrate more on a socio-political analysis, because the 
rediscovery of skills and experience within technological innovation processes inevitably 
oblige us to reflect on the issue of participation – which in turn raises issues around the 
possibilities for a democratization of technology (the second part of the question). The 
focus is placed on a particular technological practice, that of open source, since this is 
                                                            
95 This chapter is based on the content of the published article: G. Nicolosi and G. Ruivenkamp (2013), Re-
skilling the Social Practices: Open Source and Life. Towards a 'Commons-based Peer Production' in Agro-
biotechnology?, Science and Engineering Ethics, 19(3), 1181-1200. 
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understood as paving the way to a new participatory development model of technology, 
one that is more open to human action, more democratic. This model, it is argued, has the 
capacity to establish a participatory approach that makes the hegemonic ‘technical code’ 
discussed by Andrew Feenberg an open entity wherein it is possible to realize creative 
appropriation processes designed to literally (re-)invent new and used technologies. In this 
chapter, I will try to apply such principles to the emblematic and controversial case of 
biotechnology development. 
 
In particular, there appears to be room for maneuver in order to conceive of and also 
concretely produce reskilling practices (Giddens, 1991). It seems possible, we believe it is 
possible to develop practices aimed at the re-encapsulation of technology within social 
relations; practices aimed at an empowerment of communities and the participatory and 
shared rehabilitation of technological production ex-ante with the aim of supporting a more 
democratic endogenous development (Van der Ploeg & Long, 1994) with the potential to 
bind technological innovation (more closely) to the goals of social sustainability. 
 
The idea affirmed here is that it is possible to propose substantial criticisms to the belief of 
the radical uprooting of technology  and in such a way as to offer a positive alternative to 
the pessimistic apocalyptic visions of technology (Chapter three). Actually, many authors 
(Oyama, 1998; Ingold 1997; Latour, 1991; etc.) have expounded on the deeply rooted 
prejudice in modern Western societies that considers technology and society two separate 
and independent entities and from which is constructed a scientific and cultural paradigm 
(Kuhn, 1962) tending to interpret technology as a neutral entity, detached from the social 
context within which it has developed. This prejudice thus is named  here ‘the detachment 
paradigm’ just to emphasize that it is based on an epistemological bias founded on the 
radical separation of human experience and skills from technology development. As we 
discussed in chapter one and third, according to  this paradigm, the interweaving of human 
experience and technique is a special (unique) condition which can be considered as 
relegated to a classic golden age by now definitively passed away. Indeed, this interlacing 
appeared to many authors as irreparably lost. Particularly, modern societies, by activating 
processes of radical mechanization, were to have dramatically broken the nexus between 
 92 
 
action and perception.96 Besides, the processes of uprooting and abstraction of work and 
technical action imposed by mechanical automation and linked to the externalization of the 
forces of production had already been widely described in classic socio-anthropological 
literature (Durkheim, Marx, Weber, etc.).97 
 
The epistemological position taken here is that these uprooting processes, although real 
and often dramatic, have been overemphasized. This has resulted in their obscuring of an 
anthropological given – the corporality of man and thus the embodiedness of technique - 
that remains ineliminable, summarized by François Sigaut as ‘the law of the irreducibility 
of skills’. That is, the process of deskillization can never be brought to completion because 
the fundamental relationship between the body and instrument means that ‘new skills tend 
to continually develop around new machines’ (Sigaut, 1994: 446).98 Indeed, Sigaut (2007) 
writes of technique  as the foundation of human sociability, with a relationship between the 
real, ego and the other – a ‘triangle of sense’ - created precisely with technical and 
suitably-equipped (outillée) action. At the root of this action is the sharing of experience, 
which renders technique the source of pleasure and social in its essence.  
 
Tim Ingold, as described (Chapter 3) has demonstrated how technical action originates in 
skill; technique is a skilled practice in which both the natural and social technical domains 
are not  distinct because technique, corporeity, environment and sociality are different 
facets of the same thing. As an expert practice founded on attention and perception, 
                                                            
96 Indeed, very often our action is not linked to the direct perception of the material reality upon which we 
act, Since action is technologically mediated. 
97 Critical sociological literature from Karl Marx and subsequently both orthodox Marxist thought (e.g. 
Braverman, 1974), and that of a post-Marxist line (e.g. Gorz, 1988) has focused widely on the tendency of 
industrial capitalism to produce the de-skillization (Friedmann, 1946) of the workforce (characterize by some 
as proletarization). Anthony Giddens (1990) has re-articulated the Marxist theme, presenting modernity in 
itself as a long process of uprooting social relations from local contexts of space-time interaction, with the 
main mechanisms of uprooting (disembedding) enabled through the symbolic tokens of, for instance money 
and expert systems ‘systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize large areas 
of the material and social environments in which we live today’ (Giddens, 1990:27). 
98 The theory of alienation (Marx, 1959 [1844]) has probably had a decisive impact in obscuring this in 
critical theory. In reality, however, as Ingold observes, assembly line labourers still need to develop task-
oriented skills. It is precisely due to this ‘coping with machines’ that workers effectively resist the attempt to 
reduce their activity to the mere execution of a command generated by the forces of production and thence 
produce, beyond goods for the capitalist, social and personal identity: ‘it is true that the machinery that 
workers are required to operate may - on account of its noise, heat, vibration or whatever - strain the human 
body to its limits of tolerance. However, despite Marx’s claim to the contrary, the worker does not cease to 
dwell in the workplace. He is “at home” there. But home is often a profoundly uncomfortable place to be’ 
(Ingold, 2000b: 332). 
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imitation and improvisation, skill weaves together the dimensions of human action and 
fuses them in an inextricable interlacing. 
 
It is in the context of this analysis of skill and de-skilling that the present chapter sets out to 
discuss open source as an emblematic example of re-skilling practices, in order to illustrate 
how more room for maneuver for the social embedment of technologies  is emerging. The 
following section looks at the general concept of open source, defining it as a special form 
of commons-based peer production. The third section considers the opportunity we have 
today to use open source as a method for the re-invention of technologies, by changing 
their the codes from within, employing the domain of agro-biotechnology as a case study, 
and suggest new perspectives for a rational democratization of technology development 
(the final concluding section). 
 
This all serves to address the third study question regarding practices of technological 
development that are in a position to concretely recover human skills in the processes of 
technical innovation and thereby promote a greater democratization of technology. Thus 
the main research question – that of how the primary relationship between body, society 
and technique and its transformation by the advent of modern technology – is approached 
from a socio-political perspective. In this, it is taken as assumed that the presumed 
neutrality of technological development, in reality, constitutes an ideological veil that tends 
to support and satisfy consolidated political and economic interests (Noble, 1993), and that 
to view technological development separately from the social context, moreover, implies 
the substantial renunciation of support for efforts aimed at conceiving of a socially oriented 
technology (Gallino, 2007).99 
 
 
  
                                                            
99 Indeed, many science and technology studies (e.g. Bijker, 1995) have been emphasised that technology 
should be considered the product of a techno-scientific and social co-creation process.  
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5.2 Open source as commons-based peer production 
 
5.2.1 Open source  
 
Open source as a concept and practice is founded on the principle of free access to 
knowledge and information. Historically, it emerged within the framework of information 
technology. Indeed, open source is the fruit of the evolution of a debate and a social 
practice that, beginning from the 1960s and 70s, accompanied the development of free 
software100 and copyleft101 in the context of a hacker ethic (Himanen, 2001). The 
innovative aspect of open source derives from the ability to purposefully incorporate socio-
cultural, political, economic and organizational dimensions within a technological product, 
specifically in the interest of democratization.  
 
From the socio-cultural point of view, open source re-introduces a dynamics of exchange 
founded on an obligation based on three actions: giving, receiving and giving back. From 
this viewpoint, open source reproduces a very similar model to what Marcel Mauss (1923-
1924) described when referring to the forms of social bonding typical of pre-trade societies 
(Berra & Meo, 2001) and that was later taken up by Karl Polanyi (1944) to formulate his 
theory of the embeddedness of the economy in society criticizing the (neo)classical 
economic argument of the naturalness of the market and the underlying anthropology of 
homo oeconomicus.    
 
From the political point of view, the hacker ethic proposes a libertarian and socialist vision 
of society. Here, open source can be understood, at least in principle, as a movement of 
                                                            
100 Software programming based on the freedom to execute, study, copy, distribute and improve is formulated 
in complete contrast to proprietary software (most famously Microsoft) that uses the system of patents to 
hinder the free circulation of information (Stallman, 2002). Obviously, this refers to the digital information 
encapsulated in the source code of software, the so-called ‘kernel’. The first experiences of information 
technology in the 60s were characterized precisely by these freedoms. For a history of free software see also 
Paccagnella, 2004. 
101This play on words referring to an inversion of the concept of copyright and echoes the idea of an ‘author’s 
permission’ in formalizing the protection of free software through means of a license. In brief, copyleft 
involves a legal document- the Gnu/Gpl (Gnu/General Public License) -  in which those using and modifying 
the free software are committed, in a reciprocal spirit, to apply and grant the same freedoms to other potential 
users. Not to be confused  with freeware and shareware that do not guarantee any of the freedoms of free 
software, the Gnu/Gpl license has been created with the specific aim of avoiding the free-riding phenomena 
typically associated with public assets in which accessible goods are modified and rendered inaccessible. The 
first version (1.0) of this license was elaborated by Stallman and Eben Moglen for the earliest versions of 
Gnu Emacs. 
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resistance against de-skillization (or proletarization) and of the creation of alternative 
strategies of innovation and production that are aimed at re-skillization (de-
proletarization). The open source movement strives for a non-proprietary, commons based 
innovation model which guarantees the possibility of users designing their own software 
and thus becoming producers, no longer just users or consumers of software. It thereby 
enables them to create – as a community – their own sociotechnical environment. Re-
skillization in fact means user empowerment, the ability to participate in the process of 
technological innovations and a move away from passive consumption.   A core aspect of 
this alternative innovation trajectory is that open source transcends the dualism of user-
designer and producer-consumer. 
 
From an economic standpoint, open source represents a radical criticism of capitalism and 
its foundation on patents and champions for profits through a circulation of knowledge that 
may be characterized as coopetition (cooperation and competition). This twin aspect 
reflects the two main currents of open source which emerged in the 1990s. One current 
considers free software to be not only a simple methodology of information technology 
development, but a genuine ideology aimed at subverting the model of capitalist society in 
a libertarian vein. Here, the open source model is seen as a non-proprietary mode of 
innovation in which experience and skills are revitalized on a communitarian basis. The 
other current makes the principles of open source and sharing subservient to the goal of 
profit making and envisages a system of licenses that allows a greater promiscuity between 
free and proprietary software. It does not refute the market economy, and indeed aims at 
using open source for potential competitive advantage (Paccagnella, 2010). This twin 
aspect has been represented also by different associations (the Free Software Foundation 
with Stallman and Open Source Initiative with Eric Raymond). Today it is preferential to 
speak of FLOSS (Free/Libre Open Source Software).  
 
Finally, from the organizational point of view, the contrast between typical models of 
proprietary software and those of free software has been widely represented in the 
metaphors of the ‘cathedral’ and the ‘bazaar’ (Raymond, 2001). The cathedral model 
supports planning driven by the various phases of segmented work with a consequent loss 
by the mere executors of any form of ‘local intelligence’. The bazaar model, on the other 
hand, self-organized, rooted, acephalous and flexible, is founded on the force of the 
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cooperative motivation of participants, emphasizing what might be understood in terms of 
Mauss’ anthropology of the gift.102 This constitutes a logic that can  strengthen the social 
bond, anchoring it to an alternative model of exchange to those of the market economy and 
state centralism.  
 
5.2.2 Open source, open knowledge, commons-based peer production 
 
Free software theory (and practice) anchors its discourse within the analysis of knowledge 
as commons. Since this analysis has its roots in the field of interdisciplinary studies of 
shared natural resources (water, forests, fisheries, etc.), there are some differences and 
similarities between this the new knowledge commons. 103 The main difference between 
the traditional understanding of environmentalcommons and the recent conceptual 
development of knowledge commonsis that natural resources are usually subtractive, 
meaning that their consumption by one person prejudices the possibility of consumption by 
another, while knowledge is relatively non-subtractive, since the more people who share 
knowledge, the greater the common good.104 
Another difference can be put. Some authors (e.g. Braman, 1989) prefer to refer to a ‘dual 
functionality’ of knowledge (for human needs and economic goods) just to highlight its 
complexity and controversiality. Indeed, as immaterial entity (ideas, thoughts, etc.) it can 
be considered as a ‘public good’105, but as an economic good (books, CD, newspapers, 
etc.) it is easily converted to a capitalistic commodity with serious access and preservation 
                                                            
102 The concept of gift elaborated by Mauss, it should be noted, does not have any connection with the 
modern concept of donation, but goes back, on the contrary, to a form of social bond founded on the 
obligation of reciprocity. 
103 Traditionally understood as elements of the environment shared by all, ‘commons’ came to refer to a wide 
range of non-private goods.Technically defined by Elinor Ostrom as a ‘common-pool resources’  (CPR), 
these are a type of good consisting of a natural or human-made resource system (e.g. an irrigation system or 
fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly (though not impossible), to exclude potential 
beneficiaries from using it. Unlike pure public goods, common pool resources face problems of congestion or 
overuse. A common-pool resource typically consists of a core resource (e.g. water or fish), which defines the 
stock variable, while providing a limited quantity of extractable fringe units, which defines the flow variable. 
While the core resource is to be protected or entertained in order to allow for its continuous exploitation, the 
fringe units can be harvested or consumed. 
104 For this reason, Hess and Ostrom (2007: 5) suggest that ‘the unifying thread in all commons resources is 
that they are jointly used, managed by groups of varying sizes and interests.  Self-organized commons require 
strong collective-action and self-governing mechanisms, as well as a high degree of social capital on the part 
of the stakeholders’. 
105 In economics, a good is defined as public when for a series of natural and/or cultural circumstances 
(which can also change in time) it is characterized by a low degree of ‘rivalry’(competition for a scarcity) and 
for a low degree of excludability (difficulty in preventing its use). For the notion of ‘public good’ and its 
specificity within the theory of commons, see Ostrom (1990). 
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issues. New media and digital technologies have brought both faces of this Janus to the 
fore, entailing an ambivalent complexity. 
In all fields in which information, knowledge and goods which are information-dense play 
a fundamental role, and these are expanding quite rapidly in today’s network society 
(Castells, 1996), it is possible to realize practices of open access106 that render such assets 
ever more usable, including (and especially) by those who have been traditionally 
excluded107. This can enable the emergence of (individual and collective) practical skills, 
based on a non-proprietary logic and grounded in cooperative actions, skills that escape the 
regulation both of the state and the market. Yochai Benkler has characterized these actions 
as ‘commons-based peer production’:  
  
Commons-based peer production is a socio-economic system of production that is 
emerging in the digitally networked environment. Facilitated by the technical infrastructure 
of the Internet, the hallmark of this socio-technical system is collaboration between large 
groups of individuals, sometimes in the order of tens or even hundreds of thousands, who 
cooperate effectively to provide information, knowledge or cultural goods without relying 
on either market pricing or managerial hierarchies to coordinate their common enterprise. 
(Benkler, 2006a: 395) 
 
Benkler goes on to single out the main characteristic of these forms of production precisely 
in the fact that nobody has exclusive control over the use of resources. On the contrary, 
they are based on what is essentially a freedom of access regulated only by a general 
symmetry of reciprocity. The principle guideline is that of sharing (and developing) 
knowledge and information and with production substantially decentralized, no 
institutionalized hierarchy of system is envisaged. 
 
For these forms of production, the Internet represents the main material and symbolic 
infrastructure of action and sharing. The underlying assumption lies in the conviction that 
also more complex tasks, has been assumed to require a high levels of specialization 
attributed to professionals with advanced skills, can be reorganized (by moderators 
accredited with systems of appraisal between peers) and, therefore, realized by simply 
                                                            
106This issue of the highly important potential of access require in-depth theoretical and practical reflection 
on the commons in the next few years (Hess & Ostrom, 2007). 
107The French philosopher Michel Serres, in an interview in France-Info, has recently spoken on the 
revolutionary potential of this aspect in highly significant terms. See http://www.fabriquedesens.net/A-
propos-de-Wikipedia-Michel-Serre 
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interested volunteers and with intrinsic motivations bound to social rewards. In the last 
instance, these forms of production mostly play on a non-economic capital, namely social 
capital. 
 
It is important to note that commons transcend the traditional division between the private 
and the public; commons do not refer to the traditional notions of community or the public. 
Commons are based on the free and open communication and collaboration and arise from 
social processes of production resting on voluntary cooperation and enabled by digital 
network technologies. It is a productive cooperation that produces and sustains commons. 
Instituting commons requires a shift from a focus on the public interest – the res publica – 
to that of the interest in commons – the res communis. This commons-based knowledge 
production enables and requires a new research network configuration built upon open 
codes, re-skilling practices and democracy.  
 
 
5.3 Democracy, open codes and reskilling practices: the case of life technologies 
 
Benkler rightly asserts that a wider accessibility to knowledge and information may surely 
have a remarkable impact on reducing the serious imbalances that undermine the basis of 
world-wide human development. Indeed, this is closely correlated to the real development 
of some specific fields like food, health, education. In all of these fields, a determining role 
is being played today by information-embedded products, goods and tools (Benkler, 
2006b). The application here of commons-based forms of production of these information-
based products may contribute to a fairer human development by facilitating bottom-up 
decentralized practices. In this sense, open source may help us avoid what was 
efficaciously defined ‘the tragedy of the anti-commons’ (Heller, 1998) - an expression 
coined in criticism of the unscrupulous use that many liberal economists continue to make 
of the famous dilemma formulated by the American ecologist Garrett James Hardin (1968) 
as ‘the tragedy of the commons’ in which a plurality of individuals use a common good 
and, acting rationally to pursue their own short-lived private interests, end up by 
squandering the (limited) common resources, which evidently harms their own interests 
over the long term (hence the ‘tragedy’). 
 
 99 
 
The tragedy of the anti-commons describes an opposite situation, in which the proliferation 
of holders of property rights frustrate the possibility of reaching a desirable social result, 
owing to the collapse of the mechanisms of coordination needed to ensure the development 
and marketing of the products. Indeed, economists recognize that if the ownership rights of 
multiple components of a single technology are held by a relatively high number of entities 
(individuals or companies), the marketing and development of products requires 
considerable effort of coordination between the various parties involved. In an ideal world 
without transaction costs,108 this would not create particular negotiation problems. Reality 
is very different, however, and transaction costs are often so high as to hinder negotiation 
with the paradoxical effect of preventing the satisfaction of both private interests and those 
of the public.  
 
This theory has not been spared by criticism. Particularly strong is that elaborated by the 
neo-liberal jurist Richard A. Epstein. Referring to biomedical research, Epstein claims that 
Heller overestimated the problems of patent protection at both theoretical and empirical 
levels. Empirically, the number of patents filed has continued to grow. Theoretically, 
according to Epstein (2004), Heller fails because of a set of ‘faulty analogies’ – primarily 
between patent system and natural barriers as well as bureaucratic permits. 
 
Concerning the first of these, Epstein argues that nature can erect a barrier against 
innovation109, but this is not the case in the world of biomedical research. Concerning the 
second analogy, Epstein argues that the parallel is not pertinent because the patent is 
always a ‘wasting asset’. Actually, the legal monopoly created by a patent is limited in 
time and, even during the period of its validity, new and old patents or new technologies 
can challenge its dominance. Epstein claims that ‘those who do not deal will not prosper, 
so that the entire culture works in ways that encourage various forms of cooperation’. 
Essentially, therefore, Epstein believes that patents do not necessarily create economic 
blockades and that the fear for anti-commons is based on a faulty imagination. People 
imagine that each patent operates alone. At the contrary, he says ‘in most instances, an 
aggressive program of patent pooling changes the overall landscape’. 
 
                                                            
108 One in which all the players have a perfect knowledge of all the variables at play and in which there are 
no associated impediments or costs to negotiation. 
109 He cites as an example the blocking power of multiple owners controlling different segments of a river. 
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Epstein’s authoritative opinion has also been contested, in turn, as being founded on weak 
theoretical and empirical underlying assumptions. It is important to note that part of this 
criticism comes from outside the open source movement (see Dreyfuss, 2003). Clearly the 
framework of patenting and open access is controversial and complex.  For example, since 
the rapid expansion of the intangible or immaterial commons in particular communications 
systems and genetic information commons, private companies in all areas of production 
have attempted to privatize parts of these commons for the purpose of commercialization 
and commoditization.  As detailed below (4.3.1), these so-called ‘new enclosures of the 
commons’ – latter day versions of the earlier enclosures of the natural commons during the 
initial stages of capitalism, now concerning the immaterial commons – do seem have led to 
a widespread ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’. It is partly as a result of this that the new 
enclosures have also met with increasing resistance globally by alternative legal, technical 
and politico-economic strategies employed by all kinds of local and global movements 
fighting for the protection the commons or the reclamation of them, movements like the 
free software movement, the peer-to-peer movement, creative commons, open access, A2K 
among many others.   
 
5.3.1 The case of agro-biotechnologies 
 
The ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ has been given by biotechnologies, both the ‘red’ 
(health and pharmaceutical fields) as well as ‘green’ (agricultural sector) varieties. The 
effort that began in the 1930s to increase crop yields and boost the nutritional quality of 
produced food in order to reduce the impact of famine and malnutrition has prompted 
proprietary processes of techno-scientific innovation that can no longer respond 
satisfactorily to human needs, as demonstrated by the case of Golden Rice, a variety of 
genetically modified rice with the aim of boosting the vitamin A intake of the poor. The 
vetoes, obstacles and very high costs caused by the combination of tens of patents 
(distributed throughout the world) weighing on the several passages that obligatorily must 
be tackled for its realization have given rise to an inextricable legal and economic tangle. 
This predicament has made Golden Rice a rather ineffective product (Hope, 2008). The 
problem with Golden Rice thus exemplify well how the resorting to the politics of 
proprietary patents has transformed a potentially revolutionary product into a tragic 
paradox. 
 101 
 
This disheartening narrative can easily be generalized to all the experiences of a 
proprietary kind regarding biotechnology. Globally, a picture emerges in which the levels 
of social equity, the defense of environmental resources and public health have often been 
subjected to critical distortions. The case of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is 
only the most glaring, as observed by critiques from the perspectives of socio-economics 
(impoverishment and mass proletarization of small-holders farmers in poor countries), the 
environment (reduction of biodiversity) and real effectiveness (Shiva, 2004) – and this 
without taking account of the serious symbolic crisis that they have caused also in the rich 
and economically developed world (Nicolosi, 2007). 
 
By means of a patenting policy based on ‘exclusion’, the biotechnological industry has 
increasingly restricted crop farmers’ access to phytogenetic resources. Germplasm is the 
raw material on which any program of plant-breeding is based and to which selectors have 
traditionally always had free access in order to make on-going selective improvements in 
plants varieties over the course of several generations. The advent of GMOs has drastically 
changed this situation. In an apparently paradoxical way, indeed, what has happened is a 
typical example of antisocial free-riding. The selector (often a multinational corporation) 
patents (and therefore renders inaccessible) a germplasm that is itself the result of the 
crossing of genes and other germplasm developed by other selectors in a system of free 
access, sometimes from the cultural practices of indigenous communities, and sometimes 
within programs financed with public funds or by international research centers and made 
freely available to all.  
 
One of the more sensational instances of patenting fundamentalism occurred with the 
development and patenting of seeds rendered artificially sterile in order to exclude the 
possibility that they might be re-sown by farmers110. By separating seeds (and the genetic 
information contained within them) from the harvest and, therefore, from the socio-cultural 
practices and the natural environment that traditionally generated and ‘safeguarded’ it, 
conventional biotechnologies have made farmers dependent on the specialist globalized 
                                                            
110Genetic use restriction technology (GURT), colloquially known as ‘terminator technology’ or suicide 
seeds restricts the use of GM plants by causing second generation seeds to be sterile. Initially developed as a 
concept by the US Department of Agriculture and multinational seed companies, such seeds have not been 
commercialized anywhere in the world due to opposition from farmers, indigenous peoples, NGOs, and some 
governments. In 2000, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity recommended a de 
factomoratorium on the field-testing and commercial sale of terminator seeds, which was re-affirmed in 
2006. India and Brazil have passed national laws to prohibit the technology. 
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multinationals and owners of highly expensive patents (Kloppenburg, 2005) which enable 
these firms to programme the agricultural production at a distance (Ruivenkamp, 2005). 
 
The production of food and the development of agricultural techniques are the fruit of an 
age-old storehouse of social, cultural and symbolic resources. This storehouse is 
marginalized by the present processes of scientific production, uprooting food and 
agriculture from local traditions and causing an unequal distribution of benefits to the clear 
gain of the big globalized players111. In practice, the privatization of biodiversity has 
effected a gradual erosion of the sovereignty that farmers have had in the past over their 
relationships with their seeds (Kloppenburg, 2010). What we have witnessed, therefore, 
has been the systematic expropriation of symbolic and material resources by opaque and 
uprooted international knowledge networks (Ruivenkamp, 2008).  
 
5.3.2 Democratizing innovation: opening codes  
 
The Golden Rice example may be conceived as symbolizing the new enclosure trajectory 
in knowledge production that characterizes the last thirty years of techno-scientific 
development. This trajectory has introduced serious inefficiencies that have drastically 
limited the economic and social potential of knowledge production. It is assumed that open 
source can resolve some of these problems, adapting knowledge production to the real 
needs of users also in the cases where the potential market is not broad, and speeding up 
innovative processes, making them economically more accessible and more reliable. 
Moreover, and this is no secondary matter, open source can facilitate a greater 
democratization of innovation since it guarantees an effective involvement of the 
user/consumer – or prosumer  - in the processes of technological innovation (Von Hippel, 
2005).  
 
In open source, the one-way and top-down logic of the traditional practices of consumption 
is radically overturned. There is also, it should be emphasized a broad literature in social 
sciences and humanities (mainly neo-Marxist) criticizing the actual extent of this process. 
                                                            
111According to the International Center for Agriculture Research (ICARDA), today approximately 50% of 
the world market of seeds is monopolized by four large biotechnological multinationals: Monsanto (USA), 
DuPont (USA), Syngenta (CH) and Groupe Limagrain (f). A similar statement can be made with reference to 
pesticide production: Bayer (D), Syngenta (CH), BASF (D), Dow Agrosciences (USA), Monsanto (USA) 
and DuPont (USA). 
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Some of these authors (e.g. Suarez-Villa, 2001) consider prosumerism, and more generally 
the practical involvement of the user, as little more than just a new form of exploitation in 
the age of techno-capitalism, where the reproduction of knowledge has become the most 
important function of society since it is replacing the process of reproduction of capital. 
According to Suarez-Villa, the emergence of the so-called knowledge society has rendered 
creativity and knowledge the scarcest resources for capital. Under techno-capitalism, 
knowledge assumes the properties of a private commodity, as much as raw materials or 
labor power did under industrial capitalism. For this reason, there are pressures to globalize 
and commodify intellectual property (patenting). This system, he argues, is strongly 
dominated by big corporations since the vast majority of new technologies, and 
particularly the most valuable ones, are spawned within corporate structures. The most 
radical example of this process, says Suarez-Villa, is the commodification of life itself with 
the acquisition of patents in the field of genetics, with biotechnology companies obtaining 
patents on decoded genes that can be used to develop new drugs. In this context, each 
innovation produced outside the corporation framework is, in the end, appropriated and 
absorbed by it.  
 
This is the case of open source, Suarez-Villa claims, but it is also the case of prosumerism 
where the user contribution to innovation helps corporations increase profits through the 
most sophisticated and pervasive example of alienation. Here, neo-Marxism finds 
significant support in governamentality112, inspired by the post-structuralist thought of 
Foucault. From this perspective, individual freedom, empowerment and technology of the 
self express contradictory trends as they have ambivalent critical points where their 
implied liberalism may suddenly change to its opposite and incorporated (embodied) forms 
of control and can become a dramatic ‘microphysics of power’. That is, disciplinary 
techniques of the self can very easily become disciplinary technologies of power; people 
may believe they are able to express themselves and their autonomy, but really they 
effectively find the ‘right’ way to align themselves to the power desiderata. Here, ‘the 
autonomy of the self is thus not the eternal antithesis of political power but one of the 
objectives and instruments of modern mentalities for the conduct of conduct’ (Rose, 1996: 
155). 
                                                            
112 That is, ‘the dramatic expansion in the scope of government, featuring an increase in the number and size 
of the governmental calculation mechanisms’ (Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 76). 
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While appreciating these radical and well-founded interpretations, however in this chapter, 
a different position is advocated. The skilled involvement of user can - I argue – on the 
basis of a choice supported by political and ethical awareness, move in the direction of the 
ideal ‘democratic rationalization’ of technology of which Andrew Feenberg (2010) speaks. 
There are two reasons for this affirmation.  
 
First of all, open source commons based knowledge production radically develops a 
potential implicit in every technology, and one that in contrast to the ‘essentialist’ vision of 
the philosophy of technology, such as that developed by Heidegger (1.4.3), confirms that 
technological development is always bound to the socio-historical contingency, as 
demonstrated by constructivist sociological analysis (Bloor, 1991; Latour, 1987; etc.). It 
was probably the author Andrew Feenberg who has best expressed this principle from a 
philosophical perspective,  at the same time highlighting all its democratic and 
emancipatory political potential. Bearing in mind the teachings of the heterodox Marxism 
of Antonio Gramsci (1975), Feenberg (1999) specifically focuses on the hegemonic 
content that is encapsulated within technological objects, both at the level of the social 
meaning of individual objects and the deeper values they assume, inscribed as a technical 
code and indicating the possibility for resistance of the hegemonic through a re-encoding 
(1.4.5): 
 
Feenberg thus the establishment of a participatory method that renders the code an open 
entity in which processes of creative appropriation can be fulfilled, aimed literally at re-
inventing technologies.113 I would argue that open source, commons based knowledge 
production realizes this proposal today, opening real operating spaces for re-inventing 
technologies that did not formerly exist. 
 
Secondly, but in a closely correlated way, the processes of participation activated by the 
open source logic offer another important aspect the issue (also tackled by Feenberg) the 
need to limit the solipsistic power of technocracy. This is a power that, in modern societies, 
is often more substantial than the political system itself. Technicians, as is known, exercise 
an influence and control over communities that goes beyond that exercised by the 
institutions appointed to implement democracy. Winner (1995) speaks of the influence of 
                                                            
113 Feenberg’s studies have been applied to the medical (AIDS) and information technology world 
(MINITEL in France). 
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technocracy in terms of a new form of legislative power lacking representativeness. For 
such reasons, for example, Richard Sclove, one of the most influential authors in this field, 
supports the need to find new ways to integrate user participation into the processes of 
technological design (Sclove, 1995; 2010) and points specifically toward non-specialists to 
limit the autonomy and self-referentiality of technical staff114. In order to achieve this, 
Sclove refers to the need to revitalize local communities to favor the growth of their 
independence and ability to govern science and technique.   
 
Open source, commons-based knowledge production heads right in the direction indicated 
by Sclove through the activation of a re-skilling process that re-directs a part of the design 
and technical creation process into the hands of non-experts and, therefore, of the 
communities in which the technology unfolds its effects. In this sense, they become fully 
inserted in the river bed of re-skilling practices (Giddens, 1991), oriented toward 
empowering communities based on the re-appropriation of knowledge and know-how 
(savoir-faire) expropriated from techno-scientific ‘abstract systems’.  
 
5.3.3 Re-skilling practices 
 
Further developing the discussion of the value and epistemological and ontological 
importance of skills, Richard Sennett has elaborated the Jeffersonian ideal according to 
which democratic competence resides in skills practiced to modify material conditions. He 
points out that citizenship can be lost or earned through the material conditions of labor 
and proposes forward artisan work as the ideal form in which participation, sharing, 
personal realization and social bonds are articulated.   
 
With this argument, the American sociologist critically reviews of the thought of one of his 
masters, Hanna Arendt, whose analysis of the ‘human condition’ (Arendt, 1964) 
distinguishes two figures of the human being at work: the animal laborans and the homo 
faber. The first echoes a vision of man as a beast of burden, referring to the repetitive and 
laborious dimension of work. The second, instead, recalls a higher world of the activity of 
building a communal life. For Arendt, the figure of the homo faber goes directly back to 
                                                            
114These themes have been keenly and seminally discussed by John Dewey (1927). For this reason, a 
pragmatist shift has been ascribed to Feenberg (Hickman, 2001) from which Feenberg (2003) has 
disassociated himself. 
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the high and noble art of Politics (and therefore of Philosophy). In this distinction there is, 
however an implicit hierarchy: 
 
Homo faber is the judge of material labour and practice, not Animal laborans’s colleague 
but his superior. Thus, in her view, we human beings live in two dimensions. In one we 
make things; in this condition we are amoral, absorbed in a task. We also harbour another, 
higher way of life in which we stop producing and start discussing and judging together. 
Whereas Animal laborans is fixated with the question ‘How?’ Homo faber asks ‘Why?’ 
(Sennett, 2008: 6-7)  
 
For Sennett, such a distinction makes a fundamental philosophical error that leads to 
serious ethical and political consequences. In particular, it devalues material labor. For 
Sennett, work, intended as artisan work, has a founding value for a broad democratic 
citizenship and is not left in the hands of the expert elite. Working well, indeed, puts 
people in the condition to govern themselves and educates them toward citizenship. In 
artisan work, one must learn to reconcile autonomy and authority, but everyone can 
become good craftsmen since the required abilities are innate. 
 
A central aspect of Sennett’s argument is the principle according to which the advent of 
technology does not necessarily imply a marginalization of artisan skills. On the contrary, 
the advent of the most highly evolved digital technologies is making their revival possible, 
with skill defined as a ‘trained practice’ (Sennett, 2008: 37), and the new information 
technologies creating a dynamic feedback that can ‘learn’ from the experience. As already 
detailed (Chapter 3), all the elements present in Plato’s celebration of Hephaestus - in 
particular the aspiration to quality, the control over processes, the participatory and shared 
dimension, the unity between individual skill and social community - are present in the 
new forms of organization of work employed to develop open source software and, more 
generally, in all the forms of information technology development characterized by Eric 
Raymond  as in the ‘bazaar’ category.115 Indeed, Sennett shows how the new information 
and communication technologies (ICT) allow a revival of ‘craftsmanship’, ‘maestria’ in 
Italian translation (3.5). 
 
                                                            
115Obviously, this refers to a potential. Indeed, Sennett, considering the opportunities furnished by new 
digital technologies emphasises how they can also induce an ‘incorrect’ usage (repetitive, static, alienated), 
that is oriented to a separation between reality and simulation. 
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For Sennett, therefore, the dystopian techno-phobia of Arendt, albeit comprehensible given 
the contextual conditions in which her generation lived, goes directly back to the Greek 
myth of Pandora’s casket116 in establishing her ideal model based on the control ex post 
facto of technology, in which Politics (the Public, the Discourse) must try to face and 
resolve the problems that have been created by experts and technocrats117. Sennett invokes 
an opposite model, based on a new ‘cultural materialism’, in which participation must 
begin before (ex ante), when people produce things through material work. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion: a copyleft germplasm for re-skilling practices? Problematic issues 
and possible future developments 
 
Open source exemplifies the important room for maneuver for technology and human 
experience to be brought together more closely. In the re-skilling processes launched by 
open source practices, it becomes clear that technology and society are not two distinct 
entities, that the mutual interweaving through which they are constructed can be intensified 
with the development of innovative socially embedded technological devices and 
procedures, and further that modernity has never – as it cannot – completed the uprooting 
process which has characterized it. It seems that technical rationality is only partially de-
contextualized and disembodied, because there do exist practices of technological 
development that are able to indicate a recovery of human and social skills within technical 
innovation processes.  
 
With specific reference to the agro-biotechnical domain, it could be said that open source 
re-skilling practices can give life to a participatory research model that affords farmers a 
fundamental role. Of course, this is not entirely novel, since it was the first modern 
economist, Adam Smith, who described the phenomenon in 1776 when referring to a great 
part of the machines used in the nascent manufacturing industry. Actually, those machines 
were originally the inventions of common workmen, who employed in some very simple 
operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of 
performing it. Similarly, and long before Smith, farmers were solving bio-technical 
                                                            
116Pandora, we should recall, in Greek mythology is the Goddess of invention. She was sent to Earth by Zeus 
as a punishment for Prometheus’ transgression (the fire theft). 
117Arendt, for example, was convinced that there should have been a public debate on the atomic bomb when 
this was created by scientists and technologists. 
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problems and sharing their inventions with their peers. In this sense, open source 
agriculture may be regarded more as a restoration than a revolution. 
 
In light of these considerations, although it is not universally acknowledged and there are 
various critiques drawn from the right (neo-liberals) and the left (neo-Marxists) of the 
political spectrum, it does appear that open source might be able to promote, in specific 
circumstances, re-skilling practices oriented towards introducing greater participation and 
social sharing in the processes of technological production.  In the agro-biotechnological 
field, for example, there are already important experiences of re-skilling practices having 
the ambitious objective of uniting advanced genetic research and farmers’ know-how. We 
may note here the research and projects of intervention carried out by the research group 
heading up the Critical Construction Technology (CTC) of the Wageningen University and 
Research (WUR) and aimed at developing Tailor-Made Biotechnologies (Ruivenkamp, 
2005; 2008; 2009; Ruivenkamp at al., 2008); similarly, Participatory Plant Breeding (PPB) 
developed in Italy and realized throughout the world by Ceccarelli and Grando (Ceccarelli 
et al., 2007; Ceccarelli, 2009). In both cases, there is an attempt of bottom up technological 
development that re-encapsulates biotechnologies in the social, cultural and environmental 
traditions of communities, through the participated collaboration of technologists, 
scientists, farmers and citizens in a virtuous mechanism of participation and sharing that 
recovers all the local know-how and environmental resources. 
 
Conventional biotechnologies tend to proceed with the selection of varieties that do not 
respond to the needs of the poorest farmers working in marginal environments with 
difficult climatic and social conditions where the paucity of common assets, such as water 
and the unavailability of seeds, are more often than not critical118. Against this, the 
decentralization of the genetic improvement envisages the use and valorization of the local 
knowledge of farmers from the beginning of the process, in identifying 
problems/challenges and goals at which point, crucially in the procedures of biogenetic 
engineering (technology), the possibilities of genetic variability are still large (i.e., before 
the options available are narrowed). This process brings farmers and researchers together 
so that one learns from the other. The participation of farmers in their own agronomic and 
                                                            
118 The objective of the large biotech corporations is that of creating products able to ‘function’ in artificially 
standardized environments by means of the massive use of technologies and chemicals (with prohibitive 
costs for many farmers). Biodiversity, in this context, is neither contemplated nor valorised.   
 109 
 
climatic conditions for the purpose of selection is not only effective, but considerably 
speeds up the process of adopting new varieties without involving the complex 
mechanisms of the official release of varieties and production and divulgation of certified 
seed (c.f. the concomitant risk of anti-commons tragedy) and, moreover, ensures a higher 
preservation of biodiversity (Ruivenkamp, 2005; 2008; 2009; Ceccarelli et al., 2007; 
Ceccarelli, 2009). 
 
These methodologies have important implications for democracy. In fact, they show the 
possibility of opening technical codes and proposing a participatory method oriented to a 
creative appropriation aimed at re-inventing technologies. From this perspective, the 
Andrew Feenberg’s approach of developing resistance tactics aimed at re-encoding the 
hegemonic social order incorporated in the technological objects can be realized. This is 
not an utopian dream any more. 
 
Of course, we are only at the very beginning of this journey. In order to develop and 
strengthen tailoring and participatory processes in the agro-biotechnological sector, it will 
be crucial in the next few years to experiment and carry out in-depth research to develop 
models for the incorporation of open source licenses of intellectual and personal property 
in biotechnological innovations. Indeed, open source may promote the emergence or 
strengthening of commons-based production strategies, stimulating a cooperation model 
that, taking advantage of the potential offered by new technologies, connects the local with 
the global. Today, there are already important institutes, foundations and programmes thus 
engaged and applying such local/global model - glocal (Bauman, 2005) – model. 
Organizations aiming to reduce the superpower of the biotechnological patents system 
include the PIPRA (Public Intellectual Property for Agriculture), a grouping of public 
American Universities; CGIAR (the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research)119; and, above all, BiOS (Biological Innovation for an Open Society), probably 
the most ambitious commons-based project oriented toward biotechnological 
innovation120.  
                                                            
119 CGIAR aims to create a web interface sharing data and computer resources in order to access databases 
distributed throughout the world that contain the traces of the samples of germplasm produced by local 
agricultural know-how. Access to these data and tools can prove fundamental in the development of useful 
innovations. 
120 BIOS is an initiative of CAMBIA (Center for the Application of Molecular Biology to International 
Agriculture), an Australian research institute founded by Richard Jefferson, himself a pioneer in the field of 
biotechnological research. The BIOS initiative is based on a strong IT component and the application of the 
 110 
 
There are, of course, technical and legal difficulties in applying the copyleft or creative 
commons model (Lessig, 2005) to forms of life and synthetic biology and deriving from 
such major success in the information technology sector121. Partly, this is due to the fact 
that open source in biotechnology is a young field at a very early stage of development, but 
there are also some important differences between ICT and biotechnology, which should 
be briefly discussed. 
 
Firstly, ICT is a field mainly characterized by the copyright law whereas biotechnology is 
regulated by a patent law system. This difference significantly affects the development 
opportunities for open source in biotechnology because several aspects of patent law 
present create challenges to the application of an open source model. Also, and partly 
related to this, there are crucial differences in respect of the commercialization paths. In the 
life sciences, a huge amount of money is necessary to ‘move’ inventions through 
development, field testing, manufacturing, and distribution, whereas the open source 
software has no expensive regulatory encumbrances and can be duplicated and distributed 
with (practically) no marginal costs. 
 
A complication arises here, as Boettiger and Wright (2006) claim, when a product has both 
commercial and humanitarian markets this point can create some economic and ethical 
paradoxes. In the case of  an AIDS vaccine, for example, the patent owner, usually a 
public-private partnership, can play with (differentially apply) patent rights in the licensing 
agreements in order to segment the market and thus provide a specific drug to underserved 
populations (the patent owner can bargain the licensing of the patent rights with the 
company engagement in delivering a low cost product into developing countries). In these 
cases, open source licenses may actually be an encumbrance rather than a solution as they 
could discourage private investments.122 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
tools used on a very similar license model to that of copyleft. An historic example of how CAMBIA acts is 
given by the TransBacter system, in which alternative bacteria to Agrobacterium tumefaciens (generally used 
to transfer DNA into the genome of the plants) are produced. CAMBIA freely supplies these - Sinorhizobium 
meliloti, Mesorhizobium loti and Rhizobium sp. NGR234 - to both non-profit and for-profit research, but on 
the condition that eventual genetic improvements are in turn made freely accessible (Broothaearts et al., 
2005). 
121For an overview of these legal difficulties, see Rai and Boyle, 2007. 
122 This may be why BiOS decided to focus on enabling technologies, just to preserve patent rights on 
application-level technologies. 
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Another problematic issue that of ‘interoperability’. The success of Linux has mainly been 
linked to its operation as a complete, functional alternative to proprietary operating 
systems. Linus Torvalds was able to create a kernel through which a set of open source 
licenses were enabled to become ‘viral’ tools ‘infecting’ also proprietary software. This 
special quality broadened the field of applications integrating open source code. In a sense, 
the problem is that it is still hard to consider, as many claim, Transbacter as the new kernel 
of a bio-Linux. 
 
Also economic issues can create what might be referred to as ‘cultural’ encumbrances to 
the dissemination of open source in the biotechnological field. A large part of the success 
of open source in ICTs has been due to the (sub)culture of hackers. In life sciences, open 
source is supported mainly by researchers operating in the public sector. Here, scientists 
are rarely, if ever, free to choose how to arrange patents issues because patent rights, 
differently from copyright on texts, are in the hands of their employer institutions 
(universities, research organisms, etc.).  
 
Finally, another important cultural issue could become an insurmountable obstacle. In 
recent years, particularly in Europe, a widespread opposition to GMOs has mushroomed in 
civil society. Irrational, ideological as well as some well founded bio-safety reasons 
support this lack of public acceptance. The ‘orthorexic society’ (Nicolosi, 2007) should not 
be considered a secondary problem.123 
 
There are, presently, various interesting attempts to introduce open source into 
biotechnology. One particularly significant example is by Tom Michaels’ (1999) ‘General 
Public License for Plant Germplasm’ (GPLPG). Usable by any person, group or institution, 
such as individual cultivators, communities, indigenous peoples, scientists, universities, 
NGOs and private firms, this licensing model, Michaels emphasizes, proposes an 
adaptation of the GPL software licensing model by means of a ‘materials transfer 
agreement’ (MTA). As recently claimed by Jack Kloppenburg (2010), it has a high 
                                                            
123Orthorexia nervosa is a psycho-cultural syndrome, whose definition is the work of Steve Bratman (2001), 
that may summarily be described as the obsession for healthy (opportune) feeding. Although the clinical 
picture has still not been definitively established, it represents a condition that affects an increasing 
proportion of the western population and, here, serves as a metaphoric representation of an ’epoch-making’ 
condition. The orthorexic passes an important part of his time in search of dietetic perfection, organizing, 
researching and selecting food. 
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potential, both from the ‘resistance’ as well as creative points of view. Indeed, the MTA 
approach has the advantage of developing a legal frame for the recognition of the 
collective sovereignty of farmers, and to allow these to exchange, improve, conserve and 
sell seeds.  
 
Notwithstanding this promising developments, however, we are far from being able to say 
that open source in biology has become a reality. Rather, we should consider it as a ‘work 
in progress’, experimental and still controversial. Probably, it is still early to say today if 
we have the appropriate architecture yet. The experience of BiOs and its practical 
implementation will be very important to understand where we will be able to go in the 
future. In determining this direction, or these directions, there is still much work and much 
research to be done. The hope is that, in the next few years, sociologists, philosophers and 
scientists, together, will prove able to successfully rise to this challenge.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Discussing skilled experience in technical action: 
a multidimensional analysis 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The theoretical discussion developed thus far have provided, I hope, a contribution to a new 
theoretical perspective through which to re-consider the reintegration of human experience in 
technical action. This chapter discusses and criticizes the common assumption of modernity 
according to which technology is uprooted, de-humanized and de-socialized. Such a 
discussion may open some interesting perspectives for future research.  
 
Following a rhizomatic method (Chapter 1), I have discussed the research questions 
developing a semantic map adopting a critical-pragmatic perspective and sensibility. This 
choice substantially comprises three moves, which involves taking three related positions. 
 
The first move is to refute the essentialist determinism that characterizes a significant part of 
the philosophy and sociology of technique. This has been performed by valorizing the 
Marxian-Gramscian concept of praxis, in which all activities that are objectified in social 
relationships (institutions, needs, art, science and technology) are the fruit of human praxis 
and are therefore the consequence of real and material processes grounded in action and social 
experience. This move away from essentialism and determinism and towards a materialist, 
Marxian-Gramscian position effectively refutes every kind of abstract determinism. Likewise, 
any vision of technology that is guided by absolute and incontrovertible principles or by a 
basic ontological materiality (expressed as embodiment) is similarly rejected. Thus, there is 
neither unalterable DNA nor an absolute metaphysics that imposes an essence on 
technological development. Everything is in the hands of man and, therefore, is always 
modifiable. There is no future history of technology already written. There are instead 
realities that can be changed by people and social praxes that we are able to implement. 
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It follows fairly straight-forwardly from a Marxian vein that it is necessary to refuse the 
contemplative philosophical approach and instead seek to change the world with philosophy; 
in other words, the dictum is to embody thinking in the concrete actions that may change the 
world. The emphasis on experience and skills in this thesis is precisely the consequence of 
this perspective. For the same reason, the emphasis is on the role of social practices rather 
than abstract principles, and on the arguments of authors who, perhaps with different outlooks 
on reality, are indebted to the philosophical school of pragmatism (some, like Ingold, Sigaut 
and Sennett, explicitly, others such as Mauss or Bourdieu, more implicitly, e.g. through their 
theoretical frame of reference).  
 
The second move is to reassess the process of production of material things. This is realized 
here, in Sennett’s terminology, by considering the homo laborans rather than the homo faber, 
on the principle that the processes and dynamics leading to the production of material culture, 
and hence also of technology, reveal the condition of man (people and their social relations) 
to a greater degree than the presumed absolute qualities of objects. The observation of the 
dynamic production of material culture unveils the social codes inscribed in objects, reveals 
their limitations and potential, and shows unequivocally that the neutrality of technology is a 
chimera. The fact that technology is not neutral means that there are hegemonic codes 
(Feenberg) characterizing it. These codes are not metaphysical but social and as such always 
open to transformations - difficult, complex social transformations, which also necessitate 
conflict, but that are in theory possible.  
 
The third move is to take a political stance, assuming that, contrary to a fairly well- 
consolidated ethico-methodological line in the STS field, the observation of social dynamics 
and practices that produce, reproduce or co-produce technological objects cannot ultimately 
be neutral. The social scientist can – and in fact should - call into question a certain social 
process of technological production in a critical way. Intervening politically in the processes 
does not means deferring the ‘resolution of problems’ to a later date, when these processes 
have become irreversible or hard to modify due to their stratification. Rather, and above all, it 
means working towards making the involvement and participation of ‘non- specialists’, 
enabling those producing or reproducing ‘things’ to be aware of the social implications that 
the production ex-ante or the usage ex-post involve. From this perspective, empowerment is 
seen as participation and therefore democratization from the bottom-up, beginning with the 
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processes of production of material culture. Re-skilling practices move precisely in this 
direction.    
 
This concluding chapter presents the semantic map emerging from this work and develops a 
general discussion aimed at sketching out some new questions that represent possible 
proposals for future lines of research.  
 
6.2 Multiple dimensions of experience and skills: a semantic map 
 
The research presented in this thesis has been developed within a general conceptual 
framework tied to the scientific and political-social debate on the relationship between 
technology and society. It began from an awareness that an important part of this debate is 
characterized by a tendency to consider these two as clearly separate. This seemed 
unsatisfactory and prompted the search for a different perspective. The alternative presented 
argues not only that technology and society as closely interwoven entity, but also (and 
primarily) that human experience and skills remain crucial elements of technical action. There 
are ineliminable socio-anthropological conditions (however reduced they may be) that tend 
constantly to re-embed and re-contextualize technical action – technique - in the field of 
human and social experience. This position must reckon with various theories that refute the 
role that man and experience are here adjudged to play in technical action. 
 
For these reasons, the semantic map presented in this research has been developed starting 
from the problematic issue defined by the theoretical background (Chapter 2) in which it was 
assumed that technology and society two independent entities (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Representation of conventional semantic map 
Technology Society
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In contrast to that assumption, this thesis presents and discusses a theoretical perspective 
according to which showing there is an intertwining link created by human experience (Figure 
2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Representation of semantic map presented (interaction) 
 
In this perspective, it is assumed that no technical action exists without experience (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Representation of semantic map presented (dynamics) 
 
More concretely I discussed three theoretical ‘access points’ supporting this assumption 
(Chapters 3-5), leading to a multidimensional definition of skilled experience in human 
technical action that provides a problematized and multifaceted answer to the three study 
questions. This, in turn, points the way to new research questions indicating possible 
directions for future research development (below). The three dimensions of the notion of 
skilled experience in technical action are distinguished and discussed thus: 
Experience
TechniqueSociety
Experi
ence
Society
Technical 
action
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 Skilled experience in terms of biological character; 
 Skilled experience in terms of socio-anthropological givens; 
 Skilled experience in terms of socio-political opportunities. 
 
 
The semantic map emerging from this multidimensional analysis may be presented as shown 
(Figure 4): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Representation of semantic map presented (multidimensional analysis) 
 
Technology 
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Society?
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6.2.1 Skilled experience in terms of (ineliminable) biological character 
 
 
Chapter 3 addressed the question of whether there is a bio-anthropological character able to 
explain and justify the relevance of experience in human culture and an epistemological 
paradigm that may represent such a basis in life sciences. To answer the question, I set out to 
show that experience and skills are an ineliminable anthropological given since they are 
bound to the very biological nature of man, a condition anchored in our interrelation and 
reciprocity with the environment. For this reason, an epistemological paradigm is described 
that, taking a biological viewpoint, has its main foundation in an epigenetic perspective.  
 
Clearly, the epigenetic approach does not deny that every organism begins its life endowed 
with a genome. Rather, it asserts that there is no model of interpreting the information 
encapsulated in the basic sequences making up DNA that is independent of the developmental 
process of that organism. More simply, we could say that the ontogenetic development of the 
organism is the model of interpreting the genome. The model of the genome as independent 
from context is thus the product of a biological fantasy.  
 
With reference to man, as Oyama informs us, epigenetics can help us to understand that it is 
the multiple ways in which human beings become in specific contexts (natural, but also 
social) that define what a human being is. Skills are not predefined and do not have an 
essence independent of performance. Like all organisms endowed with a body, human beings 
construct the environmental conditions for their development and those with whom they 
interact through their actions. Organisms are thus not only passive loci of change but creative 
agents that establish change through action and the experience of the surrounding world. To 
deny experience would mean denying the nature of organisms. 
 
The paradigm outlined thus begins from an ecological perspective that sets the biological 
organism in its entirety and in mutual relation with the surrounding environment at its core. 
This is a bottom-up model that, refuting the informational and top-down model of genetics, 
assumes the mutual ontogenetic and relational ‘co-building’ of organism and environment. 
 
At its roots lies a radical refusal of the Cartesian body/mind dualism and of any kind of its re-
proposal in a new guise. DNA is not defined as a code from which it is possible to read life, 
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but as a plastic entity that is sensitive to external changes resulting from the organism-
environment interchange. The main theoretical outcome of this picture is that the genome is a 
locus of potential that illustrates the creativity of living systems. This is a creativity that is 
implemented above all by means of the development of constructive skills employed to 
modify the environment based on the intentional (non-deterministically programmed) action 
of material (physical) embodied organisms.  
 
Concerning human and social sciences, it is possible to hypothesize a transfer of this 
paradigm onto a cultural plane, to show how knowledge also should not be considered an 
informational code that deterministically guides human behavior, but as the fruit of a 
constructive action based on abilities ripened through experience in the course of involvement 
with the natural and social external environment. Culture thus proves also to be the fruit of 
know-how associated with the skills produced ontogenetically by our bodies, through 
performative experience with the external world.     
 
6.2.2 Skilled experience in terms of socio-anthropological given 
  
Chapter 4 applied this principle to one particular product of human culture, that of 
technology. The objective was to address the question whether it is possible to consider the 
advent of modern technology a process that has weakened the relationship between corporeal 
experience and material reality. Undoubtedly, this is fairly frequent topic in contemporary 
philosophical and sociological analysis of technology.  
 
It has been shown that human culture is not just a mere package of information, rules and 
representations (the so-called ‘cultural models’) distinct from and independent of their 
practical application in real contexts of action. On the contrary, knowledge, and with it 
culture, should be considered as permeated by the real practice of doing, constructing, 
experiencing. The argument proposed here is that knowledge is not only expressed by 
practice, but is also and above all constantly (re)generated thus. Knowledge is always 
practice, and it is inextricably linked with ability. These abilities are not formalized in rules, 
instructions or informational codes, but are the fruit of repeated and often tacit corporeal 
performance. I refer, therefore, to a know-how enshrined in the body. The movement of the 
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body is then a form of perception, at the same time as a way of acting in the world and a way 
of knowing it. 
 
In particular, this paradigm is applied to that particular form of cultural expression known as 
‘technicity’, described here as an indissoluble interweaving between environment and body 
(organism). I sought to demonstrate that technical action is an emergent property of the 
process that involves tools, gestural expressiveness and matter in a determined time and space 
of a real and intentional being-in-the-world. In this context, the centrality of skill in technical 
action is revealed. The paradigm as applied here shows that skill should never be understood 
as a property that may be traced (effectively reduced) to a single organ of the body (such as 
the hand), or, for that matter, relational property (e.g., hand-eye coordination). It is, instead, 
the expression of the interaction between the organism in its entirety and the environment 
(natural and social). This allows for disposal of the prejudice that defines only the traditional 
technical action as skilful, envisaging this as the use of a tool by a specific organ (or relational 
properties as such).  
 
This insight is central to the argument that, albeit in a different way, the most evolved 
technology still demands the deployment of a broad set of abilities that are both corporeal 
(albeit not only manual) as well as social. This is a key point in the conceptual restoration of 
technology back within the field of activities that require (bodily) experience and sociality. 
This also serves to challenge the ‘techno-pessimist’ theories that, in asserting the radical 
autonomization of technology from society and the human, call into question the relationship 
between technology, experience and sociality. 
 
6.2.3 Skilled experience in terms of socio-political opportunity (challenging and 
democratizing technical codes) 
 
It is undeniable that modern technological development has extensively diminished the role of 
skills in technical action. The question, however, that has guided and that represents the key 
issue prompting this work, is that of whether there is room for manoeuver that may lead to a 
new expansion of the role that skills play in technical action.  
 
Indeed, insofar as we have established the principle that skill cannot disappear, since it is 
ontologically inherent in action in general and technique in particular, then an understanding 
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of how to facilitate its recovery and revalorization may seem to be implied as a valorization of 
human experience. It was in this context that Chapter 5 attempted to answer the question of 
whether there are practices of technological development that may concretely retrieve human 
skills in processes of technical innovation. 
 
Although always interwoven in all the known technological processes, it is argued, 
experience, sociality and skills can be enhanced in concrete terms, and by a number of 
specific logical and technological practices. In particular, the logic and practices of open 
source were discussed, in order to demonstrate how it is a domain that it is particularly well 
suited to an enhancement of this fruitful interweaving. In point of fact, open source is founded 
on socially constructed skills precisely because these are developed in practices of the sharing 
of common goods (for instance knowledge). Attention is drawn especially to the case of 
applying open source to the new ‘life technologies’ with specific reference to agro-
biotechnologies – widely regarded as hegemonically determined – in order to illustrate that 
there are very significant margins to recuperate a wider involvement of experience and social 
participation.  
 
It is shown that there is an opportunity to establish widespread re-skilling practices able to re-
embed technological production within expert social skills. As discussed, this clearly 
concerns skills that are less bound to the physical and material dimension of the body and 
more to its immaterial and social quality. Nevertheless, and this is important to emphasize, the 
body does not vanish, it always remains the prime instrument of mediation of technical action 
on the world. This is not a body limited exclusively to the skill or power of the hand – 
although note, e.g., the dexterous manipulation by fingers of the touch-screen, a recent, 
quickly disseminated and very widely developed and still developing skill-set - but is a body 
that remains present and decisive, as Sennett has demonstrated. 
 
A crucial point emerging from the fifth chapter regards the set of political implications linked 
to this transformation. In particular, the effect that open source may have on Feenberg’s 
process of ‘democratic rationalization’ is discussed. The chief merit of this derives from the 
process of opening and transparency of the technical codes encapsulated in technological 
devices. These are codes that technocrats consider ideologically neutral, the results of 
exclusively technical processes that are rational and efficient, but which in truth, also 
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incorporate hegemonic social codes. This opening and transparency adds nothing to the social 
nature of these codes, which is always and nonetheless present, but it does crucially contribute 
to rendering such socio-technical codes available, accessible to society as a whole and no 
longer exclusively to an opaque and politically irresponsible technocratic elite (irresponsible 
in the sense that it is not accountable for its actions to society as a whole).  
 
This may be summarized graphically with another version of the same semantic map (Figure 
5) 
 
 
Figure 5. Representation of semantic map presented (three realms) 
 
Summarizing, this thesis proposes an alternative gaze at the society-technology 
interrelationship stemming from a general reflection on their relationship. This is a 
controversial relationship that has provoked  a heated debate over the past half a century or 
so with and among various currents, schools and disciplines.  The objective I regard as 
significant from the scientific standpoint was to make a cross-disciplinary contribution 
aimed at showing how these two entities (technology and society) need not (cannot) be 
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considered as separate and opposing, as is often and widely explicitly and implicitly 
assumed.  
The objective may be reached by showing how human experience has always played a 
fundamental role in defining technicity with the implication that no element in the sphere of 
technology, even the most advanced, can do without human experience. In order to show 
this relationship, I have used unit skills in connection with the bio-anthropological statute of 
man and related these to technical action as a starting analysis. Indeed, skills have the merit 
of constituting an essential part of human experience while, at the same time, being firmly 
embedded in the social dimension of human action. Our thesis seeks to assert, 
syllogistically, that: 
 
a) Skills are socially characterized (starting premise) 
b) There is no human action without skills (chapter 3) 
c) There can be no technical action without skills (chapter 4) 
d) There is no technical action without sociality (closing assumption). 
 
If there is no technical action without sociality, then, in reality, there can be no technology 
without society. Our premise is that even to the extent that social and technical interweaving 
has been progressively weakened, the gradual autonomization of technological progress 
directed by developments in the most advanced technology has not entirely been pulled apart. 
It is noted that autonomizing developments have led some authors to believe we are facing a 
change of epochal paradigm, in which the technological is uprooted from the social once and 
for all and thereby - fulfilling the Heideggerian prophecy. It is in order to show, instead, that 
in today’s age also, it is not possible to suppose such a definitive uprooting and that, on the 
contrary, recent developments might favor a radical change of direction, indeed a 
strengthening of the link between technicity and sociality and therefore a bringing together of 
technology and society that I have discussed the emblematic role played by open source 
(Chapter 5).   
 
As often stated, the development of modern technology has certainly represented a heavy 
blow to the autonomy of the creative potential of human action. Nevertheless, it is argued, it is 
not possible to assert that modern technical action has been stripped entirely of the support of 
 124 
 
such abilities. Human skills are an irreducible (Sigaut) and ineliminable element of human 
action because they are bound to the biological (Chapter 3), corporeal and social (Chapter 4) 
dimension of human experience. From this perspective, any technique or technology requires 
a creative participation founded on skills and practices are both corporeal and social (in this 
sense, any nature-culture dualism is of little importance). This profound principle is at the 
heart of the pragmatic materialism informing this work. Naturally, there are techniques or 
technologies that leave a lesser or greater margin to human skills, but these (human skills), I 
reiterate, cannot ever be cancelled out.  
 
As a scientific position, this has a political implication that is by no means minor: there are 
significant margins for a valorization of such skills with the aim of augmenting processes of 
democratization of production and technological transformation. Such margins may envisage 
interventions from a productive, organizational, technical and social point of view, 
interventions in which practices of participation and sharing in deliberation and decision 
making may have more room to contribute to the process of technological creation. Open 
source represents an important emblematic case heading in this direction (Chapter 5), but it 
still raises with the force of empirical evidence a fundamental issue that contemporary society 
cannot pretend to ignore: fundamentally, technical and scientific knowledge should be 
considered common assets and as such they impose a socio-political and ethical reflection on 
the opportunity for a democratization of technology. 
 
The assertion that technical action can never exclude experience and hence skills requires the 
employment of a philosophical language to affirm a sociological fact, because experience 
always implies sociality. Experience is never only an individual or subjective entity. It is 
certainly corporeal, but implies an open corporeity that is saturated with relationality, with 
connections to the natural and social environment surrounding it. Recognizing, as, for 
instance, Feenberg does, that technological rationality is and must always be characterized by 
human experience, means establishing an essential maneuvering-room for social participation 
that can regulate, limit or change such rationality.  
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6.3 General discussion and questions for future research development: technology and 
participation  
 
The concluding chapter of this thesis - and more generally, the issues it implies related to the 
opening and transparency of hegemonic technical codes - warrants further future research.  
More generally, the issue of democracy in relation to technology represents one of the most 
important challenges that late modernity presents to us. The technologically advanced world 
as we experience it demands deeper reflection in respect of this issue. In the end, the very 
future of democracy in our societies is at stake. I do not mean here to refer to democracy from 
an institutional standpoint, as a form of state-structured governance, or mere methodology of 
political selection, but rather in terms of a deeper notion of participation. It is this I wish to 
propose as a guiding and important path for reflection and its further development. I do 
believe that this development might touch on various issues as elaborated through different 
research projects. 
 
It is not possible to discuss these here to any depth, but what I will try to do is outline a map 
of elements that can represent possible fields of future research. At the end of the chapter, I 
will present these elements as a matrix indicating a general battery of research questions.  
 
6.3.1 – a) Reciprocity as social code in technology development 
 
The first issue presented as a proposal for future research focuses on ‘reciprocity’. Actually, it 
seems that reciprocity represents the key-factor of open source relationality. As Karl Polanyi 
(1944) has amply illustrated, there are three main mechanisms of social reproduction 
allocating insufficient resources to satisfy needs: the market, redistribution and reciprocity. 
The market is a process of optimization based on exchanging goods with goods and services 
according to an abstract value of equivalence represented by a price; redistribution allots 
resources on the basis of a principle established by the authority; reciprocity is a principle of 
economic and social regulation based on the relations through cooperation and gift exchange. 
Open source is grounded entirely within this latter mechanism. Here, unlike what happens in 
the market, the relations are not neutral. On the contrary, they are founded on a social bond, a 
bond based on the social characteristics of the subjects involved (as is commonly said in 
sociology: it is contextual and socially oriented). 
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The French anthropologist and author Marcel Mauss showed  the social characteristics of 
these relations with the greatest persuasiveness. In particular, he demonstrated how 
reciprocity represents a particular form of exchange characterized by a collective nature, by 
objectives that are not purely utilitarian and, above all, by the fact of being inserted within a 
set of social obligations. Indeed, cooperating subjects are not engaged as single individuals, 
but are obliged, exchange and bargain in the name of an interest and a collective moral duty 
of a general nature. In the reciprocity, by virtue of a logic guiding exchange with a principle 
of ethical and non-utilitarian nature, the act of exchange has a value in itself of equal 
importance to that of the object being exchanged.  
 
This does not imply an absence of usefulness, just as it does not necessarily mean a lack of 
charge. In reciprocity there is a useful dimension and there is an exchange (of goods or 
services). The specificity lies in the fact that cooperation based on reciprocity envisages a 
threefold obligation: giving, receiving and giving back. The deferred restitution (hence 
uncertain in time and amount) has the effect of setting the basis for the formation and 
consolidation of the social bond. Non- economic and non-utilitarian factors such as trust and 
the willingness to offer and give back are fundamental elements. 
 
As discussed at length in Chapter 5, free software and open source answer these criteria. In 
this sense, they are evidence of a new engagement of technological innovation in the 
pronounced social dynamics of reciprocity. This aspect deserves further examination in future 
research proposals that may develop its profound implications. One research might be to 
analyze the mechanisms of this re-encapsulation of the technological in the social sphere. 
Such a process can only take place through the practice of re-skilling, namely through 
practices that enhance the value of human experience (understood as shared experience) in 
technical action. A novel and potentially revolutionary aspect of this in the case of open 
source is that it enables and involves these practices developing and extending the role of 
experience beyond scientific laboratories and, more generally, technocratic institutions. Such 
a broadening, perhaps even more significantly, operates as an alternative to and block on the 
colonizing of the field of the simple use of technology, and, moreover, even the sphere of 
technological production and innovation. These are the places that today, more so than before 
even, must be investigated.  
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From this perspective, the typically STS approach that looks to research laboratories as the 
privileged places for investigating social practices, could give more room to research that may 
break free from these (by now narrow) enclosures. Open source therefore potentially unlocks 
the code of technology that incorporates the dictates of hegemonic culture in order to make it 
accessible and adjustable by means of shared and socialized expert practices. In this way, 
‘society’ makes an incursion into the sterile sanctuary of research and innovation. This event 
removes the veil of hypocrisy that in traditional scientific rhetoric asserts the independence 
and autonomy of science in the laboratories from the ‘external’ social world.124 
 
6.3.1 – b) Opening the laboratories and the emergence of re-designers 
 
STS studies have already demystified the ideology underlying such rhetoric, showing how the 
work carried out in laboratories is socially influenced and influenceable. STS studies have had 
the huge merit of shedding light on just how far the social can condition the practices of 
laboratories, institutes or research networks. Today however, the open source movement, 
from a highly critical standpoint towards changing the relations of the status quo, claims the 
moment has arrived in which ‘the society of the few’, which until now has inhabited the 
scientific laboratories and knowingly or unwittingly transferred hegemonic social and cultural 
coding in the technical code of the objects, is giving way to ‘the society of the many’, with all 
its needs and utopias. Along such lines, a proposal of future research consists precisely in 
analyzing the opposite movement to that analyzed by STS studies and which has represented 
their most original hallmark. Indeed, after having widely analyzed how society has made its 
way into the laboratories, it is now high time to underpin a reflection on how the 
‘laboratories’ (practices, protocols, etc.) are undergoing a process of social ‘spreading’, 
becoming dispersed and decentralized outside research institutions.  
 
The open source movement would thus be in step with those who for years have maintained 
the need to democratize science and technique by means of broadening the network of 
participation in technological production. Seeking a path of genuine development (people-
needs as opposite to capital-based), for example, Ruivenkamp (1997) has defined re-designers 
                                                            
124For all these reasons, it is my belief that the open source experience is emblematic and may 
illustrate that a) technology and society are not two separate entities, and b) advanced technology is in 
a position to close the gap between the social and technical brought on by the advent of modern 
technology.  
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as those social actors who are not limited to acknowledging that biotechnologies (like all 
technologies) are the fruit of interaction and co-creation of biotechnologies and other 
processes. Indeed, they believe it possible to influence such interaction. Re-designers seek to 
create room for manoeuver within which other socio-technical combinations, other forms of 
biotechnologies can be developed125.  
 
Re-designers are also realistic. They well know that the genome and biotechnologies are 
developed inside global power structures, yet they believe that this does not mean that 
biotechnologies should inevitably be developed exclusively to serve the interests of 
multinationals.  
 
The re-designers consider it a challenge to investigate the extent to which the development of 
biotechnologies may be in line with other social interests. This makes them builders of 
networks, always on the look-out for those with whom they can work to provoke social and 
technological change. They set the scientific development of biotechnologies and the genome 
directly within social processes and seek to free them from the global system of bio-powers, 
transforming them into a catalyst of specific local development. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 5, assuming the perspective of re-designers with reference to 
agricultural science and food production, the open source movement is also seeking take up a 
position at the centre of an attempt to change the technical and social dimensions of 
biotechnologies. In this sense, the open source movement (or at least part of it) is like the 
bearer of a revolutionary vision that aims at replacing practices of dominion and exclusion 
with new practices of sharing and inclusion. Obviously, the movement must still prove itself 
to not be merely replacing one rhetoric with another: it must be able to broadly handle the 
contradictions that still characterize it, as we mentioned (Chapter 5), which gives some 
urgency to the investigation of other crucial aspects related to a democratization of 
technology.  
 
  
                                                            
125 Despite their diverging views on the value of biotechnologies, both the champions and opponents 
of this technological development agree on supporting the theoretical premise by which biotechnology 
can be seen as an instrument with positive or negative consequences for society. In other words, and 
this is crucial, both separate biotechnologies from the social context in which they developed. 
 129 
 
6.3.2 – a) Human experiences and skills as catalysts for a re-codification of technology 
 
This thesis has presented the connections between biological and anthropological dimensions 
in a rhizomatic fashion and moved thence to discussion of the socio-political implications of 
this, the main objective being to show how our biological nature, just like the socio-
anthropological, is fundamentally oriented towards the production of skills and creative 
abilities that are not determined by predefined codes (genetic or cultural). The material 
‘doing’, physical or cognitive, characterizes our way of acting in the world, and, it is argued, 
the most advanced technological development does not necessarily imply our alteration.  Put 
simply, technological development does not imply our transformation into passive beings or, 
in any case, beings destined to submissively use objects that encapsulate a what may be 
dubbed a ‘technical hetero-direct code’, as a hegemonic vulgate postulating the separation 
between technology and society would claim.  
 
Without wishing to overstate the case – by naïvely emphasize miraculous virtues or failing to 
recognize critical limitations and entanglements – I would wish to emphasize the important 
potential of open source to reconcile technology with society, opening up the former (its 
technical code) to the latter by means of the skills of users. In this sense, the argument comes 
full circle to the philosophical and sociological debate introduced in Chapter 2, representing 
the departure point and background of this work. 
 
Indeed, orthodox Marxism does seem to postulate the neutrality of technique, or rather the 
idea according to which there are no right or wrong technologies in themselves, since what 
makes them right or wrong is the ideology guiding their uses.126  
 
Feenberg has shown that within the neo-Marxist thinking that criticized Heidegerian 
essentialist determinism in the 60s and 70s – which the American philosopher defined as the 
‘left dystopians’ (for instance, the thinking of Marcuse) - there is an apparently incurable 
ambiguity. On one hand, they connect again with Marxist tradition by refuting the essentialist 
nature of technology, and therefore recognizing its autonomy and neutrality, while on the 
other, they postulate the subordination of technology to the ideological matrix that historically 
dominates a certain society. By which for instance, according to this interpretation, there are 
                                                            
126 Trotsky was to radicalize this principle, asserting that Taylorism is bad if applied in capitalist 
factories and just when applied in socialist factories.  
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intrinsically capitalist technologies, namely developed within the capitalist economic and 
social system (for example the assembly line), and therefore destined to necessarily express 
and consolidate that particular order of social domination.  
 
This vision drastically reduces the remaining possibilities of change or democratic 
transformation of technology. In the wake of this interpretation, an author like Ivan Illich 
(1973) has theorized the contrast as between industrial technologies, intrinsically capitalist 
and therefore necessarily aimed at exploitation, and ‘convivial’ technologies, namely tending 
to facilitate and based on communication, cooperation and interaction. This interpretation was 
highlighted by André Gorz (1980: 40) when he wrote that the means of production are not 
simply neutral machines since capitalist relationships of dominion are inscribed within them.  
 
In my view, it would be interesting to develop this aspect further, investigating how and 
whether open source may conceptually mend this contradiction, giving life to a theory and 
practice that shows the possibility of shared and widespread interpretative practices of a 
particular technology. In other words, even if it is true that a certain technology is never 
created neutral, but is ideologically conditioned, is it possible that this technology may be the 
object of cultural re-interpretation? Nothing is deterministically branded. With the term 
‘cultural’ I do not mean that this re-interpretation is only conceptual; on the contrary, I believe 
that it must be grounded in shared and widespread material practices. Clearly, such practices 
demand certain skills and interpretative struggles between different social subjects, struggles 
in which there are obvious asymmetries of power between the subjects involved, but in which 
the outcome is never a foregone conclusion, and rather depends on the action and the 
participation of everyone.  
 
We are therefore speaking of non- determined processes, open to various possible 
developments. The historical trend of computer science and, above all, the Internet shows just 
this. Emerging in a libertarian context impregnated by a culture of sharing and exchange, it 
has developed from an instrument of military domination, to become a battleground between 
a range of opposing spirits. The clash between the ‘proprietary’ model and ‘open’ model of 
technological and scientific development is, indeed, an emblematic example. 127 In the space 
                                                            
127 For a broad overview of this, see also the recent text by Broca (2013). 
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created by this clash, one could hinge further interesting research projects to investigate re-
interpretative practices.     
 
It is also for this reason that Chapter 5 emphasized the topic of open source and, above all, the 
possibility of realizing a transfer of the shared model motivating it to different contexts from 
the one in which it has emerged and gained a standing, namely computer science. Obviously, 
we are referring to a potential so that, to be coherent with what has been stated thus far, it 
does not deterministically encapsulate the principles of its uses. We do need to be minded that 
open source does not evade processes of interpretation and, sometimes, of radical re-
interpretation by users. At the same time, no technology is neutral, and there are ideological 
principles and political interests embedded in the design of every product. The shared and 
democratic potential of open source therefore implies but does not dictate greater participation 
and democracy: such potential must constantly be cultivated, interpreted and applied.  
 
This potential suggests an opening of the so-called ‘technical code’ of which Feenberg 
speaks. Briefly, the hegemonic culture written into (as) the technical code of every product 
(expressing a particular relationship of power between the social subjects of a given historical 
age) can be subjected to revision and transformation thanks to the open source model – at 
least, it can be subjected thus with greater facility and effectiveness than what is 
conventionally usual in the restrictive model of exclusivity. Indeed, the participation process 
enabled by the open source model allows for the introduction of mechanisms of ‘technical 
creativity’ directly within the technical code. The user’s creativity generally lies in the skills 
developed in the framework of using the technology. This creativity is certainly important, but 
expresses a clear asymmetry of power between producer and consumer (user). Here, I refer to 
de Certau’s theory on contemporary culture and its consumption (such as reading). 
 
6.3.2 – b) Resistance and occupation of spaces of social creativity 
 
Studying the practices of consumption and reinterpretation of texts, Michel de Certau (1980) 
acknowledged the user/consumer with a  freedom and a power perhaps never recognized 
before by researchers. Despite that, he revelled in distinguishing between the concept of 
strategy and tactics. Strategies express calculations, planning, the will and power of structures 
(institutions, governments, corporations, and so on) that produce texts, objects, etc. Tactics, 
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on the contrary, express the resistance practices that consumers/users enact to oppose the bid 
for dominion by producers. Tactics express a condition of freedom and resistance, but also of 
inferiority. Strategies design the places (physical and immaterial) of consumption: the cities, 
the shopping centres, the media, etc. Tactics, instead, cannot be achieved except as incursions 
into the ‘occupied territories’ by producers of strategies and through the use of objects that 
have been produced by these. Just as guerrillas who organize resistance to dictatorial 
governments or occupying forces, consumers do not have their own territory and can only 
operate in the time and with the instruments they have not created, just as the resistance uses 
stolen weapons from regular armies of the oppressors (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Strategies and tactics of resistance (de Certau, 1980).  
 Subjects Practices Places 
 
 
 
Strategies 
 
Producers 
(governments, 
institutions, 
corporations, 
media, etc.) 
 
Ideological 
planning, 
rationalization  
 Occupation of the space: 
physical or immaterial 
territories (construction, 
technological production, 
collective imagination, 
etc.) 
 
 
 
 
Tactics 
 
 
Users/consumers 
 
Resistance by 
means of the 
extemporaneous 
use and re-
interpretation of 
objects already 
produced (physical 
or immaterial) 
  
Action in time, lack 
of own places. 
Raids into occupied 
places 
 
 
With open source we are dealing with an advance of the resistance front of the consumer/user 
directly into the heart of occupied territories, namely those of production. And continuing the 
metaphor, this concerns the conquest of a key bunker that holds and thus freeing a 
fundamental portion of occupied territory. The metaphor of the ‘occupied’ territory is 
deliberately chosen here since, as we have seen, production and creation have always been an 
anthropological prerogative of man tied directly to the social nature of skills.  
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What we have witnessed in modernity has been the expropriation of the terrain of social 
creativity and its concentration into the hands of the major technocratic institutions. The 
power of resistance that has, however, remained in the hands of consumers (it is not true that 
it has been eradicated) has the possibility today of making a crucial step forward through the 
shared production models of open source. The liberation of territory implemented with open 
source concerns such an important portion as to potentially crack the historical strategy/tactics 
relationship. For the first time in a meaningful way, the liberation of territories by means of 
the open source model gives the resisters (users/consumers) the potential to shift from tactics 
to strategy, a participated, shared and newly founded strategy for the valorization of the social 
distribution of skills.  
 
The most effective antidote to the autonomization of technology from society, consists, I 
believe, in the virtuous implementation of processes of the greatest coverage and social 
sharing of technical skills. In other words, technological production should be socialized ex-
ante, with the aim of establishing the principles, the dynamics and social practices that 
generate it from within. This process of transferring know-how from an elite group of 
technology professionals to the majority of common citizens could, if opportunely guided, 
facilitate a decentralization of the choices and decisions that incorporate their ends and 
objectives in technological objects. This would constitute a virtuous model of democratization 
and sensitization that would surely help social reflexivity on the so-called impact of such 
choices and decisions.   
 
The margins, limitations and characteristics of these processes of creative transformation, just 
as of the subjects (individual or collective) of which they are protagonists, represent many 
important contexts of possible future research. This transformation, moreover, insofar as it is 
able to expand the margins of the technical creativity of  users/consumers and considerably 
limit the asymmetries of power between these and producers, does not only concern the 
narrow field of computer science. This is demonstrated by the possibility of exporting the 
participated and shared bottom-up model represented by open source in the most disparate 
contexts of techno-scientific production. We have seen this in Chapter 5 with reference to 
biotechnologies, but we could extend it to an any number of spheres. The social phenomenon 
of DIY is significant proof of this. To develop sociological research on this movement would 
be of great interest. 
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6.3.2 – c) The maker-movement and do-it-yourself technology 
 
For a number of years now, a genuine social movement of great interest and importance has 
been active in this direction: the maker movement or maker subculture. This is an approach 
founded on the principle of open source creativity that applies new technologies to set out the 
principles of do-it-yourself culture (DIY). Organized on libertarian principles (‘anarchy that 
works’), this social movement is also, as with the open source movement, subject to 
controversial interpretations that cut across the traditional left/ right political opposition. 
Indeed, it encounters fierce opponents and fervent supporters both to the left and right of the 
political-ideological spectrum. The maker movement promises the re-founding of a society of 
production as against the consumer culture that has characterized more recent capitalist 
development. Clearly, however, it does so in terms profoundly different from the old logic of 
assembly-line based manufacturing. Indeed, the main point of reference of the movement is 
the enormous potential of self-production (individual or collective) that the new technologies 
in an manner have made available.  
 
The common spirit of this movement is captured by the dictum that technical creation (from 
the production of objects to the creation of life) is a process within everyone’s reach. The use 
of open source materials and products unequivocally shows the inspiration of this movement, 
namely an emphasis on collaboration as the method and above all a willingness to facilitate a 
playful and creative relationship with technique. If we need an object-symbol of this cultural 
revolution that the movement aims to introduce, then the recent MakerBot 3D printer comes 
immediately to mind, hailed by many as the new industrial revolution for the 21st century.  
 
The technological principle on which this is based well known: driving a mechanical 
instrument with the aid of software. It works like a classic printer but in three dimensions. 
Pass after pass, a nozzle shifts on three axes and deposits layers of material (often a synthetic 
resin) replicating a digital model until achieving the desired result. From a door handle to a 
bicycle, the production possibilities are potentially endless. This technology has prompted the 
development of a multitude of small creative firms, but has above all also become a vehicle of 
creativity for amateur makers. The world of free software has seen this innovation as a way to 
apply its values and practices to manufacturing mechanisms until hypothesizing the 
realization of the principle of popular re-appropriation of the means of production (a truly 
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innovative form of socialization) and of the radical democratization of industrial production - 
the ultimate objective being the abolition of the ‘consumer society’. 
 
Another example of the maker approach is to be found in the Italian ‘Arduino board’ 
produced in Ivrea in the ‘bar of King Arduino’, from which it takes its name. Sold for a small 
sum (approximately 30 Euros), this board can be connected to numerous tools and allows 
making a wide range of tasks: guiding a 3D printer, controlling a robot, etc. Its success 
derives directly from the DIY spirit inspiring it. Entirely open source, Arduino is the most 
evident symbol of the potential passage of the open logic of software production to that of 
hardware (open hardware). The plug-and-play card enables a ‘democratization’ of the 
technological production of hardware, making it within the reach of the many. The aim is to 
enhance individual, social and collective creativity by favoring practices of creative exchange, 
with the intention of reducing the gap between producer and user, and avoiding the process of 
subordination of the subject to the technological object and, above all, to the powers of which 
it is bearer. Analyzing the processes connected to such creativity applied to hardware may be 
an interesting challenge for a future research proposal. 
 
6.3.2- d) Democratization or aristocratization? Risks and challenges 
 
Claiming to be within the reach of many clearly does not mean within the reach of all. Herein 
lies one of the more crucial problems, often highlighted by critical observers, namely the risk 
of hosting a kind of idyllic island occupied by a technophile aristocracy, proud of its own 
skills and separated from the rest of the social body. From this perspective, rather than 
representing a democratization process, the advent of open source would thus be a sliding 
towards a situation of further fragmentation, with on the one hand, producers with their 
power, and on the other, a mass of passive users who do not have the time, desire and/or 
know-how to participate in the process of technological production, with in the middle, a 
‘resisting’ élite that may gain from this situation.  
 
The problem exists and cannot be avoided, but rather than ignore it or else concede, assuming 
this to be the definitive demonstration of the inadequacy of the ‘democratic solution’ of the 
open model, I believe it should be accepted as a challenge. It is undoubtedly one of the issues 
needing further inquiry. One research question to ask then is whether we are facing a ‘nascent 
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state’ of a phenomenon that is only at the beginning and could soon lead to a simplification of 
the processes of technological assemblage so as to be able to speak of technological bricolage 
- in other words, the utopian aspect of the Ikea model of democratization of design applied to 
technological development.  
 
Again, it would be interesting to understand - as Sennett (Chapters 4 and 5) seems to suggest, 
even if the open source phenomenon were to remain confined to a narrow niche of 
users/producers - whether this would then do nothing more than reproduce the medieval 
structure of the handicraft workshops (atelier) in a modern vein, with a fragmented and 
diffused model of authority based on the prestige of masters deriving directly from 
craftsmanship and the transfer of skills. This is an idea of a society in which the power is 
based on savoir-faire distributed among ‘artisan groups’ having in common a handicraft 
model of work and whose authority is based exclusively on prestige and social recognition. 
This is not the utopian model of everyone as equals, but neither is it the current model 
characterized by the centralized dominion of big international and globalized players. It raises 
the questions of power and will as well as tendency and possibility still entirely open issues 
that we face today and which deserve further exploration.  
 
The risk of a non-democratic sliding of the phenomenon raises another correlated issue 
meriting deeper investigation: do-ocracy. Open source philosophy evokes (often explicitly 
invokes) a strong conception of participation conceived of in the pragmatic terms of ‘doing 
things’, so much so as to prompt the neologism: ‘do-ocracy’. According to the principles of 
do-ocracy, doing entails an organizational structure in which everyone can choose their role 
and tasks to perform independently. Decisional responsibilities substantially derive, therefore, 
from doing a certain job rather than being appointed or selected following formal procedures. 
The principles of such an organization of work and groups involve a non-authoritarian and 
non-coercive model of relations, a strong culture of participation and the essential value 
assigned to recognition as the main form of reward. This is an idea with significant socio-
political implications: the classic idea of democracy, like modern principles of meritocracy, is 
substantially challenged. Once again, democracy is perceived not as a formal application of 
procedural rules (elections, competitions, etc.), but as the fruit of substantial and pragmatic 
processes of action and concrete participation. 
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The risks of such a simplified vision of participation (‘if you want something done, then 
simply do it’) are obvious: the forms of representation in complex systems, the disappearance 
of intermediate bodies (unions, parties etc.), the risks of free-riding, exploitation etc. Here, we 
are concerned with highlighting how the work ethics underlying this is grounded in the 
principle (emancipatory) of cultivating passion and interest. A principle that contrasts heavily 
with the ethics (Protestant) of capitalism of which Weber spoke and that would radically 
move modern societies, where gain and duty are the prime motivational sources of work. In 
the open viewpoint, therefore, it is the realization of the self that characterizes the main 
driving force of work.  
 
This libertarian and anti-hierarchical vision, according to some authors (Gorz, 2003) is hardly 
compatible with the capitalist economy. In reality, an ambiguity that proves difficult to 
resolve is concealed within this emancipatory vision of the job: the search for autonomy in 
work could also be understood as the expression of an entrepreneurial need that in itself is not 
in conflict with capitalism. There is, for example, a rhetoric of autonomy that shapes the 
transformations of the organization of the work and managerial practices of firms. Often, this 
rhetoric is only applied to creative activities and is primarily aimed at stimulating the 
productivity of workers, augmenting their exploitation in order to boost the firm’s profits. 128 
Ultimately, this concerns issues that made their appearance in the 60s (see for example 
Marcuse) and that still exist today in sociological and psychological practices applied to the 
personnel management of capitalist companies. Using classic Marxist categories, it would 
seem that the emphasis on qualitative dimensions linked to autonomy and self-realization may 
have a positive effect on the sense of alienation, but a negative one on exploitation. It is 
manifest that open source may well not be a sufficient condition for change in the economic-
social paradigm.   
 
Moreover, some of the most fervent detractors of this technology and of the philosophy 
supporting it come from the ranks of nostalgic supporters of the workers movement.129 In 
                                                            
128 An example is the Google’s request of its employees to dedicate up to 20% of their working hours 
to personal projects but without reducing the duties to be performed. This leads to a work overload and 
a ‘creative’ stress, all of which is aimed at developing entrepreneurial ideas that the company then 
annexes, as it were. The workers have the sensation of having wide margins of autonomy, but in 
reality they give themselves over to exploitation.  
129See e.g. the article in Le Monde diplomatique of January 2013 by Johan Söderberg, sociologist of 
the Institut Francilien de Recherche, Innovation et Societé (Ifris), with the eloquent title: Illusoire 
émancipation par la technologie. 
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particular, they make the claim that self-produced digital machines might be the direct 
descendants of the same technology that has led to the destruction of the industrial workforce 
(namely the computer). The main criticism centers on the fact that the makers are not the heirs 
of the labor movement, but rather the historical outcome of the negation of this – to the extent 
that the main figures of the maker movement come from MIT, an institute that has played a 
determining role in the creation of digital technologies. The chief limitation highlighted by the 
critics is that these technologies, far from sustaining the human and economic liberation of 
workers, would support a kind of self-exploitation, since the innovations created by single 
producers who lack bargaining power compared to the major multinationals would end up by 
swelling the profits of the latter. Moreover, self-production would result in the creation of a 
form of unfair competition with respect to the mass of traditional workers with consequent 
wage squeezing. Self-production, it is thus argued, would cause mass lay-offs and a general 
lowering of workers’ earnings.   
 
6.3.3 General intellect, commons, mutualism 
 
Over the last few years, the open source movement has also been supported by the thinking of 
a number of authors who are critical of capitalism and the processes of globalization. Though 
not a direct expression of that world, they have found in open source thinking and practices 
and in DIY an important innovative potential. In particular, these intellectuals have sought to 
integrate such potential to a more general criticism of the transformations of capitalism, the 
new forms of work and the obsolescence of the model of social compromise that has 
characterized all advanced capitalist societies of the post-war period. The two perhaps most 
internationally renowned exponents of this group of intellectuals are André Gorz and Toni 
Negri. Albeit highly different authors, they seem to have common ground in the so-called 
‘general intellect’.130  
 
Without going into detail, the main hypothesis of the ‘general intellect’ theorists follows the 
idea that today productive forces are becoming freed from capital because the heart of the 
production of wealth is the so-called living labor. The creation of value increasingly resides in 
the subject at work rather than in the exploitation of ‘dead’ knowledge, in so far as the wealth 
of firms (and nations) depends on the cognitive and relational attitudes of the workforce 
                                                            
130 Here, the concept of General Intellect introduced by Karl Marx in ‘The fragment on machines’ 
from The Grundrisse (1857-1858) is central. 
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(provocatively named the ‘invention-force’):  things like creativity, intelligence and 
cooperation. All attitudes created and developed in non-working contexts (family life, social 
sphere, leisure, etc.), by means of a process of progressive colonization and exploitation of the 
social times of the individual.  
 
According to this hypothesis, regarding ‘immaterial work’, capitalism has generated a major 
contradiction. Immaterial work cannot be pigeon-holed and programmed since it thrives on 
innovation and constant creativity. Mobilizing all the faculties of the subject throughout all 
the stages of his lifetime, it is developed outside the workplace. Nevertheless, capitalism 
persists in exploiting  the wealth it produces in a parasitic fashion. The main instruments to 
implement such parasitic exploitation are precisely the copyright and the patent (Chapter 5). 
Other contradictions derive from this: in the first instance, the impossibility to normalize 
immaterial work within the legal and economic forms of the private wage-earning work; 
secondarily, the problem of measuring of work productivity, since individual contributions to 
the collective result are no longer directly quantifiable.  
 
Here, open source represents the living embodiment of the characteristics of new forms of 
productive forces, of the contradictions they embody and the potential for social 
transformation they open up. In particular, this shows how parasitic capitalism continues to 
extract value through the privatization of bio-political production based on common goods, an 
open field in which living work moves in an independent way (Negri, 2006: 91).   
 
On the basis of this analysis, I would ask whether the transformative potential implicit in open 
source does not, in fact, call into play a social model perhaps too quickly considered 
anachronistic. 
 
It was Proudhon who has the merit of having elaborated a system of thinking that, precisely 
due to the development of open source logic and technological practices, may today enjoy a 
certain vengeance on those who once considered it a minor line of inquiry. In truth, his model 
was extraordinarily ahead of the times. The third way131 of the libertarian socialism of 
                                                            
131  The term “third way” has been used in politics to indicate various and often highly dissimilar 
things. In Italy it was likely used for the first time at the beginning of the 20th century in contexts of 
the arising fascist movement then arising and referring to the elaboration of an alternative political, 
cultural, social and economic system to the capitalist and communist; thereafter, it was re-formulated 
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Proudhon (by many considered the true father of anarchism) forges a politico-social formula 
that challenges both bourgeois capitalism as well as state communism. Recognizing neither 
God nor Master, Proudhon raised the alert to the dangers of a dogmatic Marxist communism 
which was perilously exposing itself to a new idolatry of power that would have the 
exploitation of capital replaced by that of the state. In this sense, Proudhon prophetically 
anticipated the disasters of Soviet communism and real socialism.  
 
The social model that Proudhon supported was founded instead on mutualism. In biology, 
mutualism is a type of harmonic symbiosis in which cohabiting species draw mutual 
advantages from the reciprocal arrangement of their communal life. In the socio-economic 
field, mutualism is consequently a relationship of reciprocity between individuals and/or 
associations of individuals structured fairly on ‘equal duties and equal rights’, thereby 
uncoupling the subordination that characterizes the individual-state relationship. Favorable to 
the concept of property, understood as personal possession and usufruct,132 and to the free 
interchange of goods between producers, Proudhon’s mutuality had as its goal a free society, 
structured horizontally and equally. 
 
Proudhon did not believe that the state could be the representative of the general will 
(Rousseau’s social contract). In his view, individual commitment must remain the cornerstone 
of community life. His community federalism, in this sense, goes against any centralized and 
impersonal system, whether public or private, which always ends up by degenerating into 
authoritarianism and the illegitimate appropriation of the fruits of social work. Proudhon’s 
political hypothesis, founded on mutualism and cooperativism, foresaw a society in which the 
individual is both producer and consumer at the same time, citizen and prince, administrator 
and administered. The relevance of Proudhon today seems invigorated by the blooming of 
various issues and social and political allied to this thesis: such as microcredit, common assets 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
again in Italy by the politician, journalist and partisan Pietro Ingrao to indicate the presence within the 
Italian Communist Party of an alternative political road to both the soviet-styled line of Cossutta and 
the gradualist one of Napolitano (current President of the Italian Republic). The expression has also 
more recently been used for Blairism. 
132The celebrated phrase ‘property is theft’ was successively embraced by communist Marxists to lend 
it a sense that was not expressly intended by Proudhon in his Qu’est-ce que la propriété? Here the 
thinker of Besançon was referring to the property of the means of production that exploiting the plus-
value generated by the pooling of human means, de facto expropriated workers from the fruits of their 
labor. Instead, Proudhon was favorable towards individual property (possession or usufruct) that 
represents a protective guarantee against the abuses of power by landlord or state. 
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and self-management - but the aspect that lends centrality to his thinking now lies especially  
in the success of free software and all its possible applications, including those deriving from 
it and not only in IT.  
 
From the viewpoint of philosophical analysis or social epistemology, open source experiences 
might therefore be a fertile field of theoretical and empirical investigation. Studying the best 
real social conditions for the development of this third way and analyzing good and bad 
practices in the various sectors in which technology increasingly digs further into the field of 
development would appear to represent a major and interesting line of research for future 
exploration.  
 
6.3.4 New technologies, new organizational challenges: towards open source unionism? 
 
A fundamental aspect deserving in-depth research along such lines regards the political forms 
for the organization of such experiences. It seems important to analyze the limitations and 
opportunities of this. With reference to the movement looking towards open source creativity, 
there is a need to further examine its various aspects and implications. As a case in point, a 
number of the considerations previously reported and upheld by envoys of the labour 
movement, merit investigation. These regard not only the specific case of the MakerBot 3D 
printer, but may easily be extended to all the innovations that, in the various technological 
domains, bring the shared logic of open source into play.  
 
More generally, a contrast seems to be taking shape, entirely on the left from a political 
standpoint, between the interests of the traditional workers’ movement and those of the new 
libertarian groups that see in new technologies an important instrument to free-up the energies 
and creativity of individuals and small communities of shared production. The issue at hand 
regards the possibility of these small communities representing a valid counterbalance to the 
power of multinationals, big corporations and the state in defense of the interests of their own 
supporters. The risk is that of crushing the political resistance to these great powers. The fear 
is that of leaping into the void with respect to the traditional and by now reassuring forms of 
organisation of the less powerful groups of society (for instance, the unions).  
 
 142 
 
Obviously, one may readily object that such organizational forms of work and society are 
already going through a radical transformation and that it is necessary, therefore, to discuss 
the internal innovations it may be opportune to introduce to adapt to the radical changes that 
society and culture face. While recognizing the legitimacy of the fears indicated, however, the 
impression is that there are strong cultural oppositions within these organizations allied to 
both the traditional left and the right that are heading in an alarmingly conservative direction.  
 
In those places where the crisis of trade-unionism has reached its peak, for example in the 
United States, open source logic has set forth possible innovative solutions. There is talk of a 
new ‘open source unionism’, an expression coined by Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers to 
outline possible new models of organization of workers based on practices of membership and 
servicing grounded in the use of the net and its related logic of sharing and exchange. This 
clearly means hypothesizing a radical transformation of organizational practices in the 
direction of modifying the meaning and forms of membership, changing the incentives and 
the relations of inner power and imagining in time new political and organizational strategies.  
 
In particular, the adoption of a similar model would imply accepting the crisis and the 
overcoming of the current traditional form of representation: collective bargaining in favor of 
workers in contexts where unions demonstrate a majority support. In the open source model, 
similarly to the open logic of the IT world, the union should construct a language, practices 
and a common and collaborative platform between workers (often contractually flexible, 
politically diverse and geographically distant) and activists. The challenge is great, the 
outcome uncertain. The question is whether the unions will be able to grasp this challenge.  
The impression is that the social and economic changes impose a radical change. At stake is 
the very survival of unions. In this paragraph, we suggest that an important line of social and 
political analysis could be developed on this topic. What are the risks and opportunities that 
open source unionism generates? And what are the political-organizational conditions needed 
to bring it about?   
 
6.3.5 What kind of ethical governance for ‘open source technology'?  
 
Lastly, though no less important, the advent of new open source logics in the technological 
domain also compel critical reflection on the ethical implications of technological innovation. 
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Historically, the main agents considered legitimized to ‘guide’ technological development 
have been the state and the market. The growth of a greater sensibility to ethical issues 
applied to technology has favored the emergence of new figures to control techno-scientific 
development: technology assessment (Technikbewertung), the various deontological forms 
connected to the professions, the affirmation of the so-called ‘ethics of technical acting’ with 
all the various forms of ethical control of commissions, boards and so on. The results are in 
plain sight to everyone and are not, in my view, particularly encouraging. We may say that the 
successes are few and those partial and conflicting.  
 
In truth, however, there has never been an authentic government of technology because 
technological logic has refused any kind of effective form of control and limitation. Scientific 
and technological research has become subject to such a wide and unquestionable process of 
social legitimization as to end up by transforming the very word ‘research’ into a glittering 
generality133 able to ‘externalize’, from a cultural point of view, all the eventual negative 
effects it has generated. In other words, scientific and technological research has become an 
untouchable Moloch in a position to transfer the burdens and causes of its negative social 
consequences to politics, to the users and to administrators.134 And a Moloch, as we know, 
does not allow ‘fetters and chains’ destined to limit its absolute power.  
 
Today, new challenges seem to be emerging as a result of the start of processes of participated 
and widespread innovation. It is obvious that the horizontal spread of DIY and open source 
practices inevitably implies a fragmentation and dispersion of the centers of production and 
technological innovation. Such dispersion requires, in my view, a re-launching of the reflection 
on processes of ethical governance of technological production. The tendency to concentrate 
vertically, separate and deferred (ex-post) the ethical reflection on technological production 
creates a paradoxical dimension of incongruence and potential ineffectiveness with respect to 
an increasingly encapsulated and more diffused technological production at a social level. In 
                                                            
133 A term created within the Institute of Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in the 1930’s, ‘glittering 
generalities’ refers to emotionally appealing words so closely associated with highly-valued concepts 
and beliefs that they carry conviction without supporting information or reason. Such highly-valued 
concepts attract general approval and acclaim. Appealing to emotions such as love of country and 
home, and desire for peace, freedom, glory, and honor, they demand approval without examination 
and are typically used by politicians and propagandists. These highly abstract and ambiguous 
words/phrases are described at length by George Orwell (1946) in his essay ‘Politics and the English 
Language’. 
134The very idea of such consequences implicitly echoes the principle of an entity that is not born in 
the bosom of society even if it may cause certain effects on it (from without). 
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this sense, the more that open source applied to processes of technological innovation finds 
space, the more a reflection on the idea of a possible open ethical governance seems necessary. 
 
Indeed, I would argue, the ethical challenges raised by open source concern the method and 
process of technological innovation rather more than single technological developments. Thus, 
it seems that the problem today is really that of finding or creating more institutions or 
specialist bodies to deal with the aims, limits or ethics of technology. On the contrary, setting 
up such bodies would only result in an acceptance of the erroneous assumption of the 
separation of technology from society and accentuate its effects. In other words, it would mean 
giving lifeblood to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1949).  
 
The question is whether this ‘division of labor’ is still a useful instrument, if there are margins 
in which the model can be revised. Are we sure that responsible innovation does not imply the 
end of the model of delegating responsibility to groups of qualified specialists? Is it possible to 
imagine the creation of open and participated spaces in which professionals and common 
citizens may reflect together on the ethical implications of techno-scientific development? Can 
we hypothesize a deliberative function of binding choices for these new entities? Is there a 
techno-ethic-cracy needing to be democratized?  In general, it would be preferable were such 
reflection to be not only theoretical but also empirical; it would target possible techniques and 
platforms that might facilitate decentered processes of collective deliberation, practices of 
participated democracy and open source governance as applied to the ethical evaluation of 
technological innovation.    
 
6.4 Critical Synopsis 
 
Five critical knots are identified from the analysis of the debate developed on the theme of 
‘open source and democracy’ that seem to emerge as particularly worthy of note. Presented in 
synoptic form in Table 2 (below), these represent as many potential contexts of research for the 
development of future lines of scientific investigation. With each critical knot linked to 
different a cultural context, though they are all clearly correlated. 
 
This presents an overview of the main questions that critically define the outline of a theory of 
democratization of technology related to the advent of open source. Clearly this is by no means 
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exhaustive. It sets out research questions at an embryonic level that need further analytical 
development. Nevertheless, in my view, it pinpoints the very important critical knots, whose 
unravelling is a fundamental condition in order to really be able to speak of a new 
democratization of technological production. For now, it seems to delineate a condition that is 
simple but has important potential; since processes never come about independently, it is a 
good idea to extend this reflection if we wish to help this development. 
 
In the first place, there is an anthropological dominion that we might also consider 
propaedeutic regarding others. Since it concerns the issue of reciprocity, on which other 
dominions depend in various way. Can we really consider, as various commentators have 
claimed (Berra & Meo, 2001), that open source is able to re-propose the structure of the social 
bond, characterizing cultures based on the model of exchange originating with the so-called 
gift, in a modern perspective? This is decisive, since all is said done, hypothesized and  
developed concerning democratization has its roots to a significant degree in this 
anthropological question that deserves exploring. 
 
In the second instance, there is a correlated sociological domain. Here the issues to be 
developed concern the presumed capacity of open source to favor social processes of re-
interpreting technology and creating social spaces of technical creativity by individual and 
(above all) collective subjects. Is this really the case? Are there truly these margins of creativity 
and interpretation? Is there, also methodologically speaking, the possibility of verifying such 
margins? Are they real? 
 
There is then a political domain of the issue. The main questions here regard the effective force 
and pervasiveness of the process of distributing the choices and decisions that open source 
would promote. The debate seems to focus particularly on the real effectiveness of the 
mechanisms started and on the possibility that the open source model, favoring apparently 
greater decisional power, in reality conceals self-exploitive mechanisms. The Google case cited 
above and the theoretical examinations in Chapter 5 would point in this direction. Namely, that 
the margins of freedom and participation guaranteed by the open source model may only serve 
a greater productivity and creativity for the existing (albeit adapted) system to utilize at the 
expense of the creators. 
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A second political issue concerns the possible affirmation of a new split within the category of 
users. This would be a renewed version of a question consolidated within the context of the 
disciplines that are concerned with these issues. The problem regards the affirmation of a 
monopoly of technological innovation in the hands of a narrow elite of non-professional 
experts. In this sense, far from guaranteeing greater democratism, open source could be setting 
up a new selective elitism. 
 
Finally, in the framing of questions by political order, there is a serious dilemma related to the 
inner dynamics of the practices and also the ‘visions’ of open source communities. The 
emphasis on ‘doing’ and the political importance (in terms of decision making power) that is 
recognized within open source communities raises no lesser problems of democratism (do-
ocracy) concerning the patterns and traditional models that have been consolidated in modern 
Western liberal societies. 
 
The socio-philosophical domain regards instead the possibility to really consider open source as 
the terrain on which the theoretical terms to realize a neo-Proudhonian mutualist ideal are 
defined. In other words, a condition of potential federalist neo-cooperativism that can be self-
regulated in a distributed and participated way, free from the traditional modern and dual 
contrast imposed by the binomial state/market that has characterized much of the development 
of modern philosophical and social thinking. One may ask, moreover, if the theory of the 
common good, like that of the ‘general intellect’, can be a useful instrument in this direction. 
 
The organizational domain concerns the radical impact that the development of open source 
practices could (further) have on the organization and legal management of the world of work. 
The democratization of techno-science and society also proceeds from this. The resistance and 
drive towards change reveal very interesting challenges, but also alarming grey areas on the 
rights of workers and the possibility to guarantee real participation in decisional processes and 
the protection of fundamental prerogatives. This applies also in the world of scientific research. 
The achievement of many of the opportunities for positive change (for workers) demands a 
radical change in the established models of representation in work places. Much research and 
analysis should be made in this area, traditionally little inclined to change. 
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The last domain concerns the ethical dimension of the problem. Processes of democratization 
of techno-science have certainly not been initiated by open source: there has been reflection on 
this issue for at least forty years. However, open source seems to be setting new challenges and 
new dynamics today, including from the viewpoint of the ethical governance of techno-
scientific development. Indeed, just as in the case of the de-professionalization of the processes 
of technological innovation, the great democratic expectations created by the implementation of 
mechanisms of radical fragmentation and dispersion raise alarming questions about the risks of 
an ethical uncontrollability of these mechanisms. Put in perspective, a question seems to be 
forming on the horizon: in this picture of fragmentation and diffusion of techno-scientific 
innovation, is the classical model of recognizing ethical sustainability tenable? Can it still 
work? In other words, is the separation between bodies of ethical evaluation and common 
society still sustainable in a context in which the traditional separation between technology and 
society might be reduced until disappearing altogether? 
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SUMMARY 
 
 
In the general understanding, and also in scientific practice, technology and society are 
viewed as two distinct entities. Related to this view is the assumption that technology and 
human experience are quite different and unconnected and also the idea that modernity has 
uprooted, de-contextualized and disembodied technical rationality. Taking a contrary 
approach, this study represents a theoretical exploration aimed at showing that in the domain 
of technological development, there are significant margins for maneuver in which to 
recuperate and valorize human and social action.  
 
As a work of theoretical sociology or social epistemology, this thesis approaches its subject 
from the theoretical background of the philosophy and sociology of technique. The historical 
and conventional assumptions of this theoretical background, it is argued, have been and 
continue to be characterized by a hegemonically defined essentialist paradigm. This paradigm 
has been fiercely counteracted by two opposed approaches, critical theory and pragmatism. 
The present work combines these approaches, usually considered mutually incompatible, for 
the development of a new theoretical gaze or perspective. The aim has been to engage in a 
theoretical research oriented to a new philosophy of praxis in order to instigate a critical and 
constructivist approach to technology. The main result expected of this work is the provision 
of a problematized and multifaceted semantic map leading to a multidimensional conceptual 
re-integration of skilled experience in human technical action.   
 
Chapter 1 comprises the methodological presentation of this research. It introduces the 
problem statement and the research questions, the thesis structure and the rhizomatic method 
of this work. It is also explained the conceptual process leading to the selection of the unit 
observation (skills).      
 
Chapter 2 explicates the theoretical background to the research. The first section discusses 
the hegemonic determinist paradigm (an essentialist inclination) within the field of the 
philosophy of technique that has sought to demonstrate how the passage from technique to 
technology (from ancient to modern society) has brought about the understanding of the 
separation of the role of experience and human acting (hence of perception, action, 
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intentionality and praxis). In its idealized form, this underwrites the narrow interests of elites, 
while the darker version presents dystopian visions of alienation and apocalypse. At the root 
of this paradigm is an analysis of modern technology as having i) disembedded and detached 
technique from the social and cultural fabric that had safeguarded it for centuries, and thus ii) 
rendered it an autonomous corpus, a neutral and independent ensemble, linked to ‘inner’ 
logics and dynamics and answering exclusively to linear principles of efficiency, 
effectiveness, functionality and rationality.  
 
The second section briefly overviews the philosophy of praxis, with the intent of showing that 
this may offer a real alternative to the determinism of the essentialist paradigm. It is suggested 
that it was precisely the sidelined concept of praxis that Marx’s thinking had set center stage 
in his critical analysis of technique, and that this led to a logical paradox in the history of 
Western thought which continues to heavily condition philosophy: technique, the essence of 
man, expands in modernity out of all proportion, to end up by negating man in his essence. 
The third section explores how the paradox has transversally conditioned not only 
conservative currents of thought but also progressive ones, with particular reference to the 
Frankfurt School, which has been very influential in the social critical thinking of the Left. 
This influence, it is suggested, has damaged the revolutionary potential of the philosophy of 
praxis that the Frankfurt School, as a neo-Marxist tendency, should have developed and 
diffused.  
 
The fourth section discusses how Andrew Feenberg’s thinking has brought a philosophical 
vision to the field of the analysis of technique that is able to rehabilitate Marx’s concept of 
praxis and thereby introduces a possible way out of the blind alley of needing to choose 
between the two unsatisfactory visions: the determinism of the philosophy of essentialist 
technique or the insufficiently critical potential of constructivism. Constructivism recognizes 
the fundamental role played by society in determining the very nature of technique but has a 
limited vision of social conflict mediated by science, technology and technical expertise. 
Sagaciously combining the anti-essentialism of constructivism with the analyses of socio-
political dynamics linked to power relationships and class conflict produced by the Frankfurt 
School, Feenberg has managed to revalorize the role of experience and praxis in technical 
action. This is a revaluation, moreover, oriented to supporting the possibility of changing 
technological development in the direction of a democratic rationalization and a greater 
 164 
 
participation from below (bottom up). Finally, the fifth section introduces the new theoretical 
perspective of a critical pragmatism oriented to stimulating a new materialist philosophical 
orientation that emerges from a fecund (albeit difficult) encounter between the anti-
essentialist current of critical theory and pragmatist philosophy.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates the possibilities of a bio-anthropological foundation that can explain 
and justify the importance of experience in human culture and presents an overview of a 
contemporary epistemological paradigm that seems to be able to represent such a foundation 
in the life sciences. The paradigm suggested is that of epigenetics and its conception of the 
organism, regarded as scientifically supporting a socio-anthropological idea of man as a real 
being-in-the-world, an intentional body that lives out a relationship of reciprocity with the 
surrounding environment (physical and social).  
 
The last three decennia have seen an intensive debate in science and wider society on the 
development and impact of genetics and genomics. This debate had important scientific, 
philosophical, economic and symbolic implications. The general assumption of the third  
chapter is that in spite of the wide range of actors and institutions (scientists, politicians, 
churches, bio-ethicists, etc.) animating this discussion with a variety of (often opposing) 
views, the debate in itself takes place within a hegemonic scientific and cultural framework 
built upon specific conceptual interpretations of life that demands the development of a 
critical reflection. This chapter reflects both on the basic epistemological pillars of this 
hegemonic paradigm and on the emergence of a new scientific and epistemological turn that 
leaves the gene-centric paradigm in serious crisis. 
 
Chapter 4 presents a reflection on the advent of modern technology, focusing on a discussion 
of whether this has really ended the relationship between bodily experience and material 
reality, or whether, in fact, an innovative and skilled handicraft experience of the world still 
exists in the context of contemporary technological developments. This chapter thus 
represents a socio-anthropological approach to the subject at hand, with the approach being 
informed by two different theoretical contributions or perspectives.  
 
Supported by of the work of British anthropologist Tim Ingold, the first perspective highlights 
the ‘ecological’ principle according to which it is never a single organ (quintessentially, the 
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hand) that represents the privileged locus of technical skills, insofar as these are generally 
nested within a ‘technicity’, namely, in the particular alignment (tuning) between corporeity, 
the situational context and the materials and tools used. Supported by theoretical contributions 
of a pragmatist and phenomenological inclination, the second perspective here seeks to 
illustrate how the reduction of the manual dimension of work (whose demise is seen, in fact, 
as highly improbable) does not necessarily imply a complete retreat of the innovative nature 
and singularity of action preserved in human experience. For this reason, the development of 
mechanical and electronic technology – including, now, the digital – has not, in fact, brought 
about many of the pessimistic prophecies that over the years have foretold the end of creative 
handicraft skills tied to the expert use of tools.  
 
The line of reasoning developed aims to highlight that, if technicity is not defined in terms of 
a single organ representing the privileged locus of technical skills (since these are, in fact, 
linked to the tuning of our body with the surrounding environment), then the advent of 
modern technologies cannot do away with such a locus in absolute terms by transferring it to 
a technological design encapsulated in a set of rules and defined algorithms. Indeed, the user 
is still and will always be a body operating within a context. Moreover, as is stressed using 
insights from Richard Sennett, the advent of new (digital) technologies is actually opening up 
interesting potential margins of recovering a dynamic feedback between operator, tool and 
environment (the physical and social). And while dextrous (finger) manipulations may 
characterize this at present, it is surely no longer primarily centered on the manual and 
corporeal dimension of the gesture (which indeed can be re-valorized) so much as on the 
intellectual and socio-relational dimension of design. The consequence of this argument is 
that today there are (at least potentially) relevant theoretical and practical margins around the 
hegemonic center within which to stimulate a recovery of the value of experienced and skilful 
technical action. 
 
Chapter 5 presents a concrete case through which it is possible to perceive and develop this 
room for maneuver to recover and give value to experience and social skills in modern 
technical action as proposed in the argument of the previous chapters. The relevant literature 
for this chapter is anchored more to a socio-political analysis, primarily because the 
rediscovery of skills and experience within technological innovation processes inevitably 
oblige us to reflect on the issue of participation. Thus, the question is addressed of whether 
 166 
 
these practices give voice to the possibility of a better democratization of technology. In 
particular, focus is placed on a specific technological practice, that of open source, as 
potentially paving the way to a new participatory development model of technology, one that 
is more democratic and open to human action. This model is able to establish a participatory 
approach that makes the hegemonic ‘technical code’ discussed by Andrew Feenberg an open 
entity in which it is possible to realize creative processes, including those of re-appropriation 
designed to literally re-invent used technologies. 
 
This chapter attempts to apply the participatory re-appropriation principles to the emblematic 
and controversial case of biotechnology development. In particular, it is suggested that there is 
room for maneuver in order to conceive of and also materially produce re-skilling practices. 
The argument made is that it is possible to develop practices aimed at the re-encapsulation of 
technology within social relations, practices aimed at an empowerment of communities and 
the participatory and shared rehabilitation of technological production ex-ante and with the 
aim of supporting a more democratic endogenous development that has the potential to more 
closely bind technological innovation to the goals of social sustainability and reduction of 
inequalities.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes by reviewing the study structure and key issues and presenting the main 
conceptual results as an original semantic map. The particular value of this map lies in its 
visual presentation of semantic links and connections among the issues developed. As a 
second main aim, this chapter also engages in a general discussion aimed at sketching out new 
questions representing proposals for future lines of research. This overview critically defines 
the outline of a theory of democratization of technology related to the advent of open source. 
Specifically, it looks forward to the possibilities for re-skilling practices as a new form of 
democratic participation based on the social sharing of technology. These questions are 
related to anthropological, sociological, philosophical, political and ethical domains of 
reflection. Issues discussed include reciprocity, technical creativity, self-exploitation, 
technological elitism, do-ocracy, mutualism, open-source unionism and ethical-governance 
reconfiguration. Finally, a brief synopsis is provided linking all these possible research 
directions to the democratic implications of open source re-skilling practices.   
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Technologie en samenleving worden vaak als twee afzonderlijke entiteiten gezien. 
Gerelateerd aan deze opvatting is de vooronderstelling dat technologie ontkoppeld is van de 
menselijke ervaring en dat de moderniteit ook gekenmerkt wordt door een technische 
rationaliteit die op zichzelf staat. Ondanks de dominante positie van deze perceptie van 
technologie in wetenschappelijke en algemene publieke kringen, wordt in deze studie een 
tegenovergestelde theoretisch verkenning uitgevoerd. Dit onderzoek is erop gericht om aan te 
tonen dat de mens juist wel een aanzienlijke manoeuvreerruimte heeft op het gebied van 
technologische ontwikkeling en dat de menselijke ervaring en het sociale handelen wel in het 
centrum van de belangstelling kan komen te staan en opnieuw gewaardeerd kunnen worden. 
 
Als een theoretisch sociologisch of sociaal epistemologisch werk worden technologie en 
samenleving in dit proefschrift benaderd vanuit een techniek filosofische en techniek 
sociologische achtergrond. De historische en conventionele vooronderstellingen van dit 
theoretische referentiekader worden gekenmerkt – zo wordt betoogd – door een 
essentialistisch paradigma van technologieontwikkeling dat een hegemoniale positie heeft 
verworven  en bepalend is voor ons kijken naar techniek in de huidige tijd. Toch zijn er twee 
filosofische stromingen geweest – de kritische theorie en het pragmatisme -  die zich sterk 
hebben afgezet tegen de hegemoniale positie van het essentialistische technologische 
paradigma. Hoewel deze twee benaderingen vaak als onderling tegenstrijdig en incompatibel 
zijn beschouwd, wordt in dit proefschrift geprobeerd deze twee benaderingen samen te 
brengen voor de ontwikkeling van een nieuw theoretisch perspectief;  een nieuwe lens van 
waaruit naar technologieontwikkeling kan worden gekeken. Het proefschrift beoogt een 
theoretisch onderzoek uit te voeren dat erop gericht is een bijdrage te leveren aan de 
ontwikkeling van een nieuwe filosofie van de praxis om van daaruit een kritisch en 
constructivistische technologie benadering te gaan ontwikkelen.  Het belangrijkste resultaat 
dat van deze studie verwacht kan worden is de schets van een veelzijdig semantische kaart die 
de hegemoniale positie van het essentialistische paradigma problematiseert en een aanzet 
geeft tot een multi-dimensionele en nieuwe integratie van de menselijke ervaring in het 
technisch handelen.  
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Hoofdstuk 1 presenteert de methodologie van dit onderzoek en bespreekt de 
probleemstelling, onderzoeksvragen, de opbouw en de rhizomatische onderzoeksmethode van 
het proefschrift. Bovendien wordt het conceptuele proces uitgelegd dat leidt tot de selectie 
van “skills” als observatie-eenheid.  
 
Hoofdstuk 2 expliciteert de theoretische achtergrond van het onderzoek. Het eerste deel 
bespreekt het deterministische paradigma (met de essentialistische nadruk) en de hegemoniale 
positie in de techniekfilosofie. Daarbij wordt aangetoond hoe de overgang van techniek (in de 
klassiek oude samenleving) naar technologie (in de moderne samenleving) heeft geleid tot de 
aanname dat technologieontwikkeling is losgekoppeld van de menselijk ervaring en het 
menselijk handelen (en dus van de waarneming, handeling, intentionaliteit en praktijk). In zijn 
geïdealiseerde vorm representeert deze ontkoppelde technologieontwikkeling de beperkte 
belangen van elites, terwijl de ontkoppelde technologieontwikkeling bezien vanuit een 
pessimistische invalshoek een weergave vormt van de dystopieën van vervreemding en 
vernietiging van de wereld (Apocalyps). Aan de basis van dit paradigma staat een analyse van 
de moderne technologie als voortkomend uit i) de techniek die ontkoppeld en losgemaakt is 
van de sociale en culturele context waaraan zij eeuwenlang gerelateerd was, waardoor ii)  de 
techniek (nu als technologie) een autonoom corpus is geworden; een neutraal en 
onafhankelijk geheel dat uitsluitend gerelateerd is aan de 'intrinsieke' logica en dynamiek van 
de technologieontwikkeling en nog uitsluitend reageert op de lineaire principes van 
efficiëntie, effectiviteit, functionaliteit en rationaliteit. 
 
Het tweede deel van Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een kort overzicht van de filosofie van de praxis om 
aan te tonen dat deze filosofie een echt alternatief kan bieden voor het determinisme van het 
essentialistische paradigma. Er wordt betoogd dat juist door het negeren van het concept van 
praxis - dat in Marx denken centraal staat in zijn analyse van techniek - er een logische 
paradox ontstond in de geschiedenis van het westerse denken die de techniekfilosofie sterk is 
blijven conditioneren. Een paradox waarin  techniek enerzijds het wezenlijke van de 
menselijke conditie vertegenwoordigt maar anderzijds zich zodanig in de moderniteit heeft 
uitgebreid dat de techniek ernaar neigt de mens in zijn existentiële essentie te ontkennen. 
Het derde deel van Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt hoe deze paradox niet alleen invloed heeft gehad 
op conservatieve denkstromingen,  maar ook op de progressieve denkstromingen over 
technologie - in het bijzonder op het denken van de “Frankfurter Schule” – dat grote invloed 
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heeft gehad op het linkse maatschappijkritisch denken. De  invloed van deze paradox – zo 
wordt betoogd - heeft het revolutionaire potentieel van de praxis filosofie, die de Frankfurter 
Schule als neo-marxistische stroming juist ontwikkeld zou moeten hebben, aangetast.  
Het vierde deel bespreekt hoe Andrew Feenberg's denken heeft geleid tot een filosofische 
visie op de techniek die in staat is om Marx praxis concept te rehabiliteren en een mogelijke 
uitweg biedt uit de impasse om te moeten kiezen tussen twee onbevredigende visies op 
technologieontwikkeling: het determinisme van de essentialistische techniekfilosofie en het 
onvoldoende kritisch potentieel van het constructivisme. Het constructivisme erkent dat de 
samenleving een fundamentele rol speelt in het bepalen van het wezen van de techniek maar 
heeft een beperkte visie op maatschappelijk conflicten die bemiddeld worden door  
wetenschap, technologie en technische expertise. Door op een scherpzinnige wijze het anti-
essentialisme van het constructivisme te combineren met de sociaal-politieke analyses van de  
dynamiek van machtsverhoudingen en het klassenconflict door de Frankfurter Schule, is 
Feenberg erin geslaagd de rol van de menselijke ervaring en van de praxis in het technisch 
handelen te rehabiliteren. Deze rehabilitatie is gericht op de ondersteuning van veranderende 
technologische ontwikkelingen in de richting van een democratische rationalisering en een 
grotere participatie van onderaf  (bottom-up).  
 
Tot slot introduceert het vijfde deel van Hoofdstuk 2 het nieuwe theoretisch perspectief van 
het kritisch pragmatisme dat erop gericht is een nieuw materialistische filosofische oriëntatie 
te stimuleren die voortkomt uit een vruchtbaar (zij het moeilijke) ontmoeting tussen de anti-
essentialistische stroming van kritische theorie en de pragmatische filosofie. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de mogelijkheden voor een bio-antropologische fundering die het 
belang van ervaring in de menselijke cultuur kunnen verklaren en rechtvaardigen, en geeft een  
overzicht van het hedendaagse epistemologische paradigma dat in staat lijkt te zijn om een 
dergelijke bio-antropologische fundering in de levenswetenschappen te vestigen. Het 
voorgestelde moderne epistemologische paradigma is dat van de epigenetica en haar 
conceptualisering van het organisme; een conceptualisering dat het sociaal-antropologisch 
idee van de mens als een  “zijn-in-de-wereld” wetenschappelijk ondersteunt; als een 
doelbewust ageren op haar omringende (fysieke en sociale) omgeving vanuit een relatie van 
wederkerigheid.  
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In de afgelopen drie decennia vond er in de verschillende delen van de wereld een intensief 
debat plaats in de wetenschap en samenleving omtrent de ontwikkeling en impact van 
genetica en genomics. Dit debat had belangrijke wetenschappelijke, filosofische, economische 
en symbolische implicaties. De algemene veronderstelling van het derde hoofdstuk is dat dit 
debat - ondanks de aanwezigheid van vele actoren en instellingen (wetenschappers, politici, 
kerken, bio-ethici, etc.) die vanuit verschillende en (vaak tegengestelde) standpunten aan dit 
debat deelnamen  – toch plaatsvond binnen één hegemoniaal wetenschappelijke en cultureel 
kader dat zich baseerde op specifieke conceptuele interpretaties van het leven. Interpretaties 
die een kritisch reflectie noodzakelijk maken. In dit hoofdstuk vindt deze kritisch reflectie 
plaats op de basale epistemologische pijlers van dit hegemoniale gen-centrische paradigma én 
wordt gewezen op de opkomst van een nieuwe wetenschappelijke en epistemologische 
verandering die het gen-centrische paradigma in een ernstige crisis brengt. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 reflecteert op de opkomst van moderne technologie en richt zich op de vraag óf 
de moderne technologie echt de relatie tussen lichamelijke ervaring en materiële 
werkelijkheid beëindigd heeft óf dat er toch nog steeds een innovatieve en deskundige 
ambachtelijke ervaring bestaat in de context van de hedendaagse technologische 
ontwikkelingen. Dit hoofdstuk vertegenwoordigt aldus een sociaal-antropologische 
benadering ten opzichte van het in dit proefschrift behandelde thema en doet dit door twee 
verschillende theoretische bijdragen of perspectieven uit te werken.  
 
Allereerst wordt het perspectief van het “ecologisch beginsel” toegelicht zoals dat door het 
werk van de Britse antropoloog Tim Ingold wordt ondersteund. Volgens het “ecologische” 
beginsel is het nooit één enkel orgaan (zoals de hand) dat de bevoorrechte plaats van 
technische vaardigheden vertegenwoordigt, daar deze vaardigheden eerder in algemene zin 
zijn ingebed in “techniciteit”, namelijk in de specifieke onderlinge afstemming van 
lichamelijkheid, situationele context, materialen en gebruikte gereedschappen. Gesteund door 
theoretische bijdragen vanuit een pragmatische en fenomenologische invalshoek wordt een 
tweede perspectief uitgewerkt. Daarin wordt aangetoond dat een vermindering van de 
manuele dimensies in het werk (waarvan hun afschaffing als hoogst onwaarschijnlijk wordt 
gezien) niet noodzakelijk een volledige terugtrekking impliceert van de innovatieve eigenheid 
en singulariteit van de technische handeling die bewaard blijft in de menselijke ervaring. 
Vandaar dat de ontwikkeling van mechanische, elektronische – inclusief recentelijk - de 
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digitale technologieën niet heeft geleid tot een beëindiging van creatieve ambachtelijke 
vaardigheden,  zoals dat in vele pessimistische profetieën is voorspeld. 
 
De redenering die hier ontwikkeld wordt beoogt duidelijk te maken dat als “techniciteit” niet 
meer geassocieerd wordt met éen orgaan (bijv. de hand) - als zijnde de bevoorrechte plaats 
van waar de technische vaardigheden zich voltrekt (omdat deze vaardigheden juist verbonden 
zijn met de afstemming van het gehele lichaam op de omringende omgeving) - dan kan ook 
de opkomst van moderne technologieën deze wederkerige relatie van het lichaam met de 
(nieuwe) omgeving niet negeren. Ook wordt het onmogelijk om die technische vaardigheden 
dan uitsluitend te verplaatsen naar een technologisch ontwerp met een set van regels en 
gedefinieerde algoritmen. De gebruiker van nieuwe technologieën is en zal altijd een fysieke 
eenheid (a body) zijn die vanuit een context opereert. Bovendien wordt met behulp van 
inzichten van Richard Sennett benadrukt dat door de opkomst van nieuwe (digitale) 
technieken een opening kan ontstaan voor interessante potentiële marges van waaruit een 
dynamische koppeling tussen operator, gereedschap en fysiek en sociale omgeving hersteld 
kan worden. Een koppeling die in het huidige digitale tijdperk gekenmerkt wordt door  
vingeroefeningen op het toetsenbord maar waarbij die koppeling toch niet primair verwijst 
naar deze manuele en lichamelijke dimensies (hoewel die wel opgewaardeerd kunnen 
worden) maar eerder naar de intellectuele en sociaal-relationele dimensies van de handeling. 
De consequentie van dit betoog is dat er momenteel (minstens potentieel) relevante 
theoretische en praktische marges zijn rondom het hegemoniale technologisch ontwerp van 
waaruit experimenteel en ambachtelijk technisch handelen opnieuw bedacht en 
geïmplementeerd kan worden.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert een concrete casus, van waaruit het mogelijk is om deze 
manoeuvreerruimte  waar te nemen en te ontwikkelen, en het belang te herkennen van de 
menselijke ervaring en van sociale vaardigheden in het moderne technisch handelen, zoals 
betoogd in de voorafgaande hoofdstukken. De relevante literatuur voor dit hoofdstuk verwijst 
meer naar een sociaal-politieke analyse, omdat de herontdekking van het belang van 
vaardigheden en ervaringen binnen technologische innovatieprocessen ons onvermijdelijk 
dwingen na te denken over participatie en de vraag te stellen of deze vaardigheden en 
praktijken uiting geven aan de mogelijkheid technologieontwikkelingen te democratiseren. In 
het bijzonder wordt aandacht besteed aan een bepaalde technologische praktijk, die van open 
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source, en wordt nagegaan of die praktijk in potentie de mogelijkheid biedt de weg vrij te 
maken naar een nieuw participatief ontwikkelingsmodel van  technologie dat democratischer 
is en opener staat voor het menselijk handelen. Het hoofdstuk betoogt dat dit open source 
model in staat is een participatieve benadering te hanteren waardoor de hegemoniale 
'technische code', zoals besproken door Andrew Feenberg, veranderd kan worden in een open 
code die het mogelijk maakt creatieve processen te realiseren, inclusief een maatschappelijke 
toe-eigening van het ontwerpproces en het opnieuw uitvinden van technologieën die al in 
gebruik zijn.  
 
Dit hoofdstuk probeert de principes van de participatieve toe-eigening toe te passen op de 
emblematische en controversiële casus van de biotechnologie ontwikkeling. In het bijzonder 
wordt erop gewezen dat er manoeuvreerruimte bestaat niet alleen om zich ambachtelijke 
praktijken te kunnen voorstellen maar ook om deze daadwerkelijk tot stand te brengen. 
Betoogd wordt dat het mogelijk is om praktijken te ontwikkelen die erop gericht zijn 
technologie te re-contextualiseren en vanuit specifieke sociale relaties te ontwikkelen. Het 
betreft praktijken die gericht zijn op de “empowerment” van gemeenschappen en op een 
participatief en gedeeld herstel van een ex-ante technologische productie, i.e. gericht op het 
ondersteunen van een democratischer en endogener ontwikkeling die in potentie het 
vermogen heeft om technologische innovatie te koppelen aan doelstellingen van sociale 
duurzaamheid en reductie van ongelijkheden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 sluit het proefschrift af door de opbouw en belangrijkste thema’s van het 
proefschrift weer te geven en de conceptuele resultaten samen te vatten in een semantisch 
kaart. De toegevoegde waarde van deze kaart ligt in haar visuele presentatie van de 
semantische verbanden tussen alle in het proefschrift ontwikkelde thema’s. Ten tweede 
beoogt het hoofdstuk ook de relatie van dit proefschrift te schetsen met de algemene discussie 
over democratisering van technologieontwikkeling, gerelateerd aan de opkomst van open 
source en formuleert daarover vragen die voorstellen bevatten voor toekomstige mogelijke 
onderzoekstrajecten. Het richt zich daarbij op mogelijkheden om ambachtelijke vaardigheden 
als nieuwe democratische vormen van participatieve praktijken in te zetten in de ontwikkeling 
van technologieën die vanuit een gemeenschapsperspectief worden ingezet. Deze vragen 
hebben betrekking op en reflecteren over antropologische, sociologische, filosofische, 
politieke en ethische onderwerpen zoals reciprociteit, technische creativiteit, zelf-exploitatie, 
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technologisch elitarisme, doe-ocratie, mutualisme, open-source syndicalisme, en 
reconfiguratie van ethisch bestuur. Tenslotte worden al deze mogelijke onderzoeksrichtingen 
over de democratische implicaties van nieuwe ambachtelijke vaardigheden in open  source 
praktijken samengevat in een tabel waarmee het proefschrift wordt afgesloten. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
